Editing Zbigniew Brzezinski (section)

====="Afghan Trap" theory=====
Following the [[September 11 attacks]], a theory that Brzezinski intentionally provoked the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was widely repeated.<ref>See, for example, {{cite journal|url=https://monthlyreview.org/2022/04/01/mr-073-11-2022-04_0/|title=NOTES FROM THE EDITORS|journal=[[Monthly Review]]|volume=73|issue=11|date=April 2022|accessdate=2022-10-04|quote=Brzezinski&nbsp;... had laid the trap for the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was under Brzezinski's direction, following a secret directive signed by Carter in July 1979, that the CIA, working together with the arc of political Islam stretching from Muhammad Zia-ul Haq's Pakistan to the Saudi royals, recruited, armed, and trained the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. The CIA's buildup of the Mujahideen and various terrorist groups in Afghanistan precipitated the Soviet intervention, leading to an endless war that contributed to the destabilization of the Soviet Union itself. To queries as to whether he regretted establishing the arc of terrorism that was to lead to 9/11 and beyond, Brzezinski (who posed in photos with Mujahideen fighters) responded by simply saying that the destruction of the Soviet Union was worth it.}}</ref> Some adherents of this theory thus blamed Brzezinski (and the Carter administration) for events subsequent to the Soviet invasion, including the decades-long [[Afghanistan conflict (1978–present)]], the [[September 11 attacks]], and the 2016 [[Orlando nightclub shooting]]. A 2020 review of declassified U.S. documents by Conor Tobin in the journal ''[[Diplomatic History (journal)|Diplomatic History]]'' contends that this theory—referred to as the "Afghan Trap" theory by the author—is a misrepresentation of the historical record based almost entirely on a  "caricature" of Brzezinski as an anti-communist fanatic, a disputed statement attributed to Brzezinski by a ''[[L'Obs|Le Nouvel Observateur]]'' journalist in 1998 (which was "repeatedly den[ied]" by Brzezinski himself), "and the circumstantial fact that U.S. support antedated the invasion."<ref name="Tobin 2020"/> In addition to Tobin, several academic or journalistic sources have questioned the veracity of aspects of the "Afghan Trap" theory,<ref name="Coll 2004"/><ref name="NSarchive 2019"/><ref name="Vaïsse 2018"/><ref name="Leake 2022"/> as have at least two former high-ranking Carter administration officials.<ref name="Tobin 2020"/>

While it is true that the March [[1979 Herat uprising]] in Afghanistan and a desire to rebuild [[Pakistan–United States relations|strained U.S. relations]] with Pakistani leader [[Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq]] in light of the [[Iranian Revolution]] prompted Carter to sign presidential findings in July 1979 permitting the CIA to spend $695,000 on non-military assistance (e.g., "cash, medical equipment, and radio transmitters") to [[Afghan mujahideen]] insurgents (and on a propaganda campaign targeting the Soviet-backed leadership of the [[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]] or DRA), internal deliberations show that "U.S. policies were almost wholly reactive&nbsp;... to the Soviets' escalating military presence" with policymakers rejecting "a ''substantial'' covert aid program" (including lethal provisions) "to avoid provoking Moscow." (The Soviet military and political presence in Afghanistan steadily increased throughout 1979, including "tens of millions of dollars in military aid provided by Moscow to the DRA.")<ref name="Tobin 2020"/>

According to Tobin, Brzezinski went to considerable lengths to dissuade the Soviets from invading Afghanistan, urging the Carter administration to publicize information regarding the growing Soviet military role in Afghanistan's nascent civil war and to explicitly warn the Soviets of severe sanctions in the event of an invasion; when his warnings were watered-down by the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] under the leadership of Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]], Brzezinski leaked information to a journalist, resulting in an August 1979 article in ''[[The New York Times]]'' headlined "U.S. Is Indirectly Pressing Russians to Halt Afghanistan Intervention." (Ironically, Soviet general [[Valentin Varennikov]] complained in 1995 that American officials had never made Afghanistan's strategic significance clear to their Soviet counterparts prior to December 1979, speculating—in line with the "Afghan Trap" theory—that this omission may have been deliberate as the U.S. "had an interest in us getting stuck in Afghanistan, and paying the greatest possible price for that.")<ref name="Tobin 2020"/> Furthermore, Brzezinski attempted to discretely negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet troops with [[List of ambassadors of Russia to the United States|Soviet ambassador]] [[Anatoly Dobrynin]] during 1980, privately conceding that the country would likely remain within the Soviet sphere of influence following a diplomatic settlement, as he had little confidence in the mujahideen's ability to inflict a military defeat on the Red Army.<ref name="Tobin 2020"/><ref name="Vaïsse 2018"/>

Carter administration officials [[Robert Gates]] and Vice President [[Walter Mondale]] criticized the "Afghan Trap" theory between 2010 and 2012, the former stating that it had "no basis in fact" and the latter calling it "a huge, unwarranted leap".<ref name="Tobin 2020"/> Tobin concludes: "The small-scale covert program that developed ''in response'' to the increasing Soviet influence was part of a contingency plan ''if'' the Soviets did intervene militarily, as Washington would be in a better position to make it difficult for them to consolidate their position, but not designed to induce an intervention."<ref name="Tobin 2020">{{cite journal|last=Tobin|first=Conor|title=The Myth of the "Afghan Trap": Zbigniew Brzezinski and Afghanistan, 1978–1979|journal=[[Diplomatic History (journal)|Diplomatic History]]|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|volume=44|issue=2|date=April 2020|pages=237–264|doi=10.1093/dh/dhz065|doi-access=free}}</ref> Historian Robert Rakove wrote, the notion of a U.S. effort to entrap the Soviet Union in Afghanistan has been "methodically and effectively refuted by Conor Tobin".<ref>{{cite book |last=Rakove |first=Robert B. |date=2023 |title=Days of Opportunity: The United States and Afghanistan Before the Soviet Invasion |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jaaoEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1592 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-55842-6 |page=5}}</ref> [[Steve Coll]] had previously stated in 2004 that "[c]ontemporary memos—particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion—make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried the Soviets would prevail.&nbsp;... Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism."<ref name="Coll 2004">{{cite book|author-link=Steve Coll|last=Coll|first=Steve|title=[[Ghost Wars|Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001]]|publisher=[[Penguin Group]]|year=2004|isbn=9781594200076|page=593}} cf. {{cite web|author-link=Zbigniew Brzezinski|last=Brzezinski|first=Zbigniew|url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB396/docs/1979-12-26%20Brzezinski%20to%20Carter%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf|title=Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan|date=26 December 1979|access-date=30 April 2022}}</ref> Coll's "specific debunking of the Brzezinski ''Nouvel Observateur'' interview" was cited by the [[National Security Archive]] in 2019.<ref name="NSarchive 2019">{{cite web|last1=Blanton|first1=Tom|last2=Savranskaya|first2=Svetlana|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/afghanistan-russia-programs/2019-01-29/soviet-invasion-afghanistan-1979-not-trumps-terrorists-nor-zbigs-warm-water-ports|title=The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979: Not Trump's Terrorists, Nor Zbig's Warm Water Ports|publisher=[[National Security Archive]]|date=2019-01-29|accessdate=2022-10-04}}</ref> In 2016, [[Justin Vaïsse]] referred to "[t]he thesis according to which a trap was set having been dismissed" as "[s]uch a position would not be compatible with the archives".<ref name="Vaïsse 2018">{{cite book|author-link=Justin Vaïsse|last=Vaïsse|first=Justin|translator=Catherine Porter|chapter=In the White House|title=Zbigniew Brzezinski: America's Grand Strategist|publisher=[[Harvard University Press]]|year=2018|isbn=9780674919488|pages=307–311}} (First published in 2016 as ''Zbigniew Brzezinski: Stratège de l’empire'' in French.)</ref> Elisabeth Leake, writing in 2022, agreed that "the original provision was certainly inadequate to force a Soviet armed intervention. Instead it adhered to broader US practices of providing limited covert support to anti-communist forces worldwide."<ref name="Leake 2022">{{cite book|last=Leake|first=Elisabeth|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DiFnEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA178|title=Afghan Crucible: The Soviet Invasion and the Making of Modern Afghanistan|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|year=2022|isbn=9780198846017|page=178}}</ref>