Editing Vagueness (section)

=== Epistemicist view ===
{{main|Epistemicism}}
A fourth approach, known as "the [[epistemicist]] view", has been defended by [[Timothy Williamson]] (1994),<ref>Williamson, T. 1994. ''Vagueness'' London: Routledge.</ref> [[Roy Sorensen|R. A. Sorensen]] (1988)<ref>Sorensen, R.A. 1988. ''Blindspots''. Oxford: Clarendon Press.</ref> and (2001),<ref>{{cite book| author=Sorensen, Roy| title=Vagueness and Contradiction| year=2001| publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref> and [[Nicholas Rescher]] (2009).<ref>[[Nicholas Rescher|Rescher, N.]] 2009. ''Unknowability''. Lexington Books. <br /> Uses [[vagrant predicate]]s to elucidate the problem.</ref> They maintain that vague predicates do, in fact, draw sharp boundaries, but that one cannot know where these boundaries lie. One's confusion about whether some vague word does or does not apply in a borderline case is due to one's ignorance. For example, in the epistemicist view, there is a fact of the matter, for every person, about whether that person is old or not old; some people are ignorant of this fact.