Editing Thurgood Marshall (section)

=== Criminal procedure and capital punishment ===
Marshall supported the Warren Court's constitutional decisions on criminal law, and he wrote the opinion of the Court in ''[[Benton v. Maryland]]'', which held that the Constitution's prohibition of double jeopardy applied to the states.<ref name="Tushnet-2006" />{{Rp|page=337}} After the retirements of Warren and Justice [[Hugo Black]], however, "Marshall was continually shocked at the refusal" of the Burger and [[Rehnquist Court]]s "to hold police and those involved in the criminal justice system responsible for acting according to the language and the spirit of fundamental procedural guarantees", according to Ball.<ref name="Ball-1998" />{{Rp|page=286}} He favored a strict interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement and opposed rulings that made exceptions to that provision;<ref name="Ogletree-1989">{{Cite journal |last=Ogletree |first=Charles J. |author-link=Charles Ogletree |date=1989 |title=Justice Marshall's Criminal Justice Jurisprudence: 'The Right Thing to Do, the Right Time to Do It, the Right Man and the Right Place' |url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/hblj6&id=117&div=&collection= |journal=Harvard Blackletter Journal |volume=6 |pages=111–130}}</ref>{{Rp|page=112}} in ''[[United States v. Ross]]'', for instance, he indignantly dissented when the Court upheld a conviction that was based on evidence discovered during a warrantless search of containers that had been found in an automobile.<ref name="Ball-1998" />{{Rp|pages=291–292}} Marshall felt strongly that the [[Miranda warning|''Miranda'' doctrine]] should be expanded and fully enforced.<ref name="Ogletree-1989" />{{Rp|page=112}} In cases involving the [[Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Sixth Amendment]], he argued that defendants must have competent attorneys; dissenting in ''[[Strickland v. Washington]]'', Marshall (parting ways with Brennan) rejected the majority's conclusion that defendants must prove prejudice in [[ineffective assistance of counsel]] cases.<ref name="Tushnet-1997" />{{Rp|pages=187–188}}<ref name="Ogletree-1989" />{{Rp|page=112}}

Marshall fervently opposed [[Capital punishment in the United States|capital punishment]] throughout his time on the Court, arguing that it was [[Cruel and unusual punishment|cruel and unusual]] and therefore unconstitutional under the [[Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Eighth Amendment]].<ref name="Davis-1992" />{{Rp|page=318}} He was the only justice with considerable experience defending those charged with capital crimes, and he expressed concern about the fact that injustices in death-penalty cases could not be remedied, often commenting: "Death is so lasting."<ref name="Tushnet-1997a" />{{Rp|pages=1514–1515}} In ''[[Furman v. Georgia]]'', a case in which the Court struck down the capital-punishment statutes that were in force at the time, Marshall wrote that the death penalty was "morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their history" and that it "falls upon the poor, the ignorant, and the underprivileged members of society".<ref name="Tushnet-1997a" />{{Rp|page=1515}} When the Court in ''[[Gregg v. Georgia]]'' upheld new death-penalty laws that required juries to consider [[Aggravation (law)|aggravating]] and [[Mitigating factor|mitigating circumstances]], he dissented, describing capital punishment as a "vestigial savagery" that was immoral and violative of the Eighth Amendment.<ref name="Ball-1998" />{{Rp|page=305}} Afterwards, Marshall and Brennan dissented in every instance in which the Court declined to review a death sentence, filing more than 1,400 dissents that read: "Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, we would grant [[certiorari]] and vacate the death sentence in this case."<ref name="Tushnet-1997" />{{Rp|page=175}}