Editing Thought (section)

===Behaviorism===
According to [[behaviorism]], thinking consists in behavioral dispositions to engage in certain publicly observable behavior as a reaction to particular external stimuli.<ref name="RescorlaComputationalism"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lazzeri |first1=Filipe |title=O que é Behaviorismo sobre a mente? |journal=Principia|date=2019-08-16 |volume=23 |issue=2 |pages=249–277 |doi=10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p249 |s2cid=212888121 |language=pt |issn=1808-1711|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Graham">{{cite web |last1=Graham |first1=George |title=Behaviorism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 May 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> On this view, having a particular thought is the same as having a disposition to behave in a certain way. This view is often motivated by empirical considerations: it is very difficult to study thinking as a private mental process but it is much easier to study how organisms react to a certain situation with a given behavior.<ref name="Graham"/> In this sense, the capacity to solve problems not through existing habits but through creative new approaches is particularly relevant.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Audet |first1=Jean-Nicolas |last2=Lefebvre |first2=Louis |title=What's flexible in behavioral flexibility? |journal=Behavioral Ecology |date=18 February 2017 |volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=943–947 |doi=10.1093/beheco/arx007 |url=https://academic.oup.com/beheco/article/28/4/943/3003315 |issn=1045-2249|doi-access=free }}</ref> The term "behaviorism" is also sometimes used in a slightly different sense when applied to thinking to refer to a specific form of inner speech theory.<ref name="Reese">{{cite journal |last1=Reese |first1=Hayne W. |title=Thinking as the Behaviorist Views It |journal=Behavioral Development Bulletin |date=2000 |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=10–12 |doi=10.1037/h0100531 |url=https://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2014-55592-003.html |language=en}}</ref> This view focuses on the idea that the relevant inner speech is a derivative form of regular outward speech.<ref name="BritannicaThought"/> This sense overlaps with how behaviorism is understood more commonly in philosophy of mind since these inner speech acts are not observed by the researcher but merely inferred from the subject's intelligent behavior.<ref name="Reese"/> This remains true to the general behaviorist principle that behavioral evidence is required for any psychological hypothesis.<ref name="Graham"/>

One problem for behaviorism is that the same entity often behaves differently despite being in the same situation as before.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Mele |first1=Alfred R. |title=Motivation and Agency |date=2003 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMAA-2 |chapter=Introduction}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mele |first1=Alfred R. |title=Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes |journal=Philosophical Review |date=1995 |volume=104 |issue=3 |pages=387–423 |doi=10.2307/2185634 |jstor=2185634 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMEM}}</ref> This problem consists in the fact that individual thoughts or mental states usually do not correspond to one particular behavior. So thinking that the pie is tasty does not automatically lead to eating the pie, since various other mental states may still inhibit this behavior, for example, the belief that it would be impolite to do so or that the pie is poisoned.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Schwitzgebel |first1=Eric |title=Belief |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2019 |access-date=22 June 2020 |archive-date=15 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115080001/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Belief |access-date=2 April 2021 |archive-date=12 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210112065913/https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |url-status=live }}</ref>