Editing Taiwan independence movement (section)

== Legal basis for Taiwan independence ==
Taiwan independence is supported by the [[Pan-Green Coalition]] in [[Taiwan]], led by the centre-left [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP), but opposed by the Pan-Blue Coalition, led by the conservative [[Kuomintang]] (KMT). The former coalition aims to eventually achieve full sovereign independence for Taiwan. Whereas, the latter coalition aims to improve relations with the Beijing government (PRC) — which it refers to as "[[mainland China]]" — and eventually "[[Chinese unification|reunify]]" at some point.

Both factions have long been forced to precariously dance around the so-called "[[status quo]]" of Taiwan's political status. The DPP is unable to immediately declare independence due to pressure from the PRC and the KMT, whereas the KMT and PRC are unable to immediately achieve Chinese unification due to pressure from the DPP and its ''de facto'' allies (including the [[United States]], Japan, and the [[European Union]]); further, the vast majority of Taiwanese as well as the KMT oppose the mainland's proposed [[one country, two systems]] solution.<ref name="heritage.org">{{unfit|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20060316065901/http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl808.cfm U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relations in the Bush Administration]}}, [[The Heritage Foundation]] (noting the policy of President [[George W. Bush]] toward Taiwan's defense).</ref>{{Failed verification|date=February 2023|reason=The given source only highlights the specific policy of one U.S. administration and does not attest to the assertions made in this paragraph.}}

The 1895 [[Treaty of Shimonoseki]] and 1951 [[Treaty of San Francisco]] are often cited as the main bases for Taiwan independence in [[international law]],<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1950&context=ilj |title=Archived copy |access-date=23 May 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160512160757/http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1950&context=ilj |archive-date=12 May 2016 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fpri.org/docs/media/201107.delisle.taiwan.pdf|title=Microsoft Word - deLisle - Taiwan for Brookings.doc|access-date=23 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180723064358/https://www.fpri.org/docs/media/201107.delisle.taiwan.pdf|archive-date=23 July 2018|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/748/11PacRimLPolyJ063.pdf|title=Data|website=digital.law.washington.edu|access-date=11 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160208080106/http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/748/11PacRimLPolyJ063.pdf|archive-date=8 February 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> if such things as "[[self-determination]]" and the [[Montevideo Convention|Montevideo Convention (on the Rights and Duties of States)]] are to be disregarded. These two treaties are not recognized by the Beijing government and the Pan-Blue Coalition of Taiwan.

=== Undetermined status theory ===
One hypothesis as to a legal basis for an independent Taiwanese state, the [[Theory of the Undetermined Status of Taiwan|theory of the undetermined status of Taiwan]], posits that:

a) [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|Japan gained sovereignty over Taiwan]] in 1895

b) Japan lost sovereignty over Taiwan in 1951–1952 according to the [[Treaty of San Francisco]]

c) The Treaty of San Francisco does not assign Taiwan to any power

Therefore, some activists and legal scholars hold that, legally speaking, the island of Taiwan is not an integral part of the territory of the Republic of China (or any other internationally-recognized state); its status is more similar to a [[League of Nations mandate]] or [[United Nations trust territories|United Nations trust territory]] administered by (the Republic of) China pending a final decision.

==== Mainland position ====
The PRC government regards these agreements as irrelevant to the Taiwan issue, arguing that the Treaty of Shimonoseki (being an [[Unequal treaties|unequal treaty]]) has been nullified and the Treaty of San Francisco assigns Taiwan to China. It also cites the [[Potsdam Declaration]] and [[Cairo Communique]] as confirming Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan; inasmuch as the PRC is the internationally-recognized "China", it thus posits that it is the lawful sovereign power on the island. The United Nations currently recognizes Taiwan as an integral part of China (and thus, implicitly, the PRC).

=== ''Huadu'' and ''Taidu'' ===
Within the Pan-Green Coalition of Taiwan, there are two main factions, the [[Huadu (Taiwan)|''Huadu'']] and ''Taidu''. The more moderate ''Huadu'' faction, mainly located in the ruling [[Democratic Progressive Party]], posits [[Taiwan]] and its outlying islands are ''already'' a sovereign state under the name "Republic of China"'','' making a formal declaration of independence unnecessary. ''Huadu'' politics is the semi-official stance of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party under the [[Lai Ching-te]] and [[Tsai Ing-wen]] administrations. 

Conversely, the more radical ''Taidu'' faction advocates a more radical departure from the ''[[status quo]]'' by making a formal [[declaration of independence]] to create a ''de jure'' "Republic of Taiwan"; advocates for a ''de jure'' Taiwanese state can be found in smaller parties in the Pan-Green coalition, such as the [[Taiwan Statebuilding Party]] and [[Taiwan Solidarity Union]], as well as in minority elements of the ruling DPP.

The term "Taiwan independence movement" is thus somewhat imprecise inasmuch its main representative, the Democratic Progressive Party, does not support any change in the constitutional name of the Taiwanese state for the foreseeable future; they generally view the modern Republic of China as [[Four-Stage Theory of the Republic of China|synonymous with a sovereign Taiwanese state]]; the incumbent President of Taiwan, [[Lai Ching-te]] of the DPP, believes that "Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China".<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-08-14 |title=Taiwan's Election Is All About War |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-08-14/why-taiwan-s-2024-election-is-all-about-threat-of-war-with-china |access-date=2024-09-25 |work=Bloomberg.com |language=en}}</ref>

=== Kinmen and Matsu issue ===

==== Background ====
{{Main|Kinmen|Matsu Islands}}
When the government of the Republic of China (under the Kuomintang) [[Retreat of the government of the Republic of China to Taiwan|was forced to retreat]] to Formosa and the Pescadores<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm|title=Treaty of Peace with Japan|website=Taiwan Documents Project|type=This is an archive displaying the original text of the main segments of the [[Treaty of San Francisco]], including the specific phrase "Formosa and the Pescadores".|access-date=7 June 2019|quote=ch. II, art. 2, (b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20010221045459/http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm|archive-date=21 February 2001|url-status=live}}</ref> ([[Geography of Taiwan|Taiwan]] and [[Penghu]]) in 1949, several Chinese (i.e. [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|not Japanese]]) islands still remained under Kuomintang control. Because the [[Chinese Communist Party]] never gained control of the Kinmen, [[Wuqiu, Kinmen|Wuqiu]], and Matsu Islands, they are now governed by the [[Republic of China on Taiwan]]  as Kinmen County (Kinmen and Wuqiu) and Lienchiang County (Matsu) within [[Fuchien Province, Republic of China|a streamlined Fujian Province]]. The islands are often referred to collectively as Quemoy and Matsu<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2010/11/quemoy-and-matsu/|title=Quemoy and Matsu: A Historical Footnote Revisited|last=Norris|first=Robert B.|date=November 2010|website=American Diplomacy|type=This is an article discussing the usage of the phrase "Quemoy and Matsu". The phrase was widely used throughout [[Politics of the United States|American political discourse]] during the 1950s–1970s. In modern times, Quemoy is called "Kinmen".|access-date=7 June 2019|quote=Early on in the presidential debates, Kennedy was asked if the United States defense line in the Far East should include Quemoy and Matsu. Kennedy responded that these islands — just a few miles off the coast of China and more than a hundred miles from Taiwan — were strategically indefensible and were not essential to the defense of Taiwan. The Massachusetts Senator also alluded to the unsuccessful efforts by the Eisenhower Administration to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to abandon the offshore islands in order to avoid the possibility of being dragged into a major confrontation with the PRC over these two islands. Perhaps feeling the need to disagree with Kennedy, Vice President Nixon countered. Since Quemoy and Matsu were in the "area of freedom," Nixon contended that they should not be surrendered to the Communists as a matter of "principle." Theodore H. White was of the opinion that Kennedy's initial answer to the question on Quemoy and Matsu was "probably one of the sharpest and clearest responses of any question of the debates."|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190607102301/http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2010/11/quemoy-and-matsu/|archive-date=7 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> or as "[[Golden Horse Film Festival and Awards#History|Golden Horse]]".

Historically, Kinmen County ("Quemoy") and Lienchiang County ("Matsu") served as important defensive strongholds for the Kuomintang during the 1950–1970s, symbolizing the frontline of Kuomintang resistance against [[Chinese Communist Revolution|the Communist rebellion]]. They represented the last Kuomintang presence in "[[mainland China]]".<ref>{{Cite book|title=Current Notes on International Affairs|author=Department of External Affairs|date=1955|publisher=[[Department of External Affairs (1921–70)|Department of External Affairs]]|volume=26|location=[[Canberra]]|page=57|quote=In this area of tension and danger a distinction, I think, can validly be made between the position of Formosa and Pescadores, and the islands off the China coast now in Nationalist hands; the latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, Formosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for fifty years prior to 1945 and had had a checkered history before that are not.|author-link=Department of External Affairs (1921–70)}}</ref> The islands received immense coverage from Western (especially United States) media during the [[First Taiwan Strait Crisis]] of 1954–1955 and the [[Second Taiwan Strait Crisis]] of 1958. They were very significant in the context of the [[Cold War]], a period from 1946 until 1991 of geopolitical tension between the [[Soviet Union]] (and [[Eastern Bloc|its allies]]) and the United States (and [[Western Bloc|its allies]]).

Ever since the transition into [[Multi-party system|multi-party politics]] (i.e. "[[Politics of the Republic of China#Republic of China on Taiwan since 1949|Democratization]]") during the 1990s, Kinmen and Lienchiang counties have now essentially developed into two electorates that can be contested through democratic elections. Currently the two electorates are "strongholds" for the Kuomintang<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://international.thenewslens.com/article/72871|title=On the Front Lines of Taiwan's History in Kinmen|author=American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan|date=7 July 2017|website=The News Lens International Edition|language=en|type=This article discusses the history of Kuomintang influence in Kinmen and Matsu and the absence of Taiwan independence sentiments.|access-date=2 June 2019|quote=Further, Kinmen differs from Taiwan in its consistently close ties with the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT). Indeed, Kinmen is one of the few locations in ROC territory that the DPP has never controlled. The reason can be traced to the late 1940s, when some Taiwanese began to view the KMT as unwelcome occupiers. That view never took hold in Kinmen, Weng notes. During the Cold War, "the military was here on the front lines protecting people from the enemy – Communist China," he says. Since soldiers were numerous, "they made important contributions to the local economy too. Their presence created many business opportunities." Critically, Kinmen did not experience the 2–28 Incident, an uprising against Nationalist rule in Taiwan that began on February 28, 1947. Government troops brutally suppressed the rebellion; the death toll is generally estimated at 18,000- 28,000. To this day, opponents of the KMT in Taiwan trace their antipathy toward the party to the 2–28 Incident and the subsequent White Terror.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190602171323/https://international.thenewslens.com/article/72871|archive-date=2 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> due mainly to popular opinion within the electorates, rather than brute control (as in the past). The two electorates have recently developed close relations with the mainland, which lies only around 2–9&nbsp;km west from the islands, whereas Taiwan lies around 166–189&nbsp;km east from the islands.

==== Significance of Quemoy and Matsu ====
Quemoy and Matsu are unique and important for several reasons.
* The islands straddle the southeastern coastline of mainland China, only a few kilometers away from mainland China's [[Fujian|Fujian Province]].
* The islands are geographically defined as being part of mainland China rather than Taiwan (aka "Formosa and the Pescadores").
* The islands are defined as comprising the [[Rump state|truncated]], [[Fujian Provincial Government#Government structure|streamlined]] Fujian Province (officially [[Fuchien Province, Republic of China|"Fuchien Province"]]) of the ROC on Taiwan.

==== Quemoy and Matsu in Cross-Strait relations ====
Reportedly, the local government of Kinmen County supports stronger business and cultural ties with mainland China, similarly to the Kuomintang, and views itself as an important [[Wikt: proxy#English|proxy]] (representative) or [[Wikt: nexus#English|nexus]] (focal point) for improving [[Cross-Strait relations]] (that is, in the favour of [[Chinese Unification|Chinese unification]]). In January 2001, direct travel between Kinmen County (and Lienchiang County) and mainland China re-opened under the "mini [[Three Links]]".<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Headline/201103/t20110316_1787640.htm|title=Backgrounder: Milestones in cross-Straits relations over 30 years|website=Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714173713/http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Headline/201103/t20110316_1787640.htm|archive-date=14 July 2014|url-status=live}}</ref> As of 2015, Kinmen has plans to become a "[[Special economic zones of China|special economic zone]]" in which free trade and free investment would be allowed between it and the neighbouring mainland SEZ of [[Xiamen]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china/china-turns-firepower-to-soft-power-to-try-to-win-tiny-taiwan-held-island-idUSKCN0S12L320151007|title=China turns firepower to soft power to try to win tiny Taiwan-held island|last1=Lee|first1=Yimou|last2=Hung|first2=Faith|date=8 October 2015|website=Reuters|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190606034556/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china/china-turns-firepower-to-soft-power-to-try-to-win-tiny-taiwan-held-island-idUSKCN0S12L320151007|archive-date=6 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> This might be accomplished in part by building a huge bridge connecting Kinmen to Xiamen, via the island of [[Lieyu|Lesser Kinmen (Lieyu)]];<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.vagabondjourney.com/bridge-between-kinmen-islands-and-mainland-china-xiamen/|title="Bridging" the Gap between Mainland China and Taiwan|last=Shepard|first=Wade|date=7 November 2014|website=Vagabond Journey|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190606034542/https://www.vagabondjourney.com/bridge-between-kinmen-islands-and-mainland-china-xiamen/|archive-date=6 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> A bridge [[Kinmen Bridge|has since been constructed]] between Greater Kinmen and Lesser Kinmen.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/07/17/2003696837|title=Pier foundation laid for Kinmen Bridge|last=Shan|first=Shelley|date=17 July 2018|website=Taipei Times|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190606034544/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/07/17/2003696837|archive-date=6 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> Additionally, Kinmen has plans to become a "university island".<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=971|title=Chinese Students Set to Invade Kinmen|last1=Ma|first1=Yueh-lin|last2=Wu|first2=Ting-feng|date=20 August 2010|newspaper=Commonwealth Magazine|last3=Chen|first3=Yi-Shan|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171124225507/http://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=971|archive-date=24 November 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> In 2010, "National Kinmen Institute of Technology" was upgraded to "[[National Quemoy University]]".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://free-apply.com/university/1015800120|title=National Quemoy University|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190606034543/https://free-apply.com/university/1015800120|archive-date=6 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> Kinmen County plans to establish several branches of mainland Chinese universities in Kinmen, and has bargained with the central Taiwanese (ROC) government so that universities in Kinmen don't have to be bounded by the same quotas as other Taiwanese universities in terms of admitting mainland Chinese students. In 2018, the local government of Kinmen County unveiled a new undersea pipeline linking Kinmen to mainland China, through which drinking-water can be imported.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-starts-supplying-fresh-water-to-taiwanese-county|title=China starts supplying fresh water to Taiwanese county|last=hermes|date=6 August 2018|website=The Straits Times|language=en|access-date=2 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190602161927/https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-starts-supplying-fresh-water-to-taiwanese-county|archive-date=2 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> This business deal caused controversy in Taiwan and resulted in a "stand-off" between Kinmen County and the [[Mainland Affairs Council|Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan (ROC)]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/controversial-chinese-fresh-water-pipeline-starts-supply-to-taiwanese-island/50000262-3711602|title=Controversial Chinese fresh water pipeline starts supply to Taiwanese island|date=5 August 2018|website=EFE (China Taiwan, English)|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190421064137/https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/controversial-chinese-fresh-water-pipeline-starts-supply-to-taiwanese-island/50000262-3711602|archive-date=21 April 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

==== Quemoy and Matsu as part of Taiwan ====
{{Unreferenced section|date=December 2022}}
Within Taiwan, one camp{{who|date=March 2021}} believes that Kinmen County (Quemoy) and Lienchiang County (Matsu) should be abandoned from a potential independent and sovereign Taiwanese state. This view aligns with the aforementioned treaties and acts that do not define Kinmen and Matsu as being part of Taiwan. This same camp also believes that the PRC has only "allowed" the ROC to continue controlling Kinmen and Matsu in order to "tether" Taiwan to mainland China. The fact that the PRC propagandizes Kinmen and Matsu is evidence that this is true to at least a certain degree. In a hypothetical scenario where Kinmen and Matsu are abandoned by the Taiwanese state, they would likely be "ceded" to the People's Republic of China via a peace treaty, officially ending the Chinese Civil War.

Also within Taiwan, a second camp{{who|date=May 2021}} believes that Quemoy and Matsu belong to Taiwan. This camp believes that the ROC and Taiwan have become one and the same. By this logic, Taiwan effectively owns all of the same territories that the ROC is said to own. Among these territories is Quemoy and Matsu. If a potential Taiwanese state were to be created, this camp believes that the new country will actually be the [[successor state]] to the ROC, rather than an entirely new country. Therefore, if Taiwan independence were to be successfully achieved, then the islands of Quemoy and Matsu would hypothetically cease to be administered as "Fujian Province", and would instead simply be classified as "satellite islands of Taiwan" (much in the same way as Penghu).

Despite the differing views of these two camps, there is a general understanding throughout Taiwan that Quemoy and Matsu are not part of the historical region of "Taiwan", due to having never been governed under the following regimes: [[Dutch Formosa]], [[Spanish Formosa]], [[Kingdom of Tungning]], [[Republic of Formosa]], and [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|Japanese Formosa]]. Additionally, Quemoy and Matsu experienced a unique history for several years as military outposts of the ROC, further separating the islands from Taiwan in terms of culture.