Editing Soviet–Afghan War (section)

=== Saur Revolution of 1978 ===
{{Main|Saur Revolution}}
The [[Marxist]] [[People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan]]'s strength grew considerably after its foundation. In 1967, the PDPA split into two rival factions, the [[Khalq]] (Masses) faction headed by [[Nur Muhammad Taraki]] and the [[Parcham]] (Flag) faction led by [[Babrak Karmal]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Barfield|first1=Thomas|title=Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics)|date=2012|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-15441-1|page=213|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fqRFCkpTdUcC}}</ref>{{sfn|Brogan|1989|pp=119–120}} Symbolic of the different backgrounds of the two factions were the fact that Taraki's father was a poor Pashtun herdsman while Karmal's father was a Tajik general in the Royal Afghan Army.{{sfn|Brogan|1989|pp=119–120}} More importantly, the radical Khalq faction believed in rapidly transforming Afghanistan, if necessary even using violence, from a [[Feudalism|feudal system]] into a Communist society, while the moderate Parcham faction favored a more gradualist and gentler approach, arguing that Afghanistan was simply not ready for Communism and would not be for some time.{{sfn|Brogan|1989|pp=119–120}} The Parcham faction favored building up the PDPA as a mass party in support of the Daoud Khan government, while the Khalq faction were organized in the Leninist style as a small, tightly organized elite group, allowing the latter to enjoy ascendancy over the former.{{sfn|Brogan|1989|pp=119–120}} In 1971, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul reported that there had been increasing leftist activity in the country, attributed to disillusionment of social and economic conditions, and the poor response from the Kingdom's leadership. It added that the PDPA was "perhaps the most disgruntled and organized of the country's leftist groups."<ref name="nsaessay">{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html|title = Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War}}</ref>

[[File:Saur Revolution stamp 1979.jpg|thumb|[[Afghan Post|Postage stamp]] from 1979 depicting the [[Arg (Kabul)|Arg]], with the text reading "The Great Saur Revolution is the fruit of the class struggle"]]
Intense opposition from factions of the PDPA was sparked by the repression imposed on them by Daoud's regime and the death of a leading PDPA member, [[Mir Akbar Khyber]].<ref>{{cite book|last=Bradsher|first=Henry S.|title=Afghanistan and the Soviet Union|location=Durham|publisher=Duke Press Policy Studies |year=1983 |pages=72–73}}</ref> The mysterious circumstances of Khyber's death sparked massive anti-Daoud demonstrations in [[Kabul]], which resulted in the arrest of several prominent PDPA leaders.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Hilali|first=A. Z.|title=The Soviet Penetration into Afghanistan and the Marxist Coup|journal=The Journal of Slavic Military Studies|volume=18|year=2005|page=709|issue=4|doi=10.1080/13518040500354984|s2cid=145101689}}</ref> On 27 April 1978, the [[Afghan Army]], which had been sympathetic to the PDPA cause, overthrew and executed Daoud along with members of his family.<ref>{{cite book|last=Garthoff|first=Raymond L.|title=Détente and Confrontation|location=Washington D.C.|publisher=The Brookings Institution|year=1994|page=986}}</ref> The Finnish scholar Raimo Väyrynen wrote about the so-called "Saur Revolution": "There is a multitude of speculations on the real nature of this coup. The reality appears to be that it was inspired first of all by domestic economic and political concerns and that the Soviet Union did not play any role in the Saur Revolution".<ref name="Väyrynen pp.93-102" /> After this the [[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]] (DRA) was formed. Nur Muhammad Taraki, General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, became Chairman of the [[Revolutionary Council (Afghanistan)|Revolutionary Council]] and [[Prime Minister of Afghanistan|Chairman of the Council of Ministers]] of the newly established Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. On 5 December 1978, a treaty of friendship was signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=N_hfPrIMYuEC|title=From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War|page=146|last=Gates|first=Robert|publisher=Simon & Schuster|isbn=978-1-4165-4336-7|date=2007}}</ref>

==== "Red Terror" of the revolutionary government ====
{{See also|Adolph Dubs|l1=Kidnapping and assassination of U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs}}
{{quote box|"We only need one million people to make the revolution. It doesn't matter what happens to the rest. We need the land, not the people."
| source = — Announcement from [[Khalq]]ist radio-broadcast after the [[Saur Revolution|1978 April coup]]  in Afghanistan<ref>{{Cite book|last=Klass|first=Rosanne|chapter=4: Genocide in Afghanistan 1978–1992| year=2017| title=The Widening Circle of Genocide: Genocide – A Critical Bibliographic Review Volume 3 |editor-last=W. Charny|editor-first=Israel |publisher=Routledge|location=New York |isbn= 978-1-56000-172-0 |lccn= 93-46257| page=132 }}</ref>
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After the revolution, Taraki assumed the leadership, prime ministership and general secretaryship of the PDPA. As before in the party, the government never referred to itself as "[[communist]]".<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2015/PSA%202015%20-%20Paper%20-%20Darren%20Atkinson%20-%20Otago.pdf |title=From Communism to Nationalism? The Trajectory of "Post-Communist" Ideology in Afghanistan |last=Atkinson |first=Darren |website=psa.ac.uk |access-date=12 November 2021 }}</ref> The government was divided along factional lines, with Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister [[Hafizullah Amin]] of the Khalq faction pitted against Parcham leaders such as Babrak Karmal. Though the new regime promptly allied itself to the Soviet Union, many Soviet diplomats believed that the Khalqi plans to transform Afghanistan would provoke a rebellion from the general population, which was socially and religiously conservative.{{sfn|Brogan|1989|pp=119–120}} Immediately after coming to power, the Khalqis began to persecute the Parchamis, not the least because the Soviet Union favored the Parchami faction whose "go slow" plans were felt to be better suited for Afghanistan, thereby leading the Khalqis to eliminate their rivals so the Soviets would have no other choice but to back them.{{sfn|Brogan|1989|pp=120–121}} Within the PDPA, conflicts resulted in [[exile]]s, [[purge]]s and executions of Parcham members.<ref name="lcweb2">[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0087) ''The April 1978 Coup d'état and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan'' – Library of congress country studies](Retrieved 4 February 2007)</ref> The Khalq state executed between 10,000 and 27,000 people, mostly at [[Pul-e-Charkhi prison]], prior to the Soviet intervention.{{sfn|Kaplan|2008|p=115}}<ref name="autogenerated2006">{{cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4756480.stm |title=Kabul's prison of death |work=BBC News |date=27 February 2006}}</ref> Political scientist [[Olivier Roy (political scientist)|Olivier Roy]] estimated between 50,000 and 100,000 people disappeared during the Taraki–Amin period:<ref>{{cite book |last=Roy |first=Olivier |author-link=Olivier Roy (political scientist) |date=1990 |title=Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=m3OfC1ZRq38C&pg=PA95 |location=New York |publisher=Cambridge University Press |edition=2nd |pages=95–96 |isbn=978-0-521-39700-1}}</ref>

{{blockquote|text=There is only one leading force in the country – Hafizullah Amin. In the Politburo, everybody fears Amin.|author=PDPA Politburo member [[Nur Ahmad Nur]] to Soviet Ambassador [[Alexander Puzanov]], June 1978<ref name="nsarchive2.gwu.edu">{{cite web |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/docs_intervention_in_afghanistan_and_the_fall_of_detente/fall_of_detente_chron.pdf |title=The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Detente: A Chronology |website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu |access-date=12 November 2021 }}</ref>}}
During its first 18 months of rule, the PDPA applied a Soviet-style program of modernizing reforms, many of which were viewed by conservatives as opposing Islam.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr75/fafghan1978.htm|title=Afghanistan Marxist Coup 1978|publisher=Onwar.com|access-date=28 July 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111108112152/http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr75/fafghan1978.htm|archive-date=8 November 2011|url-status=dead}}</ref> Decrees setting forth changes in marriage customs and [[land reform]] were not received well by a population deeply immersed in tradition and Islam, particularly by the powerful landowners harmed economically by the abolition of [[usury]] (although usury is prohibited in Islam) and the cancellation of farmers' debts. The new government also enhanced women's rights, sought a rapid eradication of [[illiteracy]] and promoted Afghanistan's ethnic minorities, although these programs appear to have had an effect only in the urban areas.{{sfn|Amstutz|1994|p=315}} By mid-1978, a rebellion started, with rebels attacking the local military [[garrison]] in the [[Nuristan Province|Nuristan]] region of eastern Afghanistan and soon civil war spread throughout the country. In September 1979, Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin seized power, arresting and killing Taraki. More than two months of instability overwhelmed Amin's regime as he moved against his opponents in the PDPA and the growing rebellion.

==== Affairs with the USSR after the revolution ====
[[File:Afghan Girl Scouts 1950s.jpg|thumb|left|[[Afghanistan Scout Association]] in the 1950s]]
Even before the revolutionaries came to power, Afghanistan was "a militarily and politically neutral nation, effectively dependent on the Soviet Union."<ref name="nsaessay" /> A treaty, signed in December 1978, allowed the Democratic Republic to call upon the Soviet Union for military support.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Soviet Afghan-War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost|url=https://archive.org/details/sovietafghanwarh00gres|url-access=limited|author=The Russian General Staff|editor-first1=Lestwer W. |editor-last1=Grau |editor-first2=Michael A. |editor-last2=Gress |publisher=[[University Press of Kansas]]|page=[https://archive.org/details/sovietafghanwarh00gres/page/n38 10]|isbn=978-0-7006-1186-7|year=2002}}</ref>

{{quote box|align = right|width = 30%|quote = We believe it would be a fatal mistake to commit ground troops. [...] If our troops went in, the situation in your country would not improve. On the contrary, it would get worse. Our troops would have to struggle not only with an external aggressor, but with a significant part of your own people. And the people would never forgive such things.<br />– Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in response to Taraki's request for Soviet presence in Afghanistan<ref>{{cite book|author=Walker, Martin|title=The Cold War and the Making of the Modern World|publisher=[[HarperCollins|Fourth Estate]]|year=1993|isbn=978-1-85702-004-5 |page=253}}</ref>}}

Following the [[1979 Herat uprising|Herat uprising]], the first major sign of anti-regime resistance, General Secretary Taraki<ref>{{cite web | url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html | title=Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War }}</ref> contacted [[Alexei Kosygin]], [[Premier of the Soviet Union|chairman]] of the [[Council of Ministers (Soviet Union)|USSR Council of Ministers]] and asked for "practical and technical assistance with men and armament". Kosygin was unfavorable to the proposal on the basis of the negative political repercussions such an action would have for his country, and he rejected all further attempts by Taraki to solicit Soviet military aid in Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite book|author=Misdaq, Nabi|title=Afghanistan: Political Frailty and External Interference|publisher=[[Taylor & Francis]]|year=2006|isbn=978-0-415-70205-8 |page=134}}</ref> Following Kosygin's rejection, Taraki requested aid from [[Leonid Brezhnev]], the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] and [[List of heads of state of the Soviet Union|Soviet head of state]], who warned Taraki that full Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies – both yours and ours". Brezhnev also advised Taraki to ease up on the drastic social reforms and to seek broader support for his regime.<ref>{{cite book|author=Grigory, Paul|title=Lenin's Brain and Other Tales from the Secret Soviet Archives|publisher=[[Hoover Press]]|year=2008|isbn=978-0-8179-4812-2|page=121}}</ref>

In 1979, Taraki attended a conference of the [[Non-Aligned Movement]] in [[Havana]], Cuba. On his way back, he stopped in Moscow on 20 March and met with Brezhnev, [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Soviet Union)|Soviet Foreign Minister]] [[Andrei Gromyko]] and other Soviet officials. It was rumoured that Karmal was present at the meeting in an attempt to reconcile Taraki's Khalq faction and the Parcham against Amin and his followers. At the meeting, Taraki was successful in negotiating some Soviet support, including the redeployment of two Soviet armed divisions at the Soviet-Afghan border, the sending of 500 military and civilian advisers and specialists and the immediate delivery of Soviet armed equipment sold at 25 percent below the original price; however, the Soviets were not pleased about the developments in Afghanistan and Brezhnev impressed upon Taraki the need for party unity. Despite reaching this agreement with Taraki, the Soviets continued to be reluctant to intervene further in Afghanistan and repeatedly refused Soviet military intervention within Afghan borders during Taraki's rule as well as later during Amin's short rule.<ref>{{cite book|author=Rasanayagam, Angelo|title=Afghanistan: A Modern History|publisher=[[I.B.Tauris]]|year=2005|isbn=978-1-85043-857-1|pages=[https://archive.org/details/afghanistan00ange/page/86 86–88]|url=https://archive.org/details/afghanistan00ange/page/86}}</ref>

{{blockquote|text=[[Lenin]] taught us to be merciless towards the enemies of the revolution, and millions of people [[Red Terror|had to be eliminated]] in order to secure the victory of the [[October Revolution]].|author=Taraki's reply to the Soviet ambassador Alexander Puzanov, who asked Taraki to spare the lives of two [[Parcham]]ites sentenced to death.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://archive.org/details/TheWorldWasGoingOurWayTheKGBAndTheBattleForTheTheThirdWorld/page/n707/mode/2up?view=theater&q=lenin+taught|title = The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World}}</ref>}}

Taraki and Amin's regime even attempted to eliminate Parcham's leader Babrak Karmal. After being relieved of his duties as ambassador, he remained in [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic|Czechoslovakia]] in exile, fearing for his life if he returned as the regime requested. He and his family were protected by the Czechoslovak [[StB]]; files from January 1979 revealed information that Afghanistan sent [[KHAD|AGSA]] spies to Czechoslovakia to find and assassinate Karmal.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.rferl.org/a/that-time-an-afghan-president-(to-be)-was-secretly-hiding-in-a-czechoslovak-forest/30250494.html|title=The Afghan President (To Be) Who Lived A Secret Life In A Czechoslovak Forest|newspaper=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|date=9 December 2019 |last1=Bezhan |first1=Frud |last2=Kubalek |first2=Petr }}</ref>