Editing Slippery slope (section)

==Defining features of slippery slope arguments==
Given the disagreement over what constitutes a genuine slippery slope argument, it is to be expected that there are differences in the way they are defined. Lode says that "although all SSAs share certain features, they are a family of related arguments rather than a class of arguments whose members all share the same form."<ref name="Lode 1999" />{{rp|1476}}

Various writers<ref>{{cite journal |last=Govier |first=Trudy |title=What's wrong with slippery slope arguments? |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |volume=12 |issue=2 |date=1982 |pages=303–316 |doi=10.1080/00455091.1982.10715799 |s2cid=170107849}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Walton |first=Douglas |title=Slippery slope arguments |publisher=Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press |location=Oxford; New York |date=1992 |isbn=978-0-19-823925-3}}</ref><ref name="Lode 1999" /> have attempted to produce a general taxonomy of these different kinds of slippery slope. Other writers have given a general definition that will encompass the diversity of slippery slope arguments. [[Eugene Volokh]] says, "I think the most useful definition of a slippery slope is one that covers all situations where decision A, which you might find appealing, ends up materially increasing the probability that others will bring about decision B, which you oppose."<ref>{{cite journal |first=Eugene |last=Volokh |author-link=Eugene Volokh |title=The mechanisms of the slippery slope |volume=116 |journal=Harvard Law Review |pages=1026–1137 |date=February 2003 |url= http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/slippery.pdf |jstor=1342743 |issue=4 |doi=10.2307/1342743}}</ref>{{rp|1030}}

Those who hold that slippery slopes are causal generally give a simple definition, provide some appropriate examples and perhaps add some discussion as to the difficulty of determining whether the argument is reasonable or fallacious. Most of the more detailed analysis of slippery slopes has been done by those who hold that genuine slippery slopes are of the decisional kind.

Lode, having claimed that SSAs are not a single class of arguments whose members all share the same form, nevertheless goes on to suggest the following common features.<ref name="Lode 1999" />
{{Ordered list |list_style_type=upper-alpha
 |The series of intervening and gradual steps
 |The idea that the slope lacks a non-arbitrary stopping place
 |The idea that the practice under consideration is, in itself, unobjectionable
}}

Rizzo and Whitman identify slightly different features. They say, "Although there is no paradigm case of the slippery slope argument, there are characteristic features of all such arguments. The key components of slippery slope arguments are three:<ref name="Rizzo & Whitman 2003 p.541" />
#An initial, seemingly acceptable argument and decision;
#A "danger case"—a later argument and decision that are clearly unacceptable;
#A "process" or "mechanism" by which accepting the initial argument and making the initial decision raise the likelihood of accepting the later argument and making the later decision."

Walton notes that these three features will be common to all slippery slopes but objects that there needs to be more clarity on the nature of the 'mechanism' and a way of distinguishing between slippery slope arguments and arguments from negative consequences.<ref name="Walton 2015" />{{rp|275}}

Corner et al. say that a slippery slope has "four distinct components:
{{Ordered list |list_style_type=lower-roman
 |An initial proposal (A).
 |An undesirable outcome (C).
 |The belief that allowing (A) will lead to a re-evaluation of (C) in the future.
 |The rejection of (A) based on this belief.
}}

The alleged danger lurking on the slippery slope is the fear that a presently unacceptable proposal (C) will (by any number of psychological processes—see, e.g., {{harvnb|Volokh|2003}}) in the future be re-evaluated as acceptable."<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Corner |first1=Adam |last2=Hahn |first2=Ulrike |last3=Oaksford |first3=Mike |title=The psychological mechanism of the slippery slope argument |journal=Journal of Memory and Language |volume=64 |issue=2 |date=2011 |pages=133–152 |doi=10.1016/j.jml.2010.10.002}}</ref>

Walton adds the requirement that there must be a loss of control. He says, there are four basic components:<ref name="Walton 2016" />
{{blockquote|One is a first step, an action or policy being considered. A second is a sequence in which this action leads to other actions. A third is a so-called gray zone or area of indeterminacy along the sequence where the agent loses control. The fourth is the catastrophic outcome at the very end of the sequence. The idea is that as soon as the agent in question takes the first step he will be impelled forward through the sequence, losing control so that in the end he will reach the catastrophic outcome. Not all of these components are typically made explicit&nbsp;...."}}