Editing Score voting (section)

==Strategy==
{{See also|Tactical voting#Score voting}}
Ideal score [[strategic voting|voting strategy]] for well-informed voters is generally identical to their optimal [[approval voting]] strategy; voters will want to give their least and most favorite candidates a minimum and a maximum score, respectively. The game-theoretical analysis shows that this claim is not fully general, but holds in most cases.<ref>{{cite journal |title = Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections |journal =  Social Choice and Welfare |volume = 42|pages = 313–340  |last1 = Nunez |first1 = Matias |last2 = Laslier |first2 = Jean-François |year = 2014 |issue = 2 |doi = 10.1007/s00355-013-0728-0 |s2cid = 5738643 |url = https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00917099/file/overstateREVIEW20120928.pdf }}</ref> Another strategic voting tactic is given by the weighted mean utility theorem, maximum score for all candidates preferred compared to the expected winners weighted with winning probability and minimum score for all others.<ref>Approval Voting, Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn, 1983</ref>

Papers have found that "experimental results support the concept of bias toward unselfish outcomes in large elections." The authors observed what they termed ethical considerations dominating voter behavior as pivot probability decreased. This would imply that larger elections, or those perceived as having a wider margin of victory, would result in fewer tactical voters.<ref>{{cite journal |jstor = 27798496 |title = Moral Bias in Large Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence |journal = The American Political Science Review |volume = 103 |issue = 2 |pages = 175–192 |last1 = Feddersen |first1 = Timothy |last2 = Gailmard |first2 = Sean |last3 = Sandroni |first3 = Alvaro |year = 2009 |doi = 10.1017/S0003055409090224 |s2cid = 55173201 }}</ref>

How voters precisely grade candidates is a topic that is not fully settled, although experiments show that their behavior depends on the grade scale, its length, and the possibility to give negative grades.<ref name=":Baujardetal2014">{{Cite journal |last1 = Baujard |first1 = Antoinette |last2 = Igersheim |first2 = Herrade |last3 = Lebon |first3 = Isabelle |last4 = Gavrel |first4 = Frédéric |last5 = Laslier |first5 = Jean-François |title = How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting|journal = European Journal of Political Economy  |volume = 55 |pages = 14–28 |doi = 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.09.006 |year = 2014|url = https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01618039/file/1729.pdf }}</ref>

[[STAR voting]] (Score Then Automatic Runoff) is a variant proposed to address some concerns about strategic exaggeration in score voting. Under this system, each voter may assign a score (from 0 to the maximum) to any number of candidates. Of the two highest-scoring candidates, the winner is the one most voters ranked higher.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Equal Vote Coalition |url=http://equal.vote |access-date=2017-04-05}}</ref> The runoff step was introduced to mitigate the incentive to exaggerate ratings in ordinary score voting.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2016-12-08 |title=Score Runoff Voting: The New Voting Method that Could Save Our Democratic Process |url=https://ivn.us/2016/12/08/score-runoff-voting/ |access-date=2017-04-05 |website=IVN.us}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Strategic SRV? - Equal Vote Coalition |url=http://equal.vote/strategic_srv |access-date=2017-04-05 |work=Equal Vote Coalition}}</ref>