Editing Saul Kripke (section)

===="A Puzzle about Belief"====
{{further|disquotational theory of truth}}
In ''Naming and Necessity'', Kripke argues for [[direct reference theory]] (that the meaning of a name is simply the object it refers to). Nevertheless, he acknowledges the possibility that propositions containing names may have some additional semantic properties,<ref>Kripke, 1980, p. 20</ref> properties that could explain why two names referring to the same person may give different [[truth value]]s in propositions about beliefs. For example, Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly, although she does not believe that Clark Kent can fly. According to the [[mediated reference theory]] of names, this is explained by the fact that the names "Superman" and "Clark Kent", though referring to the same person, have distinct semantic properties.

But in his article "A Puzzle about Belief" (1988) Kripke seems to oppose even this possibility. His argument can be reconstructed as follows: The idea that two names referring to the same object may have different semantic properties is supposed to explain the fact that the intersubstitution of [[Coreference|coreferring]] names in propositions about beliefs can alter truth value (as in Lois Lane's case). But the same phenomenon occurs even without the intersubstitution of coreferring names: Kripke invites us to imagine a French, monolingual boy, Pierre, who believes the proposition expressed by "''Londres est jolie''" ("London is beautiful"). Pierre moves to London without realizing that London = Londres. He then learns English the same way a child would learn the language, that is, not by translating words from French to English. Pierre learns the name "London" from the unattractive part of the city where he lives, and so comes to believe that London is not beautiful. Pierre will now assent to the sentences "Londres est jolie" and "London is not beautiful". With only translation and disquotation, the puzzle can be generated: Pierre both believes that London is pretty and doesn't believe that London is pretty. This paradox arises without making use of intersubstitution of coreferring names. Kripke shows later in the article how this puzzle can be generated ''within a single language'', using only disquotation. The upshot of this, according to Kripke, is that intersubstitution of coreferring names cannot be blamed for the difficulty created by belief contexts. If this is right, contra proponents of mediated reference theory, the inconsistency of belief contexts involving coreferring names cannot be taken as evidence against his direct reference theory of names.