Editing SA80 (section)

===Design flaws===
Soon after being adopted for service, problems began to surface during troop trials held between 1986 and 1987. Components were found to be insufficiently robust, the LSW's bipod lock often failed to hold the bipod legs in closed position, the plastic furniture was melted by insect repellent, metal parts were quick to rust in jungle environments, and the weapon's mechanism was highly susceptible to dusty and arctic environments.{{Sfn|Grant|2016|p=49}}<ref name=IHpg158>{{cite book |last1=Hogg |first1=Ian |last2=Weeks |first2=John |title=Military Small Arms of the 20th Century|year=1991|publisher=Arms and Armour Press|location=London|isbn=978-1-854-09034-8|page=158|quote=[...] the first five years of this rifle's service have been disastrous. A number of manufacturing defects showed up in service conditions, and it was not until the closure of the RSAF at Enfield and the setting up of an entirely new production line, with new computer-controlled machine tools, at the new RSAF Nottingham, that the quality of the production weapons began to improve. It will take some time for the poor reputation gained by the initial issue weapons to be overcome; the only consolation is that the same sort of thing has happened to other military rifles in the past, and they have managed to live down their early reputation and prove their innate reliability. It is to be hoped that the L85A1 will do as well.}}</ref>

These problems were not helped by the production process. The SA80 series was produced from metal stampings. While [[Royal Small Arms Factory|RSAF Enfield]] had previous experience in manufacturing stamped-metal firearms, this was only in relation to weapons such as the [[Sten]] submachine gun that had relatively loose tolerances. The tighter tolerances required by the SA80 soon led to production delays and high wastage levels.{{citation needed|date=May 2023}} There were also issues with regard to working practices and employee attitudes at the Enfield site which were exacerbated by its closure in 1988 and resulting redundancies.{{Sfn|Grant|2016|p=74}} One worker was recorded as saying that "Having been shafted by BAE and our own management, we thought why the hell should we care if [the SA80] worked or not. All we wanted to do was see the last of the bloody things and leave."<ref name=lastenfield>{{cite book |last1=Raw |first1=Steve |title=The Last Enfield – SA80: The Reluctant Rifle|year=2003|publisher=Collector Grade Publications|location=Cobourg|isbn=978-0-889-35303-9}}</ref>

While production at the Nottingham facility was supposed to result in better-quality weapons owing to the use of newer manufacturing methods,<ref name=IHpg158/> few of the staff working there had any experience of firearms manufacture. Only 15 to 20 components were produced in-house, compared to the Enfield site's total of 230, with the rest being outsourced to subcontractors. Since the plant kept low stocks of pre-produced components, significant delays were incurred if subcontracted components were late in arriving at the Nottingham site or did not meet required tolerances.{{Sfn|Grant|2016|p=74}}

When the L85A1 and L86A1 were first sent into major combat during the [[Gulf War]], individual performance was far from adequate. The L85A1 proved unreliable in semi-automatic mode, and slightly better in fully automatic mode, while the opposite was true of the L86A1. Specific complaints included: the poor quality plastic furniture fell apart and the gun was damaged easily; the magazine release catch was easily knocked accidentally and dropped the magazine; the catch on the top cover over the gas mechanism was too weak and constantly popped open, so it had to be taped down; only 26–28 rounds could be loaded in a magazine because the springs were weak, something that was also mentioned in training manuals, at least with regard to earlier [[Colt's Manufacturing Company|Colt]]-produced magazines,<ref name=AC71374>{{cite book |title=Infantry Training Volume II, Pamphlet No. 6 The SA 80 Rifle and Light Support Weapon (LSW) (All Arms) |year=1988 |publisher=Ministry of Defence |id=AC71374}}</ref> and it had to be kept very clean and the lips checked for dents.{{sfn|Williams|2013}}

The magazine was made from aluminium and would deform if grasped too tightly. During firing, this could choke the flow of rounds and result in a jam; the LSW had a small magazine capacity for its role and overheated after 120–150 rounds fired in bursts; the weapons were difficult to strip and reassemble, with the gas plug easily jamming in place and requiring an armorer to remove; the firing pin was too narrow and would snap; the back of the trigger surface was flat which with snow or dirt accumulating behind it would prevent the trigger from pulling back all the way and firing the gun; and ergonomic issues related to the safety catch, cocking lever, and the location and stiffness of the fire selector switch.{{sfn|Williams|2013}}

During [[British military intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War|Operation Palliser]] and other intervention operations in Sierra Leone, it was discovered that the version of the safety plunger used for production weapons was made from cheap injection-moulded plastic that swelled when wet, potentially rendering weapons inoperative if they had been left on 'safe'.{{Sfn|Grant|2016|p=30}} The SA80 initially gained a poor reputation amongst British soldiers as being unreliable and fragile, a fact picked up by the UK media,<ref name="guardian2">{{citation |first=James |last=Meek |url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/oct/10/military.jamesmeek |title=Off Target |work=The Guardian |date=10 October 2002}}</ref> entertainment industry,<ref>for example the [[Bremner, Bird and Fortune]] satirical comedy documentary ''Between Iraq and a Hard Place'' included the line: "The SA80 is a lethal weapon, especially for anyone trying to fire it", similar to a description of the Vietnam War era M16.</ref> and members of the House of Lords.<ref>{{cite web|title=The Defence Estimates 1990|url=https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1990/jul/17/the-defence-estimates-1990|work=[[Hansard|Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)]]|date=17 July 1990|access-date=23 December 2014}}</ref> [[Special Air Service]] sergeant [[Chris Ryan]] regarded the SA80s as being "poor-quality, unreliable weapons at the best of times, prone to stoppages, and it seemed pretty tough to have to rely on them".<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ryan|first1=Chris|title=[[The One That Got Away (book)|The One That Got Away]]|publisher=Arrow Books|year=2011|isbn=978-0-099-55667-1|location=London|page=55}}</ref>

Immediately after the [[Gulf War]],{{efn|the British activities named [[Operation Granby]]}} the [[Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)|Ministry of Defence]] (MOD) commissioned the LANDSET Report,{{efn|officially entitled "Equipment Performance (SA80) During Operation Granby (The Gulf War)"}} into the effectiveness of the L85A1 and L86A1. This report criticised the acceptance of the weapon into service. Neither weapon had managed to pass the sand trials and both frequently jammed. The mechanism of both weapons needed to be well-lubricated as the weapon became prone to seizure if fired "dry", yet in a sandy environment the lubricated weapon became unreliable due to the lubricant attracting sand into the moving parts. The LANDSET report identified in excess of 50 faults, most notably the magazine release catch, which could easily be caught on clothing and accidentally release the magazine; the plastic safety plunger which became brittle in cold climates; and firing pins that were not up to repeated use, and prone to fracture if used in automatic fire mode.<ref name=lastenfield/>

The report concluded that "It is, however, quite clear that infantrymen did not have CONFIDENCE in their personal weapon. Most expected a stoppage in the first magazine fired. Some platoon commanders considered that casualties would have occurred due to weapon stoppages if the enemy had put up any resistance in the trench and bunker clearing operations. Even discounting the familiarisation period of desert conditions, when some may have still been using the incorrect lubrication drill, stoppages continued to occur."<ref name=lastenfield/>

The report was leaked to the press, at which point the Ministry of Defence claimed that it was fake; while it was later admitted that the report was a genuine document,{{Sfn|Grant|2016|p=28}} the MOD continued to downplay its significance, and only seven of the 50 faults identified were addressed by subsequent modifications, meaning that complaints over reliability in service continued. The MOD finally began to take the SA80 family's issues seriously in 1992, but procuring entirely new weapons was considered too expensive.{{sfn|Williams|2013}}