Editing Rhetoric (section)

===Knowledge===
[[Epistemology]] and rhetoric have been compared to one another for decades, but the specifications of their similarities have gone undefined. Since scholar [[Robert L. Scott]] stated that, "rhetoric is [[Epistemology|epistemic]],"<ref name=":8">{{Cite journal |last=Scott |first=Robert L. |date=1967 |title=On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic |journal=Central States Speech Journal |volume=18 |issue=1 |pages=9–17 |doi=10.1080/10510976709362856 |issn=0008-9575}}</ref> rhetoricians and [[Philosophy|philosophers]] alike have struggled to concretely define the expanse of implications these words hold. Those who have identified this inconsistency maintain the idea that [[Robert L. Scott|Scott's]] relation is important, but requires further study.<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last=Harpine |first=William D. |date=2004 |title=What Do You Mean, Rhetoric Is Epistemic? |journal=Philosophy and Rhetoric |volume=37 |issue=4 |pages=335–352 |doi=10.1353/par.2004.0026 |s2cid=53057130 |issn=1527-2079|url=https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=aiken_communications_facpub }}</ref>

The root of the issue lies in the ambiguous use of the term rhetoric itself, as well as the epistemological terms [[knowledge]], [[certainty]], and [[truth]].<ref name=":9" /> Though counterintuitive and vague, [[Robert L. Scott|Scott's]] claims are accepted by some academics, but are then used to draw different conclusions. [[Sonja K. Foss]], for example, takes on the view that, "rhetoric creates knowledge,"<ref>{{Cite book |title=Rhetorical criticism: exploration & practice |date=1996 |publisher=Waveland Press |isbn=978-0-88133-873-7 |editor-last=Foss |editor-first=Sonja K. |edition=2nd |location=Prospect Heights, Ill}}</ref> whereas [[James A. Herrick|James Herrick]] writes that rhetoric assists in people's ability to form [[belief]]s, which are defined as [[knowledge]] once they become widespread in a community.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Herrick |first=James A. |date=2017-09-22 |title=The History and Theory of Rhetoric |doi=10.4324/9781315404141|isbn=978-1-315-40414-1 }}</ref>

It is unclear whether [[Robert L. Scott|Scott]] holds that [[certainty]] is an inherent part of establishing [[knowledge]], his references to the term abstract.<ref name=":8" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Scott |first=Robert L. |date=February 2000 |title=The Forum |journal=Quarterly Journal of Speech |volume=86 |issue=1 |pages=108–110 |doi=10.1080/00335630009384281 |s2cid=147585248 |issn=0033-5630}}</ref> He is not the only one, as the debate's persistence in [[philosophical]] circles long predates his addition of rhetoric. There is an overwhelming majority that does support the concept of [[certainty]] as a requirement for [[knowledge]], but it is at the definition of [[certainty]] where parties begin to diverge. One definition maintains that [[certainty]] is subjective and feeling-based, the other that it is a byproduct of [[Justification (epistemology)|justification]].

The more commonly accepted definition of rhetoric claims it is synonymous with [[persuasion]]. For rhetorical purposes, this definition, like many others, is too broad. The same issue presents itself with definitions that are too narrow. Rhetoricians in support of the [[Epistemology|epistemic]] view of rhetoric have yet to agree in this regard.<ref name=":9" />

[[Philosophical]] teachings refer to [[knowledge]] as a [[justified true belief]]. However, the [[Gettier problem|Gettier Problem]] explores the room for fallacy in this concept.<ref>{{Cite book |date=2017-07-05 |title=Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? |doi=10.4324/9781912281862|isbn=978-1-912281-86-2 |url=https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01439314/file/2013%20Gettier%20Conocimiento.pdf }}</ref> Therefore, the [[Gettier problem|Gettier Problem]] impedes the effectivity of the argument of Richard A. Cherwitz and James A. Hikins,<ref name=":10">{{Cite journal |last1=Miller |first1=Susan |last2=Cherwitz |first2=Richard A. |last3=Hikins |first3=James |date=May 1987 |title=Communication and Knowledge: An Investigation in Rhetorical Epistemology |journal=College Composition and Communication |volume=38 |issue=2 |page=216 |doi=10.2307/357725 |jstor=357725 |issn=0010-096X}}</ref> who employ the [[justified true belief]] standpoint in their argument for rhetoric as [[Epistemology|epistemic]]. Celeste Condit Railsback takes a different approach,<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Railsback |first=Celeste Condit |date=November 1983 |title=Beyond rhetorical relativism: A structural-material model of truth and objective reality |journal=Quarterly Journal of Speech |volume=69 |issue=4 |pages=351–363 |doi=10.1080/00335638309383662 |issn=0033-5630}}</ref> drawing from Ray E. McKerrow's system of [[belief]] based on [[Validity (logic)|validity]] rather than [[certainty]].<ref>{{Citation |last=McKerrow |first=Ray E. |chapter=Chapter 16. Rhetorical Validity: an Analysis of three Perspectives on the Justification of Rhetorical Argument |date=1992-12-31 |title=Readings in Argumentation |pages=297–312 |publisher=DE GRUYTER |doi=10.1515/9783110885651.297 |isbn=978-3-11-013576-3}}</ref>

William D. Harpine refers to the issue of unclear definitions that occurs in the theories of "rhetoric is epistemic" in his 2004 article "What Do You Mean, Rhetoric is Epistemic?".<ref name=":9" /> In it, he focuses on uncovering the most appropriate definitions for the terms "rhetoric", "knowledge", and "certainty". According to Harpine, certainty is either objective or subjective. Although both Scotts<ref name=":8" /> and Cherwitz and Hikins<ref name=":10" /> theories deal with some form of certainty, Harpine believes that knowledge is not required to be neither objectively nor subjectively certain. In terms of "rhetoric", Harpine argues that the definition of rhetoric as "the art of persuasion" is the best choice in the context of this theoretical approach of rhetoric as epistemic. Harpine then proceeds to present two methods of approaching the idea of rhetoric as epistemic based on the definitions presented. One centers on Alston's<ref>{{Cite book |last=Alston |first=William P. |title=Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge |publisher=Cornell University Press |year=1989 |location=Ithaca, NY |pages=153–171}}</ref> view that one's beliefs are justified if formed by one's normal doxastic while the other focuses on the causal theory of knowledge.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Goldman |first=Alan H. |title=Empirical Knowledge |publisher=University of California Press |year=1988 |location=Berkeley, CA |pages=22–23}}</ref> Both approaches manage to avoid Gettier's problems and do not rely on unclear conceptions of certainty.

In the discussion of rhetoric and [[epistemology]], comes the question of [[ethics]]. Is it [[Ethics|ethical]] for rhetoric to present itself in the branch of [[knowledge]]? [[Robert L. Scott|Scott]] rears this question, addressing the issue, not with ambiguity in the definitions of other terms, but against subjectivity regarding [[certainty]]. Ultimately, according to Thomas O. Sloane, rhetoric and [[epistemology]] exist as counterparts, working towards the same purpose of establishing [[knowledge]], with the common enemy of subjective [[certainty]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Waddington |first1=Raymond B. |last2=Sloane |first2=Thomas O. |date=1999 |title=On the Contrary: The Protocol of Traditional Rhetoric |journal=Comparative Literature |volume=51 |issue=4 |page=346 |doi=10.2307/1771268 |jstor=1771268 |issn=0010-4124}}</ref>