Editing Rationality (section)

=== Normativity ===
Rationality is [[Normativity|normative]] in the sense that it sets up certain rules or standards of correctness: to be rational is to comply with certain requirements.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/><ref name="Pinker2022"/> For example, rationality requires that the agent does not have [[contradictory]] beliefs. Many discussions on this issue concern the question of what exactly these standards are. Some theorists characterize the normativity of rationality in the deontological terms of [[obligation]]s and [[Permission (philosophy)|permissions]]. Others understand them from an evaluative perspective as good or valuable. A further approach is to talk of rationality based on what is praise- and blameworthy.<ref name="Moser2006"/> It is important to distinguish the norms of rationality from other types of norms. For example, some forms of [[fashion]] prescribe that men do not wear [[Bell-bottoms|bell-bottom trousers]]. Understood in the strongest sense, a norm prescribes what an agent ought to do or what they have most reason to do. The norms of fashion are not norms in this strong sense: that it is unfashionable does not mean that men ought not to wear bell-bottom trousers.<ref name="Broome2021"/> 

Most discussions of the normativity of rationality are interested in the strong sense, i.e. whether agents ought always to be rational.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Kiesewetter2017"/><ref name="Broome2007"/><ref name="Salas"/> This is sometimes termed a substantive account of rationality in contrast to structural accounts.<ref name="Broome2021"/><ref name="Heinzelmann2022"/> One important argument in favor of the normativity of rationality is based on considerations of praise- and blameworthiness. It states that we usually hold each other responsible for being rational and criticize each other when we fail to do so. This practice indicates that irrationality is some form of fault on the side of the subject that should not be the case.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kiesewetter |first1=Benjamin |title=Précis Zu The Normativity of Rationality |journal=Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung |date=2017 |volume=71 |issue=4 |pages=560–4 |doi=10.3196/004433017822228923 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KIEPZT |access-date=2021-06-07 |archive-date=2021-06-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210607055013/https://philpapers.org/rec/KIEPZT |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Salas"/> A strong counterexample to this position is due to [[John Broome (philosopher)|John Broome]], who considers the case of a fish an agent wants to eat. It contains salmonella, which is a decisive reason why the agent ought not to eat it. But the agent is unaware of this fact, which is why it is rational for them to eat the fish.<ref name="Broome2007"/><ref name="Kiesewetter2017"/> So this would be a case where normativity and rationality come apart. This example can be generalized in the sense that rationality only depends on the reasons accessible to the agent or how things appear to them. What one ought to do, on the other hand, is determined by objectively existing reasons.<ref name="Littlejohn "/><ref name="Salas"/> In the ideal case, rationality and normativity may coincide but they come apart either if the agent lacks access to a reason or if he has a mistaken belief about the presence of a reason. These considerations are summed up in the statement that rationality [[supervene]]s only on the agent's [[mind]] but normativity does not.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Broome |first1=John |title=Rationality vs normativity |journal=Australasian Philosophical Review |date=nd}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kiesewetter |first1=Benjamin |title=Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness |journal=Australasian Philosophical Review |year=2020 |volume=4 |issue=4 |pages=332–342 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KIERAR-2 |doi=10.1080/24740500.2021.1964239 |s2cid=243349119 |doi-access=free |access-date=2021-06-07 |archive-date=2021-06-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210605114434/https://philpapers.org/rec/KIERAR-2 |url-status=live }}</ref>

But there are also thought experiments in favor of the normativity of rationality. One, due to [[Frank Cameron Jackson|Frank Jackson]], involves a doctor who receives a patient with a mild condition and has to prescribe one out of three drugs: drug A resulting in a partial cure, drug B resulting in a complete cure, or drug C resulting in the patient's death.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |title=Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection |journal=Ethics |date=1991 |volume=101 |issue=3 |pages=461–482 |doi=10.1086/293312 |s2cid=170544860 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/JACDCA |access-date=2021-06-07 |archive-date=2021-06-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210607055018/https://philpapers.org/rec/JACDCA |url-status=live }}</ref> The doctor's problem is that they cannot tell which of the drugs B and C results in a complete cure and which one in the patient's death. The objectively best case would be for the patient to get drug B, but it would be highly irresponsible for the doctor to prescribe it given the uncertainty about its effects. So the doctor ought to prescribe the less effective drug A, which is also the rational choice. This thought experiment indicates that rationality and normativity coincide since what is rational and what one ought to do depends on the agent's mind after all.<ref name="Littlejohn"/><ref name="Salas"/>

Some theorists have responded to these [[thought experiment]]s by distinguishing between normativity and [[Moral responsibility|responsibility]].<ref name="Salas"/> On this view, critique of irrational behavior, like the doctor prescribing drug B, involves a negative evaluation of the agent in terms of responsibility but remains silent on normative issues. On a competence-based account, which defines rationality in terms of the competence of responding to reasons, such behavior can be understood as a failure to execute one's competence. But sometimes we are lucky and we succeed in the normative dimension despite failing to perform competently, i.e. rationally, due to being irresponsible.<ref name="Salas"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Zimmerman |first1=Michael J. |title=Taking Luck Seriously |journal=Journal of Philosophy |date=2002 |volume=99 |issue=11 |pages=553–576 |doi=10.2307/3655750 |jstor=3655750 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ZIMTLS |access-date=2021-06-07 |archive-date=2021-06-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210607055016/https://philpapers.org/rec/ZIMTLS |url-status=live }}</ref> The opposite can also be the case: bad luck may result in failure despite a responsible, competent performance. This explains how rationality and normativity can come apart despite our practice of criticizing irrationality.<ref name="Salas"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sylvan |first1=Kurt L. |title=Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2020 |volume=178 |issue=10 |pages=3129–3156 |doi=10.1007/s11098-020-01573-1 |s2cid=225137550 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SYLRAT |doi-access=free |access-date=2021-06-07 |archive-date=2021-06-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210607055019/https://philpapers.org/rec/SYLRAT |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Normative and descriptive theories ====
The concept of normativity can also be used to distinguish different theories of rationality. Normative theories explore the normative nature of rationality. They are concerned with rules and ideals that govern how the [[mind]] should work. Descriptive theories, on the other hand, investigate how the mind actually works. This includes issues like under which circumstances the ideal rules are followed as well as studying the underlying psychological processes responsible for rational thought. Descriptive theories are often investigated in empirical [[psychology]] while [[philosophy]] tends to focus more on normative issues. This division also reflects how different these two types are investigated.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Sturm2021"/><ref name="Pinker2022"/><ref name="Over2004"/>

Descriptive and normative theorists usually employ different [[methodologies]] in their research. Descriptive issues are studied by [[empirical research]]. This can take the form of studies that present their participants with a cognitive problem. It is then observed how the participants solve the problem, possibly together with explanations of why they arrived at a specific solution. Normative issues, on the other hand, are usually investigated in similar ways to how the [[formal sciences]] conduct their inquiry.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Sturm2021"/> In the field of theoretical rationality, for example, it is accepted that [[deductive reasoning]] in the form of [[modus ponens]] leads to rational beliefs. This claim can be investigated using methods like [[rational intuition]] or careful deliberation toward a [[reflective equilibrium]]. These forms of investigation can arrive at conclusions about what forms of thought are rational and irrational without depending on [[empirical evidence]].<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Pust |first1=Joel |title=Intuitions |date=2014 |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/5802/chapter-abstract/148988403?redirectedFrom=fulltext |chapter=3 Empirical Evidence for Rationalism? |access-date=2022-08-18 |archive-date=2022-08-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818111248/https://academic.oup.com/book/5802/chapter-abstract/148988403?redirectedFrom=fulltext |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Daniels |first1=Norman |title=Reflective Equilibrium |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 February 2022 |date=2020 |archive-date=22 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220222215102/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

An important question in this field concerns the relation between descriptive and normative approaches to rationality.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Pinker2022"/><ref name="Over2004"/> One difficulty in this regard is that there is in many cases a huge gap between what the norms of ideal rationality prescribe and how people actually reason. Examples of normative systems of rationality are [[classical logic]], [[probability theory]], and [[decision theory]]. Actual reasoners often diverge from these standards because of [[cognitive biases]], heuristics, or other mental limitations.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>

Traditionally, it was often assumed that actual human reasoning should follow the rules described in normative theories. In this view, any discrepancy is a form of irrationality that should be avoided. However, this usually ignores the human limitations of the mind. Given these limitations, various discrepancies may be necessary (and in this sense ''rational'') to get the most useful results.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Moser2006"/> For example, the ideal rational norms of decision theory demand that the agent should always choose the option with the highest expected value. However, calculating the expected value of each option may take a very long time in complex situations and may not be worth the trouble. This is reflected in the fact that actual reasoners often settle for an option that is good enough without making certain that it is really the best option available.<ref name="Moser2006"/><ref name="Bendor2009"/> A further difficulty in this regard is [[Hume's law]], which states that one cannot deduce what ought to be based on what is.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Cohon |first1=Rachel |title=Hume's Moral Philosophy: 5. Is and ought |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#io |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=21 May 2021 |date=2018 |archive-date=10 January 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180110170335/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#io |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bloomfield |first1=P. |title=Two Dogmas of Metaethics |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2007 |volume=132 |issue=3 |pages=439–466 |doi=10.1007/s11098-005-2509-9 |s2cid=170556071 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BLOTDO |access-date=2022-08-18 |archive-date=2022-08-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814062403/https://philpapers.org/rec/BLOTDO |url-status=live }}</ref> So just because a certain heuristic or cognitive bias is present in a specific case, it should not be inferred that it should be present. One approach to these problems is to hold that descriptive and normative theories talk about different types of rationality. This way, there is no contradiction between the two and both can be correct in their own field. Similar problems are discussed in so-called [[naturalized epistemology]].<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Rysiew |first1=Patrick |title=Naturalism in Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-naturalized/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 August 2022 |date=2021 |archive-date=17 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220817114504/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-naturalized/ |url-status=live }}</ref>