Editing Rational choice model (section)

==== Rational choice in voting behavior ====
Voter behaviour shifts significantly thanks to rational theory, which is ingrained in human nature, the most significant of which occurs when there are times of economic trouble. An example in economic policy, economist [[Anthony Downs]] concluded that a high income voter ‘votes for whatever party he believes would provide him with the highest utility income from government action’,<ref>Anthony Downs (1957). "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy", ''Journal of Political Economy'', Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 135–150</ref> using rational choice theory to explain people's income as their justification for their preferred tax rate.

Downs' work provides a framework for analyzing tax-rate preference in a rational choice framework. He argues that an individual votes if it is in their rational interest to do so. Downs models this utility function as B + D > C, where B is the benefit of the voter winning, D is the satisfaction derived from voting and C is the cost of voting.<ref>Downs, A (1957) "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy", ''Journal of Political Economy'', vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 135–150</ref> It is from this that we can determine that parties have moved their policy outlook to be more centric in order to maximise the number of voters they have for support. It is from this very simple framework that more complex adjustments can be made to describe the success of politicians as an outcome of their ability or failure to satisfy the utility function of individual voters.