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===Evidential problem of evil<!--'Logical problem of evil' and 'Evidential argument from evil' redirect here-->=== The evidential problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version of the problem) seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the [[probability]] of the truth of theism.<ref>For detailed discussion of this issue, see {{cite journal |last1=Benton |first1=Matthew A. |last2=Hawthorne |first2=John |last3=Isaacs |first3=Yoaav |title=Evil and Evidence |journal=Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion |date=2016 |volume=7 |pages=1β31 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-875770-2 |url=https://philpapers.org/archive/BENEAE-5.pdf}}</ref> Both absolute versions and relative versions of the evidential problems of evil are presented below. A version by [[William L. Rowe]]: # There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. # An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. # (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.<ref name="IepEvidential" /> Another by [[Paul Draper (philosopher)|Paul Draper]]: # Gratuitous evils exist. # The hypothesis of indifference, ''i.e.'', that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism. # Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.<ref>{{cite journal |first=Paul |last=Draper |title=Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists |journal=NoΓ»s |volume=23 |issue=3 |pages=331β350 | year=1989 |doi=10.2307/2215486 |jstor=2215486}}</ref> [[Skeptical theism]] is an example of a theistic challenge to the premises in these arguments.
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