Editing Politics of Canada (section)

==Federal-provincial relations==
{{More citations needed section|date=October 2018}}
{{Canada provinces map|align=right|prefix =Politics of|the=the|caption=A map of Canada's provinces and territories}}
[[File:Mackenzie King with Ferguson and Taschereau.jpg|thumb|[[William Lyon Mackenzie King]] (centre), Prime minister of Canada, between [[Howard Ferguson]] (left), Premier of Ontario, and [[Louis-Alexandre Taschereau]] (right), Premier of Quebec, at the [[First Ministers' conference|Dominion-Provincial Conference]], 1927.]]
As a federation, the existence and powers of the federal government and the ten [[Provinces and territories of Canada|provinces]] are guaranteed by the Constitution. The ''Constitution Act, 1867'' sets out the basic constitutional structure of the federal government and the provinces.<ref name=CA67/>  The powers of the federal Parliament and the provinces can only be changed by constitutional amendments passed by the federal and provincial governments.<ref>[https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-13.html#h-57 ''Constitution Act, 1982'', Part V — Procedure for Amending Constitution of Canada.]</ref> The Sovereign is the formal head of state of the federal government and each of the ten provinces, but has no political role.  The governments are led by the representatives of the people:  elected by all adult Canadians at the federal level, and by the citizens of each province at the provincial level.

Federal-provincial (or intergovernmental, formerly Dominion-provincial) relations is a regular issue in Canadian politics: Quebec wishes to preserve and strengthen its distinctive nature, western provinces desire more control over their abundant natural resources, especially energy reserves; industrialized Central Canada is concerned with its manufacturing base, and the Atlantic provinces strive to escape from being less affluent than the rest of the country.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Sears |first=Robin |date=May 1, 2010 |title=The next federal-provincial battles: This time it's different |url=https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/the-fault-lines-of-federalism/the-next-federal-provincial-battles-this-time-its-different/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220819223125/https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/the-fault-lines-of-federalism/the-next-federal-provincial-battles-this-time-its-different/ |archive-date=August 19, 2022 |access-date=January 22, 2023 |website=Policy Options}}</ref>

In order to ensure that social programs such as health care and education are funded consistently throughout Canada, the "have-not" (poorer) provinces receive a proportionately greater share of federal "[[equalization payments|transfer (equalization) payments]]" than the richer, or "have", provinces do; this has been somewhat controversial. The richer provinces often favour freezing transfer payments, or rebalancing the system in their favour, based on the claim that they already pay more in taxes than they receive in federal government services, and the poorer provinces often favour an increase on the basis that the amount of money they receive is not sufficient for their existing needs.<ref name=":0" />

Particularly in the past decade, critics have argued that the federal government's exercise of its unlimited constitutional spending power has contributed to strained federal-provincial relations.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Bélanger |first=Claude |date=February 26, 2001 |title=Canadian federalism and the Spending Power of the Canadian Parliament |url=http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/federal/spending.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201112030655/http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/federal/spending.htm |archive-date=November 12, 2020 |access-date=January 22, 2023 |website=Quebec History}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Scotia |first=Communications Nova |date=2018-05-11 |title=New Study Confirms Fiscal Imbalance in Canada |url=https://novascotia.ca/news/release/?id=20020731014 |access-date=2023-01-23 |website=News Releases |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=August 1, 2002 |title=A NEW STUDY BY THE CONFERENCE BOARD CONFIRMS THE EXISTENCE OF AN IMPORTANT FISCAL IMBALANCE IN CANADA |url=https://scics.ca/en/product-produit/a-new-study-by-the-conference-board-confirms-the-existence-of-an-important-fiscal-imbalance-in-canada/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181027002018/https://scics.ca/en/product-produit/a-new-study-by-the-conference-board-confirms-the-existence-of-an-important-fiscal-imbalance-in-canada/ |archive-date=October 27, 2018 |access-date=January 22, 2023 |website=Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Busby |first=Colin |date=May 28, 2021 |title=Could down-payment federalism help kickstart reform in long-term care? |url=https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2021/could-down-payment-federalism-help-kickstart-reform-in-long-term-care/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220925115759/https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2021/could-down-payment-federalism-help-kickstart-reform-in-long-term-care/ |archive-date=September 25, 2022 |access-date=January 22, 2023 |website=Policy Options}}</ref> This power allows the federal government to influence provincial policies, by offering funding in areas that the federal government cannot itself regulate. The federal spending power is not expressly set out in the ''[[Constitution Act, 1867]]''; however, in the words of the [[Court of Appeal for Ontario]] the power "can be inferred" from s. 91(1A), "the public debt and property".<ref>[http://canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2004/2004canlii15104/2004canlii15104.html ''Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. v. Iness''] {{webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120712162257/http://canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2004/2004canlii15104/2004canlii15104.html |date=2012-07-12 }}, 2004 CanLII 15104 at paragraph 25.</ref>

A prime example of an exercise of the spending power is the ''[[Canada Health Act]]'', which is a conditional grant of money to the provinces. Regulation of health services is, under the Constitution, a provincial responsibility. However, by making the funding available to the provinces under the ''Canada Health Act'' contingent upon delivery of services according to federal standards, the federal government has the ability to influence health care delivery.

===Quebec and Canadian politics===
Except for three short-lived transitional or minority governments, prime ministers from [[Quebec]] led Canada continuously from 1968 to early 2006. People from Quebec led both [[Liberal Party of Canada|Liberal]] and [[Progressive Conservative Party of Canada|Progressive Conservative]] governments in this period.

Monarchs, governors general, and prime ministers are now expected to be at least functional, if not fluent, in both [[Canadian English|English]] and [[French language in Canada|French]]. In selecting leaders, political parties give preference to candidates who are fluently bilingual.

By law, three of the nine positions on the [[Supreme Court of Canada]] must be held by judges from Quebec. This representation makes sure that at least three judges have sufficient experience with the [[civil law (legal system)|civil law]] system to treat cases involving Quebec laws.<ref name="2014 SCC 21">{{cite web|title=Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6|url=https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2014/2014scc21/2014scc21.html|website=CanLII|access-date=August 5, 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://archive.today/20140505164818/http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2014/2014scc21/2014scc21.html|archive-date=May 5, 2014}}</ref>