Editing Planned Parenthood v. Casey (section)

====''Stare decisis'' analysis====
The plurality's opinion included a thorough discussion on the doctrine of ''[[stare decisis]]'' (respect of precedent), and provided a clear explanation for why the doctrine had to be applied in ''Casey'' with regards to ''Roe''. The authors of the plurality opinion emphasized that ''stare decisis'' had to apply in ''Casey'' because the ''Roe'' rule had not been proven intolerable; the rule had become subject "to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation"; the law had not developed in such a way around the rule that left the rule "no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine"; and the facts had not changed, nor viewed differently, to "rob the old rule of significant application or justification."<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 854–60.</ref> The plurality acknowledged that it was important for the Court to stand by prior decisions, even those decisions some found unpopular, unless there was a change in the fundamental reasoning underpinning the previous decision. The authors of the plurality opinion, making a special note of the precedential value of ''Roe v. Wade'', and specifically how women's lives were changed by that decision,<ref name="auto">{{Cite news |last1=Gerstein |first1=Josh |last2=Ward |first2=Alexander |date=May 2, 2022 |title=Supreme Court has voted to overturn abortion rights, draft opinion shows |work=[[Politico]] |url=https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/02/supreme-court-abortion-draft-opinion-00029473 |access-date=May 2, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220504032815/https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/02/supreme-court-abortion-draft-opinion-00029473|archive-date=May 4, 2022}}</ref> stated,
<blockquote>The sum of the precedential enquiry to this point shows Roe's underpinnings unweakened in any way affecting its central holding. While it has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable. An entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to make reproductive decisions; no erosion of principle going to liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe's central holding a doctrinal remnant.<ref name="Casey, 505 U.S. at 860">''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 860.</ref><ref name="auto"/></blockquote>
The authors of the plurality opinion also acknowledged the need for predictability and consistency in judicial decision making. For example,<blockquote>Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution."<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 866–67.</ref></blockquote>
The plurality went on to analyze past judgments refusing to apply the doctrine of stare decisis, such as ''Brown v. Board of Education''. There, the authors of the plurality opinion explained, society's rejection of the "Separate but Equal" concept was a legitimate reason for the ''[[Brown v. Board of Education]]'' court's rejection of the ''[[Plessy v. Ferguson]]'' doctrine.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 862–64.</ref> Emphasizing the lack of need to overrule the essential holding of ''Roe'', and the Court's need to not be seen as overruling a prior decision merely because the individual members of the Court had changed, the authors of the plurality opinion stated,
<blockquote>Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our understanding of it has changed (and because no other indication of weakened precedent has been shown), the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the prior law with any justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Court of 1973.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 864.</ref></blockquote>
The plurality further emphasized that the Court would lack legitimacy if it frequently changed its Constitutional decisions, stating,
<blockquote>The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.<ref>''Casey'', 505 U.S. at 865–66.</ref></blockquote>
Since the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter plurality overruled some portions of ''Roe v. Wade'' despite its emphasis on ''stare decisis'', Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent argued that this section was entirely ''[[obiter dicta]]''. All these opening sections were joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens for the majority. The remainder of the decision did not command a majority, but at least two other Justices concurred in judgment on each of the remaining points.