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===East Asia=== In East Asia by the ninth century, populations centered mostly around merchant activities in coastal [[Shandong]] and [[Jiangsu]]. Wealthy benefactors including [[Jang Bogo]] established [[Silla]] Buddhist temples in the region. Jang Bogo had become incensed at the treatment of his fellow countrymen, who in the unstable milieu of late Tang often fell victim to coastal pirates or inland bandits. After returning to Silla around 825, and in possession of a formidable private fleet headquartered at Cheonghae ([[Wando County|Wando]]), Jang Bogo petitioned the Silla king Heungdeok ({{reign|826|836}}) to establish a permanent maritime garrison to protect Silla merchant activities in the [[Yellow Sea]]. Heungdeok agreed and in 828 formally established the Cheonghae ({{lang|ko-Hani|ζ·Έζ΅·}}, "clear sea") Garrison ({{lang|ko|μ²ν΄μ§}}) at what is today Wando island off Korea's South Jeolla province. Heungdeok gave Jang an army of 10,000 men to establish and man the defensive works. The remnants of Cheonghae Garrison can still be seen on Jang islet just off Wando's southern coast. Jang's force, though nominally bequeathed by the Silla king, was effectively under his own control. Jang became arbiter of Yellow Sea commerce and navigation.<ref>Chong Sun Kim, "Slavery in Silla and its Sociological and Economic Implications", in Andrew C. Nahm, ed. ''Traditional Korea, Theory and Practice'' (Kalamazoo, MI: Center for Korean Studies, 1974)</ref> From the 13th century, Wokou based in Japan made their debut in East Asia, initiating invasions that would persist for 300 years. The wokou raids [[Jiajing wokou raids|peaked in the 1550s]], but by then the wokou were mostly Chinese smugglers who reacted strongly against the [[Ming dynasty]]'s strict prohibition on private sea trade. [[File:Wokou.jpg|thumb|right|Sixteenth century [[Wokou|Japanese]] pirate raids]] During the [[Qing]] period, Chinese pirate fleets grew increasingly large. The effects large-scale piracy had on the Chinese economy were immense. They preyed voraciously on China's junk trade, which flourished in [[Fujian]] and [[Guangdong]] and was a vital artery of Chinese commerce. Pirate fleets exercised [[hegemony]] over villages on the coast, collecting revenue by exacting tribute and running [[extortion]] rackets. In 1802, the menacing [[Zheng Yi (pirate)|Zheng Yi]] inherited the fleet of his cousin, captain Zheng Qi, whose death provided Zheng Yi with considerably more influence in the world of piracy. Zheng Yi and his wife, [[Zheng Yi Sao]] (who would eventually inherit the leadership of his pirate confederacy) then formed a pirate coalition that, by 1804, consisted of over ten thousand men. Their military might alone was sufficient to combat the Qing navy. However, a combination of famine, Qing naval opposition, and internal rifts crippled piracy in China around the 1820s, and it has never again reached the same status. In the 1840s and 1850s, [[United States Navy]] and Royal Navy forces campaigned together against Chinese pirates. Major battles were fought such as those at [[Battle of Ty-ho Bay|Ty-ho Bay]] and the [[Battle of Tonkin River|Tonkin River]] though pirate [[junks]] continued operating off China for years more. However, some British and American individual citizens also volunteered to serve with Chinese pirates to fight against European forces. The British offered rewards for the capture of westerners serving with Chinese pirates. During the [[Second Opium War]] and the [[Taiping Rebellion]], piratical junks were again destroyed in large numbers by British naval forces but ultimately it was not until the 1860s and 1870s that fleets of pirate junks ceased to exist. [[File:4ChinesePirates.jpg|thumb|Four Chinese pirates who were hanged in Hong Kong in 1863]] Chinese Pirates also plagued the Tonkin Gulf area.<ref name="KleinenOsseweijer2010">{{cite book|author1=John Kleinen|author2=Manon Osseweijer|title=Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nEgb15isFZkC&pg=PA60|year= 2010|publisher=Institute of Southeast Asian Studies|isbn=978-981-4279-07-9|page=60}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=New Peterson magazine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0nhFAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA578|year=1896|page=578}}</ref> ==== Piracy in the Ming dynasty ==== Pirates in the [[Ming]] era tended to come from populations on the geographic periphery of the state.<ref>MacKay, Joseph. "Pirate Nations: Maritime Pirates as Escape Societies in Late Imperial China." ''Social Science History'' ''37'', no. 4 (2013): 551βg573. {{doi|10.1017/S0145553200011962}}. p. 554</ref> They were recruited largely from the lower classes of society, including poor fishermen, and many were fleeing from obligatory labor on state-building projects organized by the dynasty. These lower-class men, and sometimes women, may have fled taxation or conscription by the state in the search of better opportunities and wealth, and willingly joined local pirate bands.<ref>MacKay. 2013. p. 553</ref><ref>MacKay. 2013. p. 555</ref> These local, lower class individuals seem to have felt unrepresented, and traded the small amount of security afforded them from their allegiance to the state for the promise of a relatively improved existence engaging in smuggling or other illegal trade. Originally, pirates in the coastal areas near Fujian and Zhejiang may have been Japanese, suggested by the Ming government referring to them as "''[[wokou]]'' (εε―)", but it is probable that piracy was a multi-ethnic profession by the 16th century, although coastal brigands continued to be referred to as ''wokou'' in many government documents.<ref>Higgins, Roland L. "Pirates in Gowns and Caps: Gentry Law-Breaking in the Mid-Ming." ''Ming Studies Volume 1980'', Issue #1. pp. 30β37 [31]</ref> Most pirates were probably [[Han Chinese]], but Japanese and even Europeans engaged in pirate activities in the region.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Robinson |first1=David M. |title=Banditry and the Subversion of State Authority in China: The Capital Region During the Middle Ming Period (1450β1525) |journal=Journal of Social History |date=2000 |volume=33 |issue=3 |pages=527β563 |id={{Gale|A61372233}} {{Project MUSE|17725}} |jstor=3789210 |doi=10.1353/jsh.2000.0035 |s2cid=144496554 }}</ref> ==== Illegal trade and authority ==== Pirates engaged in a number of different schemes to make a living. Smuggling and illegal trade overseas were major sources of revenue for pirate bands, both large and small.<ref name="Higgins. 1980. p. 31">Higgins. 1980. p. 31</ref> As the Ming government mostly outlawed private trade overseas, at least until the overseas silver trade contributed to a lifting of the ban, pirates basically could almost by default control the market for any number of foreign goods.<ref name="Higgins. 1980. p. 31"/><ref>Von Glahn, Richard. ''The Economic History of China: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century''. Cambridge, UK. {{ISBN|9781107030565}}. {{OCLC|919452147}}. p. 307</ref><ref name="Von Glahn. 2016. p. 308">Von Glahn. 2016. p. 308</ref> The geography of the coastline made chasing pirates quite difficult for the authorities, and private overseas trade began to transform coastal societies by the 15th century, as nearly all aspects of the local society benefitted from or associated with illegal trade.<ref>Higgins. 1980. p. 32</ref> The desire to trade for silver eventually led to open conflict between the Ming and illegal smugglers and pirates. This conflict, along with local merchants in southern China, helped persuade the Ming court to end the [[haijin]] ban on private international trade in 1567.<ref name="Von Glahn. 2016. p. 308"/> Pirates also projected local political authority.<ref name=":1">MacKay. 2013. p. 558</ref> Larger pirate bands could act as local governing bodies for coastal communities, collecting taxes and engaging in "protection" schemes. In addition to illegal goods, pirates ostensibly offered security to communities on land in exchange for a tax.<ref name=":2">MacKay. 2013. p. 557</ref> These bands also wrote and codified laws that redistributed wealth, punished crimes, and provided protection for the taxed community.<ref name=":1" /> These laws were strictly followed by the pirates, as well.<ref name=":3">MacKay. 2013. p. 567</ref> The political structures tended to look similar to the Ming structures.<ref name=":3" /> ==== Hierarchy and structure ==== Pirates did not tend to stay pirates permanently. It seems to have been relatively easy both to join and leave a pirate band, and these raiding groups were more interested in maintaining a willing force.<ref name=":4">MacKay. 2013. pp. 564, 568</ref> Members of these pirate groups did not tend to stay longer than a few months or years at a time.<ref name=":4" /> There appears to have been a hierarchy in most pirate organizations. Pirate leaders could become very wealthy and powerful, especially when working with the Chinese dynasty, and, consequently, so could those who served under them.<ref name=":2" /> These pirate groups were organized similarly to other "escape societies" throughout history, and maintained a redistributive system to reward looting; the pirates directly responsible for looting or pillaging got their cut first, and the rest was allocated to the rest of the pirate community.<ref name=":2" /> There seems to be evidence that there was an egalitarian aspect to these communities, with capability to do the job being rewarded explicitly. The pirates themselves had some special privileges under the law when they interacted with communities on land, mostly in the form of extra allotments of redistributed wealth.<ref name=":2" /> ==== Clientele ==== Pirates, of course, had to sell their loot. They had trading relationships with land communities and foreign traders in the southeastern regions of China. [[Zhu Wan]], who held the office of Grand Coordinator for Coastal Defense, documented that pirates in the region to which he had been sent had the support of the local elite gentry class.<ref>Higgins. 1980. p. 30</ref> These "pirates in gowns and caps" directly or indirectly sponsored pirate activity and certainly directly benefitted from the illegal private trade in the region. When Zhu Wan or other officials from the capital attempted to eliminate the pirate problem, these local elites fought back, having Zhu Wan demoted and eventually even sent back to Beijing to possibly be executed.<ref>Higgins. 1980. p. 34</ref> The gentry who benefitted from illegal maritime trade were too powerful and influential, and they were clearly very invested in the smuggling activities of the pirate community.<ref>Robinson. 2000. p. 547</ref> In addition to their relationship with the local elite class on the coast, pirates also had complicated and often friendly relationships and partnerships with the dynasty itself, as well as with international traders.<ref>MacKay. 2013. pp. 552, 557</ref> When pirate groups recognized the authority of the dynasty, they would often be allowed to operate freely and even profit from the relationship. There were also opportunities for these pirates to ally themselves with colonial projects from Europe or other overseas powers.<ref name="MacKay. 2013. p. 559">MacKay. 2013. p. 559</ref> Both the dynasty and foreign colonial projects would employ pirates as mercenaries to establish dominance in the coastal region.<ref>MacKay. 2013. p. 551</ref> Because of how difficult it was for established state powers to control these regions, pirates seem to have had a lot of freedom to choose their allies and their preferred markets.<ref>Szonyi, Michael. ''The Art of Being Governed: Everyday Politics in Late Imperial China''. Princeton. {{ISBN|9781400888887}}. {{OCLC|1007291604}}. pp. 101, 102</ref> Included in this list of possible allies, sea marauders and pirates even found opportunities to bribe military officials as they engaged in illegal trade.<ref>Szonyi. 2017. pp. 101β102</ref> They seem to have been incentivized mostly by money and loot, and so could afford to play the field with regards to their political or military allies. Because pirate organizations could be so powerful locally, the Ming government made concerted efforts to weaken them. The presence of colonial projects complicated this, however, as pirates could ally themselves with other maritime powers or local elites to stay in business. The Chinese government was clearly aware of the power of some of these pirate groups, as some documents even refer to them as "sea rebels," a reference to the political nature of pirates.<ref name="MacKay. 2013. p. 559"/> Pirates like [[Zheng Zhilong]] and [[Zheng Chenggong]] accrued tremendous local power, eventually even being hired as naval commanders by the Chinese dynasties and foreign maritime powers.<ref>MacKay. 2013. pp. 559, 561</ref>
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