Editing Phenomenology (philosophy) (section)

===Heidegger's conception===
{{Main|Martin Heidegger}}
Martin Heidegger modified Husserl's conception of phenomenology because of what Heidegger perceived as Husserl's subjectivist tendencies. Whereas Husserl conceived humans as having been constituted by states of consciousness, Heidegger countered that consciousness is peripheral to the primacy of one's existence, for which he introduces [[Dasein]] as a technical term, which cannot be reduced to a mode of consciousness. From this angle, one's state of mind is an "effect" rather than a determinant of existence, including those aspects of existence of which one is not conscious. By shifting the center of gravity to existence in what he calls [[fundamental ontology]], Heidegger altered the subsequent direction of phenomenology.

According to Heidegger, ontologically-inflected phenomenology is more fundamental than modern scientific inquiry. According to him, science is only one way of knowing the world with no special access to truth. Furthermore, the scientific mindset itself is built on a much more "primordial" foundation of practical, everyday knowledge. This emphasis on the fundamental status of a person's pre-cognitive, practical orientation in the world, sometimes called "know-how", would be adopted by both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.{{sfn|Smith|2023|loc=§2.d}}

While for Husserl, in the epoché, being appeared only as a correlate of consciousness, for Heidegger the pre-conscious grasp of being is the starting point. For this reason, he replaces Husserl's concept of intentionality with the notion of ''comportment'', which is presented as "more primitive" than the "conceptually structured" acts analyzed by Husserl. Paradigmatic examples of comportment can be found in the unreflective ''dealing'' with ''equipment'' that presents itself as simply "ready-to-hand" in what Heidegger calls the normally ''circumspect'' mode of engagement within the world.{{sfn|Smith|2023|loc=§3.d}}

For Husserl, all concrete determinations of the empirical ego would have to be abstracted in order to attain pure consciousness. By contrast, Heidegger claims that "the possibilities and destinies of philosophy are bound up with man's existence, and thus with temporality and with historicality."{{sfn|Heidegger|1975|loc=Introduction}} For this reason, all experience must be seen as shaped by social context, which for Heidegger joins phenomenology with philosophical [[hermeneutics]].{{sfn|Smith|2022|loc=§2}}

Husserl charged Heidegger with raising the question of ontology but failing to answer it, instead switching the topic to Dasein. That is neither ontology nor phenomenology, according to Husserl, but merely abstract anthropology.

While ''[[Being and Time]]'' and other early works are clearly engaged with Husserlian issues, Heidegger's later philosophy has little relation to the problems and methods of classical phenomenology.{{sfn|Smith|2023|loc=§1}}