Editing Pervez Musharraf (section)

==Four-star appointments (1998–2007)==

===Chief of Army Staff and Chairman Joint Chiefs===
[[File:PervezMusharraf.jpg|thumb|Musharraf in army uniform, {{circa|2007}}]]
There were three lieutenant-generals potentially in line to succeed General [[Jehangir Karamat]] as chief of army staff. Musharraf was third-in-line and was well regarded by the general public and the armed forces. He also had an excellent academic standing from his college and university studies.<ref name="Yale University Press"/> Musharraf was strongly favoured by the Prime Minister's colleagues: a straight officer with democratic views.<ref name="Yale University Press"/> [[Nisar Ali Khan]] and [[Shahbaz Sharif]] recommended Musharraf and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif personally promoted Musharraf to the rank of four-star general to replace Karamat.<ref name="nytsoldier"/><ref>{{cite news |last=Constable |first=Pamela |author-link=Pamela Constable |date=28 November 2007 |title=Musharraf Steps Down as Head of Pakistani Army |language=en-US |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/27/AR2007112702242.html |url-status=live |access-date=24 September 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160927010739/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/27/AR2007112702242.html |archive-date=27 September 2016 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=1 May 2002 |title=Pakistan's Dubious Referendum |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/01/opinion/pakistan-s-dubious-referendum.html |url-status=live |access-date=21 September 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170819064119/http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/01/opinion/pakistan-s-dubious-referendum.html |archive-date=19 August 2017 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref name="BBC News, Islamabad" />

After the Kargil incident, Musharraf did not wish to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs:<ref name="Yale University Press"/> Musharraf favoured the chief of naval staff [[Fasih Bokhari|Admiral Bokhari]] to take on this role, and claimed that: "he did not care"<ref name="Yale University Press"/> Prime minister Sharif was displeased by this suggestion, due to the hostile nature of his relationship with the Admiral. Musharraf further exacerbated his divide with Nawaz Sharif after recommending the forced retirement of senior officers close to the Prime minister,<ref name="Yale University Press"/> including Lieutenant-General Tariq Pervez (also known by his name's initials as ''TP''), commander of [[XII Corps (Pakistan)|XII Corps]], who was a brother-in-law of a high profile cabinet minister.<ref name="Yale University Press"/> According to Musharraf, lieutenant-general TP was an ill-mannered, foul-mouthed, ill-disciplined officer who caused a great deal of dissent within the armed forces.<ref name="Yale University Press"/> Nawaz Sharif's announcement of the promotion of General Musharraf to Chairman Joint Chiefs caused an escalation of the tensions with Admiral Bokhari: upon hearing the news, he launched a strong protest against the Prime minister. The next morning, the Prime minister relieved Admiral Bokhari of his duties.<ref name="Yale University Press"/> It was during his time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that Musharraf began to build friendly relations with the [[United States Army]] establishment, including General [[Anthony Zinni]], [[United States Marine Corps|USMC]], General [[Tommy Franks]], General [[John Abizaid]], and [[General Colin Powell]] of the US Army, all of whom were premier four-star generals.<ref name=Putnam>{{cite book|author1=Tony Zinni|author2=Tom Clancy |author3=Tony Koltz |title=Battle ready|year=2004|publisher=Putnam|location=New York|isbn=0-399-15176-1|edition=Berkley trade pbk.}}</ref>

===Kargil Conflict===
{{Main|Kargil Conflict}}
The Pakistan Army originally conceived the Kargil plan after the [[Siachen conflict]] but the plan was rebuffed repeatedly by senior civilian and military officials.<ref name="kapur"/> Musharraf was a leading strategist behind the Kargil Conflict.<ref name="chitkara"/> From March to May 1999, he ordered secret infiltration of forces into the [[Kargil district]].<ref name="weaver"/> After India discovered the infiltration, a fierce Indian offensive nearly led to a full-scale war.<ref name="weaver"/><ref name="kapur"/> However, Sharif withdrew support for the insurgents in July because of heightened international pressure.<ref name="weaver"/> Sharif's decision antagonised the Pakistan Army and rumours of a possible coup began emerging soon afterward.<ref name="weaver"/><ref>{{Cite news|title=A Bleak Day for Pakistan|newspaper=The Guardian|date=13 October 1999|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/13/pakistan.india|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130824021124/http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/13/pakistan.india|archive-date=24 August 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> Sharif and Musharraf dispute on who was responsible for the Kargil conflict and Pakistan's withdrawal.<ref>{{Cite news|title=Musharraf Vs. Sharif: Who's Lying?|newspaper=The Weekly Voice|date=2 October 2006|url=http://www.weeklyvoice.com/site/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1443&Itemid=66 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071011135734/http://weeklyvoice.com/site/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1443&Itemid=66 |archive-date=11 October 2007 |url-status=dead}}</ref>

This strategic operation met with great hostility in the public circles and wide scale disapproval in the [[Media of Pakistan|media]] who roundly criticised this operation.<ref>	
* {{cite news |last=Amir |first=Ayaz |url=http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/990709.htm |title=Victory in reverse: the great climbdown |date=9 July 1999 |access-date=17 February 2007 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070217075137/http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/990709.htm |archive-date=17 February 2007 |newspaper=[[Dawn (newspaper)|Dawn]]}} 
* {{cite news |last=Amir |first=Ayaz |url=http://dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/990723.htm |title=For this submission what gain? |date=23 July 1999 |access-date=20 April 2013 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070204085204/http://dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/990723.htm |archive-date=4 February 2007 |newspaper=[[Dawn (newspaper)|Dawn]]}}</ref> Musharraf had severe confrontation and became involved in serious altercations with his senior officers, chief of naval staff Admiral [[Fasih Bokhari]],<ref name="Daily Times, Pakistan">{{cite news |title=Musharraf planned coup much before Oct 12: Fasih Bokhari |url=http://www.antisystemic.org/satribune/www.satribune.com/archives/oct7_13_02/DTimes_fasihoct9.htm |access-date=16 May 2012 |newspaper=Daily Times |location=Pakistan |date=9 October 2002 |quote=Former Navy chief says the general feared court martial for masterminding Kargil |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120315013903/http://www.antisystemic.org/satribune/www.satribune.com/archives/oct7_13_02/DTimes_fasihoct9.htm |archive-date=15 March 2012 |url-status=dead }}</ref> chief of air staff, [[Air Chief Marshal]] PQ Mehdi and senior [[lieutenant-general]] Ali Kuli Khan.<ref name="kuli"/> Admiral Bokhari ultimately demanded a full-fledged joint-service court martial against General Musharraf,<ref name="Daily Times, Pakistan"/> while on the other hand General Kuli Khan lambasted the war as "a disaster bigger than the East-Pakistan [[Bangladesh Liberation War|tragedy"]],<ref name="kuli">[http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1056536 Kargil was a bigger disaster than 1971] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080406092138/http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1056536 |date=6 April 2008}} – Interview of Lt Gen [[Ali Kuli Khan Khattak]].</ref> adding that the plan was "flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution" that ended in "sacrificing so many soldiers".<ref name="kuli" /><ref>{{Cite news|author=Haleem, S. A.|date=19 October 2006|title=Sweet and bitter memories (Review of ''In the Line of Fire'' by Pervez Musharraf)|newspaper=Jang|url=http://jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2006-weekly/books&people-19-10-2006/index.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061124225759/http://jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2006-weekly/books%26people-19-10-2006/index.html|archive-date=24 November 2006|url-status=dead}}</ref> Problems with his lifelong friend, [[Chief of Air Staff (Pakistan)|chief of air staff]] air chief marshal Pervez Mehdi also arose when air chief refrained to participate or authorise any air strike to support the elements of army operations in the Kargil region.<ref name="PAF Directorate for Public Relations"/>

During the last meeting with the Prime minister, Musharraf faced grave criticism on results produced by Kargil infiltration by the principal [[Military Intelligence of Pakistan|military intelligence (MI)]] director lieutenant-general [[Jamshed Gulzar Kiani]] who maintained in the meeting: "(...) whatever has been written there is against logic. If you catch your enemy by the jugular vein he would react with full force... If you cut enemy supply lines, the only option for him will be to ensure supplies by air... (sic).. at that situation the Indian Army was unlikely to confront and it had to come up to the occasion. It is against wisdom that you dictate to the enemy to keep the war limited to a certain front...."<ref name="GEO News Network">{{cite news |last=Masood |first=Shahid |title=Former general for making an example of Musharraf |newspaper=GEO News Network |date=3 June 2008 |url=http://www.geo.tv/6-3-2008/18848.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080606010200/http://www.geo.tv/6-3-2008/18848.htm |archive-date=6 June 2008 |url-status=dead}}</ref>

Nawaz Sharif has maintained that the Operation was conducted without his knowledge. However, details of the briefing he got from the military before and after the Kargil operation have become public. Before the operation, between January and March, Sharif was briefed about the operation in three separate meetings. In January, the army briefed him about the Indian troop movement along the LOC in Skardu on 29 January 1999, on 5 February at Kel, on 12 March at the GHQ, and finally on 17 May at the ISI headquarters. During the end of the June DCC meeting, a tense Sharif turned to the army chief and said "you should have told me earlier", Musharraf pulled out his notebook and repeated the dates and contents of around seven briefings he had given him since the beginning of January.<ref name="Media Monitors Network">{{Cite news|last=Zehra|first=Nasim|title=Nawaz Sharif Not A Kargil Victim|newspaper=Media Monitors Network|date=29 July 2004|url=http://usa.mediamonitors.net/Headlines/Nawaz-Sharif-Not-A-Kargil-Victim|access-date=3 December 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150511012534/http://usa.mediamonitors.net/Headlines/Nawaz-Sharif-Not-A-Kargil-Victim|archive-date=11 May 2015|url-status=live}}</ref>