Editing Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (section)

====Cuban Missile Crisis and beyond: 1962–1963====
In October 1962, the U.S. and [[Soviet Union]] experienced the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]], which brought the two superpowers to the brink of nuclear war. This intense standoff prompted both Kennedy and Khrushchev to seek accelerated [[rapprochement]], recognizing the urgent need to reduce tensions and prevent future confrontations.<ref name=atomicheritage/>{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=307}}<ref name=cuba>{{cite web |title=1963–1977: Limits on Nuclear Testing |publisher=Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization |url=https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/history-1945-1993/1963-77-limits-on-nuclear-testing/ |access-date=31 July 2016}}</ref><ref name=cuba2>{{cite web |title=Cuban Missile Crisis |publisher=[[John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum]] |url=https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/cuban-missile-crisis |access-date=31 July 2016}}</ref>{{sfn|Strode|1990|pp=23–24}}{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=82}} After years of dormant or lethargic negotiations, American and British negotiators subsequently forged a strong working relationship and with Soviet negotiators found common ground on test restrictions later in 1962.<ref name=britannica>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty |last=Freedman |first=Lawrence D. |encyclopedia=[[Encyclopædia Britannica]] |url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty |access-date=31 July 2016}}</ref> After years of pursuing a comprehensive ban, Khrushchev was convinced to accept a partial ban, partly due to the efforts of Soviet nuclear scientists, including Kurchatov, Sakharov, and [[Yulii Khariton]], who argued that atmospheric testing had severe consequences for human health.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=307}}{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=83}} Khrushchev had been concerned by a partial ban due to the greater US experience in underground tests; by 1962, the US had conducted 89 such tests and the Soviet Union just two (the Soviet focus had been on cheaper, larger-yield atmospheric tests). For this reason, many in the Soviet weapons industry argued that a partial ban would give the US the advantage in nuclear capabilities.{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|pp=81–82}} Khrushchev would later recount that he saw test-ban negotiations as a prime venue for ameliorating tensions after the crisis in Cuba.{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=24}}

Shocked by how close the world had come to [[thermonuclear war]], [[Khrushchev]] proposed easing tensions with the U.S. In a letter to President Kennedy dated 30 October 1962, Khrushchev outlined a series of bold initiatives to prevent the possibility of nuclear war. His proposals included a non-aggression treaty between [[NATO]] and the [[Warsaw Pact]], or even the disbanding of these military blocs; a treaty to cease all nuclear weapons testing; and the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. He also suggested resolving the contentious issue of Germany by having both East and West formally recognize the existence of [[West Germany]] and [[East Germany]], as well as calling for U.S. recognition of the government of mainland China.

The letter invited counter-proposals and encouraged further exploration of these and other issues through peaceful negotiations. Additionally, Khrushchev invited [[Norman Cousins]], the editor of a major U.S. periodical and an anti-nuclear weapons activist, to serve as a liaison with President Kennedy. Cousins met with Khrushchev for four hours in December 1962..<ref>Stone, Oliver and Peter Kuznick, ''The Untold History of the United States'', (Gallery Books, 2012), pp. 313–314, ''citing'' Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 30 October 1962, in ''Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963'', vol. 11, (Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 309–317</ref> Cousins' secret mission was aided by [[Pope John XXIII]], who served as an intermediary; officially, Cousins was traveling to Rome on a personal basis, but from the Vatican he continued to the Soviet Union. Through Cousins' shuttle diplomacy in 1962 and 1963, the pontiff remained at the center of negotiations and helped ease misunderstandings between the two world leaders.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lacroix |first1=Patrick |title=John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Faith |date=2021 |publisher=University Press of Kansas |location=Lawrence |pages=93–102}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Cousins |first1=Norman |title=The Improbable Triumvirate: John F. Kennedy, Pope John, Nikita Khrushchev |date=1972 |publisher=W.W. Norton |location=New York }}</ref>

Kennedy's response to Khrushchev's proposals was lukewarm but Kennedy expressed to Cousins that he felt constrained in exploring these issues due to pressure from hardliners in the US national security apparatus. However Kennedy pursued negotiations for a partial nuclear test ban.<ref>Stone, Oliver and Peter Kuznick, ''The Untold History of the United States'' (Gallery Books, 2012), pp. 313–314 {{ISBN?}}</ref>

On 13 November 1962, Tsarapkin indicated that the Soviet Union would accept a proposal drafted by US and Soviet experts involving automated test detection stations ("black boxes") and a limited number of on-site inspections. The two sides disagreed over the number of black boxes, however, as the US sought 12–20 such stations and the Soviet Union rejected any more than three.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=71}} On 28 December 1962, Kennedy lowered the US demand to 8–10 stations. On 19 February 1963, the number was lowered further to seven, as Khrushchev continued to insist on no more than three.<ref name=cq/> Kennedy was willing to reduce the number to six, though this was not clearly communicated to the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=80}} On 20 April 1963, Khrushchev withdrew support for three inspections entirely.{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=21}}

Progress was further complicated in early 1963, as a group in the [[88th United States Congress|US Congress]] called for the Soviet proposal to be discarded in favor of the Geneva System.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=71}} On 27 May 1963, 34 US Senators, led by Humphrey and [[Thomas J. Dodd]], introduced a [[simple resolution|resolution]] calling for Kennedy to propose another partial ban to the Soviet Union involving national monitoring and no on-site inspections. Absent Soviet agreement, the resolution called for Kennedy to continue to "pursue it with vigor, seeking the widest possible international support" while suspending all atmospheric and underwater tests. The effect of the resolution was to bolster the general push for a test ban, though Kennedy initially was concerned that it would damage attempts to secure a comprehensive ban, and had administration figures (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff) reiterate a call for a comprehensive ban.<ref name=cq/>{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|pp=899–900}}{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=72}} That same spring of 1963, however, Kennedy had sent antinuclear activist [[Norman Cousins]] to Moscow to meet with Khrushchev, where he explained that the political situation in the US made it very difficult for Kennedy agree to a comprehensive ban with Khrushchev's required terms. Cousins also assured Khrushchev that though Kennedy had rejected Khrushchev's offer of three yearly inspections, he still was set on achieving a test ban.{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=85}} In March 1963, Kennedy had also held a press conference in which he re-committed to negotiations with the Soviet Union as a means of preventing rapid nuclear proliferation, which he characterized as "the greatest possible danger and hazard."{{sfn|Rhodes|2008|p=71}}

[[File:President Kennedy American University Commencement Address June 10, 1963.jpg|thumb|[[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] at American University]]
One of Kennedy's advisors, [[Walt Whitman Rostow]], advised the President to make a test ban conditional on the Soviet Union withdrawing troops from [[Cuba]] and abiding by a 1962 agreement on [[Laos]], but Kennedy opted instead for test-ban negotiations without preconditions.{{sfn|Gaddis|1982|pp=228–229}} On 10 June 1963, in an effort to reinvigorate and recontextualize a test ban, President Kennedy dedicated his [[American University speech|commencement address at American University]] to "the most important topic on earth: world peace" and proceeded to make his case for the treaty.{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=900}} Kennedy first called on Americans to dispel the idea that peace is unattainable. "Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace," Kennedy said, "based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned." Second, Kennedy appealed for a new attitude towards the Soviet Union, calling Americans to not "see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodations as impossible and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats."<ref name=au/> Finally, Kennedy argued for a reduction in Cold War tensions, with a test ban serving as a first step towards complete disarmament:

<blockquote> ...&nbsp;where a fresh start is badly needed—is in a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty—so near and yet so far—would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security—it would decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.<ref name=au>{{cite speech |title=American University's Spring Commencement 1963 |last=Kennedy |first=John F. |author-link=John F. Kennedy |date=10 June 1963 |location=[[American University]] |url=http://www1.american.edu/media/speeches/Kennedy.htm |access-date=7 August 2016 |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160816063307/http://www1.american.edu/media/speeches/Kennedy.htm |archive-date=16 August 2016}}</ref></blockquote>

Kennedy proceeded to announce an agreement with Khrushchev and Macmillan to promptly resume comprehensive test-ban negotiations in Moscow and a US decision to unilaterally halt atmospheric tests.<ref name=au/> The speech was well received by Khrushchev, who later called it "the greatest speech by any American President since [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|Roosevelt]],"{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=904}} though was met with some skepticism within the US. The speech was endorsed by Humphrey and other Democrats, but labeled a "dreadful mistake" by Republican Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] and "another case of concession" by [[Everett Dirksen]], the leader of the Senate Republicans. Dirksen and [[Charles A. Halleck]], the second-ranking [[United States House of Representatives|House]] Republican, warned that the renewed negotiations might end in "virtual surrender."<ref name=cq/>

Due to prior experience in arms control and his personal relationship with Khrushchev, former [[United States Assistant Secretary of War|Assistant Secretary of War]] [[John J. McCloy]] was first considered the likely choice for chief US negotiator in Moscow, but his name was withdrawn after he turned out to be unavailable over the summer. [[W. Averell Harriman]], a former ambassador to the Soviet Union well respected in Moscow, was chosen instead.{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|pp=902–903}} The US delegation would also include [[Adrian S. Fisher]], [[Carl Kaysen]], [[John McNaughton (government official)|John McNaughton]], and [[William R. Tyler]]. In Britain, Macmillan initially wanted David Ormsby-Gore, who had just completed a term as foreign minister, to lead his delegation, but there were concerns that Ormsby-Gore would appear to be a US "stooge" (Kennedy described him as "the brightest man he ever knew").{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=15}} Instead, Macmillan chose [[Quintin Hogg, Baron Hailsham of St Marylebone|Quintin Hogg]]. [[Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.]], a special advisor to Kennedy, believed that Hogg was "ill prepared on the technicalities of the problem and was consumed by a desire to get a treaty at almost any cost."{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=905}} [[Andrei Gromyko]], the Soviet [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Soviet Union)|Minister of Foreign Affairs]], served as Moscow's emissary.{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=906}}

Heading into the negotiations, there was still no resolution within the Kennedy Administration of the question of whether to pursue a comprehensive or partial ban. In an effort to achieve the former, Britain proposed reducing the number of mandated inspections to allay Soviet concerns, but Harriman believed such a reduction would have to be paired with other concessions that Khrushchev would be able to show off within the Soviet Union and to China. Withdrawing [[PGM-19 Jupiter]] missiles from [[Italy]] and [[Turkey]] would have been an option, had they not already been removed in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In meetings prior to the negotiations, Kennedy informed Harriman that he would be willing to make concessions on the [[Berlin]] question.{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|pp=903–904}}

On 2 July 1963, Khrushchev proposed a partial ban on tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, which would avoid the contentious issue of detecting underground tests. Notably, Khrushchev did not link this proposal to a moratorium on underground tests (as had been proposed earlier), but said it should be followed by a [[non-aggression pact]] between [[NATO]] and the [[Warsaw Pact]].{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=904}} "A test ban agreement combined with the signing of a non-aggression pact between the two groups of state will create a fresh international climate more favorable for a solution of the major problems of our time, including disarmament," Khrushchev said.<ref name=khrushchevspeech>{{cite speech |title=Excerpt from Chairman Khrushchev's Speech |last=Khrushchev |first=Nikita |author-link=Nikita Khrushchev |date=2 July 1963 |location=[[East Berlin]] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ojBXI7fmRKIC&pg=PA1000}}</ref>

As the nuclear powers pursued a test ban agreement, they also sought to contend with a rising communist China, which at the time was pursuing its own [[China and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons|nuclear program]]. In 1955, [[Mao Zedong]] expressed to the Soviet Union his belief that China could withstand a first nuclear strike and more than 100&nbsp;million casualties. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union assisted the Chinese nuclear program, but stopped short of providing China with an actual nuclear bomb, which was followed by [[Sino-Soviet split|increasingly tense relations]] in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Khrushchev began the test-ban talks of 1958 with minimal prior discussion with China, and the two countries' agreement on military-technology cooperation was terminated in June 1959.<ref name=wilsoncenter>{{cite web |title=Sharing the Bomb among Friends: The Dilemmas of Sino-Soviet Strategic Cooperation |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/sharing-the-bomb-among-friends-the-dilemmas-sino-soviet-strategic-cooperation |publisher=[[Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars]] |last=Jersild |first=Austin |date=8 October 2013 |access-date=7 August 2016}}</ref> Prior to the Moscow negotiations of the summer of 1963, Kennedy granted Harriman significant latitude in reaching a "Soviet-American understanding" vis-à-vis China.{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=904}} Secret Sino-Soviet talks in July 1963 revealed further discord between the two communist powers, as the Soviet Union released a statement that it did not "share the views of the Chinese leadership about creating 'a thousand times higher civilization' on the corpses of hundreds of millions of people." The Soviet Union also issued an ideological critique of China's nuclear policy, declaring that China's apparent openness to nuclear war was "in crying contradiction to the idea of [[Marxism–Leninism]]," as a nuclear war would "not distinguish between imperialists and working people."{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=905}}

The negotiations were inaugurated on 15 July 1963 at the [[Kremlin]] with Khrushchev in attendance. Khrushchev reiterated that the Anglo-American inspection plan would amount to espionage, effectively dismissing the possibility of a comprehensive ban. Following the script of his 3 July 1963 speech, Khrushchev did not demand a simultaneous moratorium on underground testing and instead proposed a non-aggression pact. Under instruction from Washington, Harriman replied that the US would explore the possibility of a non-aggression pact in good faith, but indicated that while a test ban could be quickly completed, a non-aggression pact would require lengthy discussions. Additionally, such a pact would complicate the issue of Western access to [[West Berlin]]. Harriman also took the opportunity to propose a non-proliferation agreement with would bar the transfer of nuclear weapons between countries. Khrushchev said that such an agreement should be considered in the future, but in the interim, a test ban would have the same effect on limiting proliferation.{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|pp=905–906}}

Following initial discussions, Gromyko and Harriman began examining drafts of a test-ban agreement. First, language in the drafted preamble appeared to Harriman to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense, which Harriman insisted be clarified. Harriman additionally demanded that an explicit clause concerning withdrawal from the agreement be added to the treaty; Khrushchev believed that each state had a sovereign right to withdraw, which should simply be assumed. Harriman informed Gromyko that without a clause governing withdrawal, which he believed the US Senate would demand, the US could not assent.{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|pp=906–907}} Ultimately, the two sides settled upon compromise language:

<blockquote>Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=907}}</blockquote>

Gromyko and Harriman debated how states not universally recognized (e.g., [[East Germany]] and China) could join the agreement. The US proposed asserting that accession to the treaty would not indicate international recognition. This was rejected by the Soviet Union. Eventually, with Kennedy's approval, US envoys Fisher and McNaughton devised a system whereby multiple government would serve as [[depositary|depositaries]] for the treaty, allowing individual states to sign only the agreement held by the government of their choice in association with other like-minded states. This solution, which overcame one of the more challenging roadblocks in the negotiations, also served to allay mounting concerns from Macmillan, which were relayed to Washington, that an agreement would once again be derailed.{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|pp=907–908}} Finally, in an original Soviet draft, the signature of France would have been required for the treaty to come into effect. At Harriman's insistence, this requirement was removed.{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=21}}

[[File:President Kennedy address on Test Ban Treaty, 26 July 1963.jpg|thumb|[[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] announces the agreement on 26 July 1963]]
The agreement was initialed on 25 July 1963, just 10 days after negotiations commenced. The following day, Kennedy delivered a 26-minute televised address on the agreement, declaring that since the invention of nuclear weapons, "all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth&nbsp;... Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness." Kennedy expressed hope that the test ban would be the first step towards broader rapprochement, limit nuclear fallout, restrict nuclear proliferation, and slow the arms race in such a way that fortifies US security. Kennedy concluded his address in reference to a Chinese [[proverb]] that he had used with Khrushchev in Vienna two years prior. "'A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step,'" Kennedy said. "And if that journey is a thousand miles, or even more, let history record that we, in this land, at this time, took the first step."{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=910}}<ref name=jfktv>{{cite speech |title=Address to the Nation on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty |last=Kennedy |first=John F. |author-link=John F. Kennedy |date=26 July 1963 |url=https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/historic-speeches/televised-address-on-nuclear-test-ban-treaty |access-date=7 August 2016}}</ref>

In a speech in Moscow following the agreement, Khrushchev declared that the treaty would not end the arms race and by itself could not "avert the danger of war," and reiterated his proposal of a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression accord.<ref name=cq/> For Khrushchev, the test ban negotiations had long been a means of improving the Soviet Union's global image and reducing strain in relations with the West.{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=24}} There are also some indications that military experts within the Soviet Union saw a test ban as a way to restrict US development of [[tactical nuclear weapon]]s, which could have increased US willingness to deploy small nuclear weapons on battlefields while circumventing the Soviet nuclear [[deterrence theory|deterrent]].{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=26}} Concern that a comprehensive ban would retard modernization of the Soviet arsenal may have pushed Khrushchev towards a partial ban.{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=27}} Counteracting the move towards a partial ban was Khrushchev's interest in reducing spending on testing, as underground testing was more expensive than the atmospheric tests the Soviet Union had been conducting; Khrushchev preferred a comprehensive ban as it would have eliminated the cost of testing entirely.{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|p=88}} Furthermore, there was internal concern about nuclear proliferation, particularly regarding the prospect of France and China crossing the threshold and the possibility of a multilateral NATO nuclear force, which was seen as a step towards West Germany acquiring nuclear weapons (the first Soviet test ban proposal in 1955 was made in the same month than West Germany joined NATO).{{sfn|Strode|1990|pp=28–29}}

It was not until after the agreement was reached that the negotiators broached the question of France and China joining the treaty. Harriman proposed to Khrushchev that the US lobby France while the Soviet Union pursued a Chinese signature. "That's your problem," Khrushchev said in reply.{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=908}} Earlier, the Soviet ambassador to the US, Mikhail A. Menshikov, reportedly asked whether the US could "deliver the French."{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=29}} Both Kennedy and Macmillan personally called on de Gaulle to join, offering assistance to the French nuclear program in return.{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|p=465}} Nevertheless, on 29 July 1963, France announced it would not join the treaty. It was followed by China two days later.<ref name=cq/> China viewed the treaty as demonstrating a re-alignment by the United States and the Soviet Union against China, with Marshal [[Chen Yi (marshal)|Chen Yi]] characterizing the treaty as "targeted against us."<ref name="Crean">{{Cite book |last=Crean |first=Jeffrey |title=The Fear of Chinese Power: an International History |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-23394-2 |edition= |series=New Approaches to International History series |location=London |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=96}}

On 5 August 1963, British Foreign Secretary [[Alec Douglas-Home]], Soviet foreign minister Gromyko, and US Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] signed the final agreement.<ref name=statedept/><ref name=faschron/>