Editing Operation Sea Lion (section)

== Land forces ==
{{Main|Operation Sea Lion order of battle}}
In the Army plan of 25 July 1940, the invasion force was to be organised into two [[army group]]s drawn from the [[6th Army (Wehrmacht)|6th Army]], the [[9th Army (Wehrmacht)|9th Army]] and the [[16th Army (Wehrmacht)|16th Army]]. The first wave of the landing would have consisted of thirteen [[infantry]] and [[Mountain warfare|mountain]] [[Division (military)|divisions]], the second wave of eight [[Panzer division|panzer]] and [[motorised infantry]] divisions and finally, the third wave was formed of six further infantry divisions.{{sfn|Schenk|1990|pp=10–11}} The initial assault would have also included two [[Airborne forces|airborne]] divisions under ''Luftwaffe'' command,{{sfn|Schenk|1990|p=190}} and the [[special forces]] of the [[Brandenburgers|Brandenburg Regiment]], controlled by the ''[[Abwehr]]''.{{sfn|Schenk|1990|pp=237–238}}

This initial plan was vetoed by opposition from both the ''Kriegsmarine'' and the ''Luftwaffe'', who successfully argued that an amphibious force could only be assured air and naval protection if confined to a narrow front, and that the landing areas should be as far from Royal Navy bases as possible. The definitive order of battle adopted on 30 August 1940 envisaged a first wave of nine divisions from the 9th and 16th armies landing along four stretches of beach – two infantry divisions on beach 'B' between [[Folkestone]] and [[New Romney]] supported by a special forces company of the Brandenburg Regiment, two infantry divisions on beach 'C' between [[Rye, East Sussex|Rye]] and [[Hastings]] supported by three battalions of submersible/floating tanks, two infantry divisions on beach 'D' between [[Bexhill-on-Sea|Bexhill]] and [[Eastbourne]] supported by one battalion of submersible/floating tanks and a second company of the Brandenburg Regiment, and three infantry divisions on beach 'E' between [[Beachy Head]] and [[Brighton]].{{sfn|McKinstry|2014|p=315}} A single airborne division would land in Kent north of [[Hythe, Kent|Hythe]]; with the objective of seizing the aerodrome at [[RAF Lympne|Lympne]] and bridge-crossings over the [[Royal Military Canal]], and in assisting the ground forces in capturing Folkestone. Folkestone (to the east) and [[Newhaven, East Sussex|Newhaven]] (to the west) were the only cross-channel port facilities that would have been accessible to the invasion forces; and much depended on these being captured substantially intact or with the capability of rapid repair; in which case the second wave of eight divisions (including all the motorised and armoured divisions) might be unloaded directly onto their respective quaysides. A further six infantry divisions were allocated to the third wave.{{sfn|Forczyk|2016|p=63}}

The order of battle defined on 30 August remained as the agreed overall plan but was always considered as potentially subject to change if circumstances demanded it.{{sfn|Forczyk|2016|p=66}} The Army High Command continued to press for a wider landing area if possible, against the opposition of the ''Kriegsmarine''; in August they had won the concession that, if the opportunity arose, a force might be landed directly from ships onto the seafront at Brighton, perhaps supported by a second airborne force landing on the South Downs.  Contrariwise, the ''Kriegsmarine'' (fearful of possible fleet action against the invasion forces from Royal Navy ships in Portsmouth) insisted that the divisions enshipped from [[Cherbourg]] and [[Le Havre]] for landing on beach 'E', might be diverted to any one of the other beaches where sufficient space allowed.{{sfn|Forczyk|2016|p=247}}

Each of the first wave landing forces was divided into three echelons. The first echelon, carried across the Channel on barges, coasters and small motor launches, would consist of the main infantry assault force. The second echelon, carried across the Channel in larger transport vessels, would consist predominantly of artillery, armoured vehicles and other heavy equipment. The third echelon, carried across the channel on barges, would consist of the vehicles, horses, stores and personnel of the division-level support services.  Loading of barges and transports with heavy equipment, vehicles and stores would start in Antwerp nine days before the first day of Operation Sealion ("S-Tag"<ref>{{cite web |title=German Plans for the Invasion of England, 1940 Operation "SEALION" |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/GERMAN%20PLANS%20FOR%20INVASION%20OF%20ENGLAND%2C%201940_0001.pdf |website=CIA Reading Room |publisher=CIA |access-date=15 July 2024 |page=v |quote=S-Tag = Erster Operationstag für den "Seelöwen" = [[D-Day (military term)|D-Day]] for Operation "Sealion"}}</ref> minus nine); and S-Tag minus eight in Dunkirk, with horses not loaded till S-Tag minus two. All troops would be loaded onto their barges from French or Belgian ports on S-Tag minus two or S-Tag minus one.  The first echelon would land on the beaches on S-Tag itself, preferably at daybreak around two hours after high tide.  The barges used for the first echelon would be retrieved by tugs on the afternoon of S-Tag, and those still in working order would be drawn up alongside the transport vessels to trans-ship the second echelon overnight, so that much of the second echelon and third echelon could land on S-Tag plus one, with the remainder on S-Tag plus two.  The Navy intended that all four invasion fleets would return across the Channel on the night of S-Tag plus two, having been moored for three full days off the South coast of England. The Army had sought to have the third echelon cross in later separate convoys to avoid men and horses having to wait for as long as four days and nights in their barges, but the ''Kriegsmarine'' were insistent that they could only protect the four fleets from Royal Navy attack if all vessels crossed the Channel together.{{sfn|Forczyk|2016|p=248}} A total of 138,000 men would have been landed in the first two days, rising to 248,000 within the first fortnight.{{sfn|Schenk|1990|p=232}}

In the summer of 1940, the headquarters staff of the British Army's [[Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces]] tended to consider East Anglia and the East coast to be the most likely landing sites for a German invasion force, as this would have offered much greater opportunities to seize ports and natural harbours, and would be further from naval forces at [[Portsmouth]]. But then the accumulation of invasion barges in French ports from late August 1940 rather indicated a landing on the South coast.  Consequently, the main Home Forces mobile reserve force was held back around London, so as to be able to move forwards to protect the capital, either into Kent or Essex.  Hence, Sea Lion landings in Kent and Sussex would have been initially opposed by [[XII Corps (United Kingdom)|XII Corps]] of [[Eastern Command (United Kingdom)|Eastern Command]] with three infantry divisions and two independent brigades and [[V Corps (United Kingdom)|V Corps]] of [[Southern Command (United Kingdom)|Southern Command]] with three infantry divisions. In reserve were two more Corps under GHQ Home Forces; located south of London was the [[VII Corps (United Kingdom)|VII Corps]] with the [[1st Canadian Infantry Division]], an armoured division and an independent armoured brigade, while north of London was [[IV Corps (United Kingdom)|IV Corps]] with an armoured division, infantry division and independent infantry brigade.{{sfn|Collier|1962|pp=219–220}} See [[British anti-invasion preparations of the Second World War#British armed forces|British army anti invasion preparations]].