Editing Nuclear weapon (section)

== Nuclear strategy ==
{{Main|Nuclear strategy|Deterrence theory}}
{{See also|Pre-emptive nuclear strike|Nuclear peace|Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence|Single Integrated Operational Plan|Nuclear warfare|On Thermonuclear War}}
Nuclear warfare strategy is a set of policies that deal with preventing or fighting a nuclear war. The policy of trying to prevent an attack by a nuclear weapon from another country by threatening nuclear retaliation is known as the strategy of [[deterrence theory|nuclear deterrence]]. The goal in deterrence is to always maintain a second strike capability (the ability of a country to respond to a nuclear attack with one of its own) and potentially to strive for [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|first strike]] status (the ability to destroy an enemy's nuclear forces before they could retaliate). During the Cold War, policy and military theorists considered the sorts of policies that might prevent a nuclear attack, and they developed [[game theory]] models that could lead to stable deterrence conditions.<ref name="Handel2012">{{cite book|author=Michael I. Handel|title=War, Strategy and Intelligence |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Gp0rBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA85|date=November 12, 2012|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-136-28624-7|pages=85– |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170331214605/https://books.google.com/books?id=Gp0rBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA85|archive-date=March 31, 2017}}</ref>

[[File:W87 MX Missile schematic.jpg|thumb|The now decommissioned United States' [[LG-118A Peacekeeper|Peacekeeper missile]] was an [[ICBM]] developed to replace the [[Minuteman missile]] in the late 1980s. Each missile, like the [[Throw weight|heavier lift]] Russian [[SS-18 Satan]], could contain up to ten nuclear warheads (shown in red), each of which could be aimed at a different target. A factor in the development of [[MIRV]]s was to make complete [[missile defense]] difficult for an enemy country.]]

Different forms of [[nuclear weapons delivery]] (see above) allow for different types of nuclear strategies. The goals of any strategy are generally to make it difficult for an enemy to launch a pre-emptive strike against the weapon system and difficult to defend against the delivery of the weapon during a potential conflict. This can mean keeping weapon locations hidden, such as deploying them on [[submarine]]s or land mobile [[transporter erector launcher]]s whose locations are difficult to track, or it can mean protecting weapons by burying them in hardened [[missile silo]] bunkers. Other components of nuclear strategies included using missile defenses to destroy the missiles before they land or implementing [[civil defense]] measures using early-warning systems to evacuate citizens to safe areas before an attack.

Weapons designed to threaten large populations or to deter attacks are known as ''[[strategic nuclear weapons|strategic weapons]].'' Nuclear weapons for use on a [[battle]]field in military situations are called ''[[tactical nuclear weapons|tactical weapons]].''

Critics of nuclear war strategy often suggest that a nuclear war between two nations would result in mutual annihilation. From this point of view, the significance of nuclear weapons is to deter war because any nuclear war would escalate out of mutual distrust and fear, resulting in [[mutually assured destruction]]. This threat of national, if not global, destruction has been a strong motivation for anti-nuclear weapons activism.

Critics from the peace movement and within the military establishment{{citation needed|date=June 2013}} have questioned the usefulness of such weapons in the current military climate. According to an [[International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons|advisory opinion]] issued by the [[International Court of Justice]] in 1996, the use of (or threat of use of) such weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, but the court did not reach an opinion as to whether or not the threat or use would be lawful in specific extreme circumstances such as if the survival of the state were at stake.

[[File:180326-N-UK333-189 (41145118741).jpg|right|thumb|[[Ballistic missile submarine]]s have been of great strategic importance for the United States, Russia, and other nuclear powers since they entered service in the [[Cold War]], as they can hide from [[reconnaissance satellite]]s and fire their nuclear weapons with virtual impunity.]]
Another [[deterrence theory|deterrence]] position is that [[nuclear proliferation]] can be desirable. In this case, it is argued that, unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons deter all-out war between states, and they succeeded in doing this during the [[Cold War]] between the US and the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Creveld |first1=Martin Van |title=The Oxford History of Modern War |chapter=Technology and War II:Postmodern War? |editor=Charles Townshend |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2000 |location=New York |page=[https://archive.org/details/oxfordhistoryofm00town/page/349 349] |isbn=978-0-19-285373-8 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/oxfordhistoryofm00town |url=https://archive.org/details/oxfordhistoryofm00town/page/349}}</ref> In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gen. [[Pierre Marie Gallois]] of France, an adviser to [[Charles de Gaulle]], argued in books like ''The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age'' (1961) that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear weapons could increase [[Nuclear peace|international stability]]. Some prominent [[Neorealism (international relations)|neo-realist]] scholars, such as [[Kenneth Waltz]] and [[John Mearsheimer]], have argued, along the lines of Gallois, that some forms of nuclear proliferation would decrease the likelihood of [[total war]], especially in troubled regions of the world where there exists a single nuclear-weapon state. Aside from the public opinion that opposes proliferation in any form, there are two schools of thought on the matter: those, like Mearsheimer, who favored selective proliferation,<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mearsheimer |first=John |year=2006 |title=Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I) |url=http://jonmearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0020.pdf |url-status=dead |journal=International Relations |volume=20 |issue=1 |pages=105–123 |doi=10.1177/0047117806060939 |s2cid=220788933 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130501181414/http://johnmearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0020.pdf |archive-date=May 1, 2013 |accessdate=November 23, 2020 |issn = 0047-1178 }} See page 116</ref> and Waltz, who was somewhat more non-[[interventionism (politics)|interventionist]].<ref>Kenneth Waltz, "More May Be Better", in Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, eds., ''The Spread of Nuclear Weapons'' (New York: Norton, 1995).</ref><ref name=waltz>Kenneth Waltz, [http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better"], {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101201053554/http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm |date=December 1, 2010}} ''Adelphi Papers'', no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).</ref> Interest in proliferation and the [[stability-instability paradox]] that it generates continues to this day, with ongoing debate about indigenous Japanese and [[South Korea]]n nuclear deterrent against [[North Korea]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1327|title=Should We Let the Bomb Spread? Edited by Mr. Henry D. Sokolski. Strategic studies institute. November 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161123214604/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1327|archive-date=November 23, 2016}}</ref>

The threat of potentially suicidal terrorists possessing nuclear weapons (a form of [[nuclear terrorism]]) complicates the decision process. The prospect of [[mutually assured destruction]] might not deter an enemy who expects to die in the confrontation. Further, if the initial act is from a stateless [[terrorist]] instead of a sovereign nation, there might not be a nation or specific target to retaliate against. It has been argued, especially after the [[September 11 attacks|September 11, 2001, attacks]], that this complication calls for a new nuclear strategy, one that is distinct from that which gave relative stability during the Cold War.<ref name="feldman">See, for example: Feldman, Noah. "[https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/magazine/29islam.html Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160219172015/http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/magazine/29islam.html |date=February 19, 2016}}", ''New York Times Magazine'' (October 29, 2006).</ref> Since 1996, the United States has had a policy of allowing the targeting of its nuclear weapons at terrorists armed with [[weapons of mass destruction]].<ref>Daniel Plesch & Stephen Young, "Senseless policy", ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=sgsAAAAAMBAJ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150919025137/https://books.google.com/books?id=sgsAAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover |date=September 19, 2015}}'', November/December 1998, page 4. Fetched from URL on April 18, 2011.</ref>

[[File:Minuteman III launches from Vandenberg (2425138).jpg|thumb|A [[LGM-30 Minuteman|Minuteman III]] ICBM test launch from [[Vandenberg Air Force Base]], United States. [[Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle|MIRVed]] land-based [[ICBM]]s are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on [[First strike (nuclear strategy)|striking first]].]]

[[Robert Gallucci]] argues that although traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe, Gallucci believes that "the United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not solely on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently leak nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent.".<ref>{{cite journal|last=Gallucci|first=Robert|s2cid=68857650|title=Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability|journal=Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|date=September 2006|volume=607|pages=51–58|doi=10.1177/0002716206290457}}</ref>

[[Graham Allison]] makes a similar case, arguing that the key to expanded deterrence is coming up with ways of tracing nuclear material to the country that forged the fissile material. "After a nuclear bomb detonates, [[nuclear forensics]] cops would collect debris samples and send them to a laboratory for radiological analysis. By identifying unique attributes of the fissile material, including its impurities and contaminants, one could trace the path back to its origin."<ref name="Allison">{{cite news|last=Allison|first=Graham|title=How to Keep the Bomb From Terrorist s|url=http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/13/how-to-keep-the-bomb-from-terrorists.html|access-date=January 28, 2013|newspaper=Newsweek|date=March 13, 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130513111324/http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/13/how-to-keep-the-bomb-from-terrorists.html|archive-date=May 13, 2013}}</ref> The process is analogous to identifying a criminal by fingerprints. "The goal would be twofold: first, to deter leaders of nuclear states from selling weapons to terrorists by holding them accountable for any use of their weapons; second, to give leaders every incentive to tightly secure their nuclear weapons and materials."<ref name="Allison" />

According to the Pentagon's June 2019 "[[Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations]]" of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs website Publication, "Integration of nuclear weapons employment with conventional and special operations forces is essential to the success of any mission or operation."<ref>{{cite news |title=The Pentagon Revealed Its Nuclear War Strategy and It's Terrifying |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/the-pentagon-revealed-its-nuclear-war-strategy-and-its-terrifying/ |work=[[Vice (magazine)|Vice]] |date=June 21, 2019 |access-date=October 9, 2019 |archive-date=December 7, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191207063100/https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/mb84db/the-pentagon-revealed-its-nuclear-war-strategy-and-its-terrifying |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Nuclear weapons: experts alarmed by new Pentagon 'war-fighting' doctrine |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/19/nuclear-weapons-pentagon-us-military-doctrine |work=The Guardian |date=June 19, 2019 |access-date=October 9, 2019 |archive-date=June 19, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190619222056/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/19/nuclear-weapons-pentagon-us-military-doctrine |url-status=live }}</ref>