Editing Nuclear proliferation (section)

===Limitations of safeguards===
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The greatest risk from nuclear weapons proliferation comes from countries that have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities; India, Pakistan, and Israel fall within this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny.

A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive [[nuclear fuel]] cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements, such as insisted upon by [[Australia]] and [[Canada]] for sale of [[uranium]], address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT, it is likely to be reported by the [[International Atomic Energy Agency|IAEA]] to the [[United Nations Security Council]], just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely.

IAEA safeguards can help ensure that uranium supplied as nuclear fuel and other nuclear supplies do not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear [[electricity]] make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely.

The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force, will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.