Editing Nicholas I of Russia (section)

==Military and foreign policy==
[[File:equestriannicholas1.jpg|thumb|[[Monument to Nicholas I]] on [[St. Isaac's Square]]]]

Nicolas' aggressive [[foreign policy]] involved many expensive wars, having a disastrous effect on the empire's finances.{{citation needed|date=April 2019}} Nicholas lavished attention on his very large army; of a population of 60–70 million people, the army counted one million men. They had outdated equipment and tactics, but the tsar, who dressed like a soldier and surrounded himself with officers, gloried in the victory over Napoleon in 1812 and took enormous pride in its smartness on parade. The cavalry horses, for example, were only trained in parade formations, and did poorly in battle. The glitter and braid masked profound weaknesses that he did not see. He put generals in charge of most of his civilian agencies regardless of their qualifications. An [[Agnosticism|agnostic]] who won fame in cavalry charges was made supervisor of Church affairs. The army became the vehicle of upward social mobility for noble youths from non-Russian areas, such as Poland, the Baltic, Finland, and Georgia. On the other hand, many miscreants, petty criminals, and undesirables were punished by local officials by being enlisted for life in the Army. The conscription system was highly unpopular with people, as was the practice of forcing peasants to house the soldiers for six months of the year. Curtiss finds that "The pedantry of Nicholas's military system, which stressed unthinking obedience and parade ground evolutions rather than combat training, produced ineffective commanders in time of war." His commanders in the Crimean War were old and incompetent, and indeed so were his muskets as the colonels sold the best equipment and the best food.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Curtiss|first=John Shelton|year=1958|title=The Army of Nicholas I: Its Role and Character|journal=[[American Historical Review]]|volume=63|issue=4|pages=880–889 [p. 886]|doi=10.2307/1848945|jstor=1848945}}</ref>

For much of Nicholas' reign, Russia was seen as a major military power, with considerable strength. The Crimean War, fought shortly before Nicholas' death, demonstrated to both Russia and the world what few had previously realized: Russia was militarily weak, technologically backward, and administratively incompetent. Despite his grand ambitions toward the south and Turkey, Russia had not built railroad network in that direction, and communications were bad. The bureaucracy was unprepared for war being riddled with graft, corruption, and inefficiency. The Navy had few competent officers, the rank and file were poorly trained and most importantly its vessels were outdated; the army, although very large, was good only for parades, suffered from colonels who pocketed their men's pay, poor morale, and was even more out of touch with the latest technology as developed by [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|Britain]] and [[Second French Empire|France]]. By the war's end, Russia's leaders were determined to reform their military and society. As Fuller notes, "Russia had been beaten on the Crimean Peninsula, and the military feared that it would inevitably be beaten again unless steps were taken to surmount its military weakness."<ref>{{cite book|author=Fuller, William C.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BNF318Pgq9kC&pg=PA273|title=Strategy and Power in Russia 1600–1914|date=1 October 1998|isbn=9781439105771|page=273| publisher=Simon and Schuster }}</ref><ref>Barbara Jelavich, ''St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974'' (1974) p. 119</ref><ref>William C. Fuller, ''Strategy and Power in Russia 1600–1914'' (1998) pp. 252–59</ref>

[[File:View of New Archangel, 1837.tif|thumb|right|270px|The [[Russian-American Company]]'s capital at New Archangel (present-day [[Sitka, Alaska]]) in 1837]]
An intensely militaristic man, Nicholas regarded the Army as the best and greatest institution in Russia and as a model for society, saying:<ref>Lincoln, W. Bruce "The Ministers of Nicholas I: A Brief Inquiry into Their Backgrounds and Service Careers" pp. 308–323 from ''The Russian Review'', Volume 34, Issue #3, July 1975 p. 312.</ref>
{{Blockquote|Here [in the Army] there is order. ... All things flow logically from one another. No one here commands without first learning to obey. No one rises above anyone else except through a clearly defined system. Everything is subordinated to a single, defined goal and everything has its precise designations. That is why I shall always hold the title of soldier in the highest esteem. I regard human life as service because everybody must serve.}}

Nicholas was often exasperated by the slow pace of the Russian bureaucracy and had a marked preference for appointing generals and admirals to high government rank because of their perceived efficiency, overlooking or ignoring whether or not they were actually qualified for the role.<ref name="Lincoln, W pages 308-323">Lincoln, W. Bruce "The Ministers of Nicholas I: A Brief Inquiry into Their Backgrounds and Service Careers" pp. 308–323 from ''The Russian Review'', Volume 34, Issue #3, July 1975 p. 313.</ref> Of the men who served as Nicholas's ministers, 61% had previously served as a general or an admiral.<ref name="Lincoln, W pages 308-323" /> Nicholas liked to appoint generals who had seen combat, and at least 30 of the men who served as a minister under him had seen action in the wars against France, the Ottoman Empire, and Sweden.<ref>Lincoln, W. Bruce "The Ministers of Nicholas I: A Brief Inquiry into Their Backgrounds and Service Careers" pp. 308–323 from ''The Russian Review'', Volume 34, Issue #3, July 1975 pp. 313–314.</ref> This proved to be something of a handicap in the sense that the sort of qualities that could make a man distinguished on the battlefields such as bravery did not necessarily make a man capable of running a ministry. The most notorious case was Prince [[Alexander Sergeyevich Menshikov]], a competent brigade commander in the Imperial Army who proved himself out of his depth as a Navy minister.<ref>Lincoln, W. Bruce "The Ministers of Nicholas I: A Brief Inquiry into Their Backgrounds and Service Careers" pp. 308–323 from ''The Russian Review'', Volume 34, Issue #3, July 1975 pp. 315–316.</ref> Of the Emperor's ministers, 78% were ethnic Russians, 9.6% were Baltic Germans while the rest were foreigners in Russian service.<ref>Lincoln, W. Bruce "The Ministers of Nicholas I: A Brief Inquiry into Their Backgrounds and Service Careers" pp. 308–323 from ''The Russian Review'', Volume 34, Issue #3, July 1975 p. 314.</ref> Of the men who served as ministers under Nicholas, 14 had graduated from university while another 14 had graduated from a ''lycée'' or a ''gymnasium'', the rest had all been educated by private tutors.<ref>Lincoln, W. Bruce "The Ministers of Nicholas I: A Brief Inquiry into Their Backgrounds and Service Careers" pp. 308–323 from ''The Russian Review'', Volume 34, Issue #3, July 1975 pp. 314–315.</ref>

=== Europe ===
[[File:Nicholas I of Russia by Alexander Schwabe (1843, GIM) detail 01.jpg|thumb|Nicholas I in an equestrian portrait]]
In foreign policy, Nicholas I acted as the protector of ruling legitimism and as guardian against revolution. It has often been noted that such policies were linked with the [[Klemens von Metternich|Metternich counter-revolutionary system]] through the Austrian ambassador Count [[Karl Ludwig von Ficquelmont]].<ref>''[[Why Nations Fail]]'', Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James p. 224. {{ISBN|978-0-307-71921-8}}</ref> Nicholas's offers to suppress revolution on the European continent, trying to follow the pattern set by his eldest brother, Alexander I, earned him the label of "gendarme of Europe".<ref>Hosking (1997), p. 32</ref>

Immediately on his succession Nicholas began to limit the liberties that existed under the [[constitutional monarchy]] in [[Congress Poland]]. Nicholas was outraged when he learned of the [[Belgian Revolution|Belgian revolt against the Dutch in 1830]] and ordered the [[Imperial Russian Army]] to mobilize. Nicholas then petitioned the Prussian ambassador for Russian troops to be granted transit rights in order to march across Europe and restore Dutch hegemony over Belgium.<ref>Rendall, Matthew "Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe" pp. 523–540 from ''Review of International Studies'', Volume 32, Issue #3 July 2006 p. 534.</ref> But at the same time, a [[cholera]] epidemic was decimating Russian troops and the revolt in Poland tied down Russian soldiers which might have been deployed against the Belgians.<ref name="Rendall pages 523-540">Rendall, Matthew "Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe" pages 523–540 from ''Review of International Studies'', Volume 32, Issue # 3 July 2006 p. 535.</ref> It seems likely that Nicholas's hawkish stance was not a sincere prelude towards invasion of the Low Countries, but rather an attempt to apply pressure on the other European powers. Nicholas made it clear he would only act if Prussia and Britain also participated as he feared that a Russian invasion of Belgium would cause a war with France.<ref name="Rendall pages 523-540"/> Even before the Poles rose up, Nicholas had cancelled his plans for invading Belgium as it became clear that neither Britain nor Prussia would join in while the French openly threatened war if Nicholas should march.<ref>Rendall, Matthew "Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe" pp. 523–540 from ''Review of International Studies'', Volume 32, Issue #3 July 2006 pp. 535–536.</ref> In 1815, Nicholas arrived in France, where he stayed with the Duke of Orleans, Louis Philippe, who soon become one of his best friends, with the grand duke being impressed with duke's personal warmth, intelligence, manners and grace.<ref>Riasanovsky, Nicholas ''Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 page 255.</ref> For Nicholas the worst sort of characters were nobility who supported liberalism, and when the duc d'Orleans become the king of the French as [[Louis Philippe I]] in the July revolution of 1830, Nicholas took this as a personal betrayal, believing his friend had gone over as he saw it to the dark side of revolution and liberalism.<ref>Riasanovsky, Nicholas ''Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 page 256.</ref> Nicholas hated Louis-Philippe, the self-styled ''Le roi citoyen'' ("the Citizen King") as a renegade nobleman and a "usurper", and his foreign policy starting in 1830 was primarily [[Anti-French sentiment|anti-French]], based upon reviving the coalition that had existed during the Napoleonic era of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain, to isolate France.<ref>Riasanovsky, Nicholas ''Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 pages 256–257.</ref> Nicholas detested Louis-Philippe to the point that he refused to use his name, referring to him merely as "the usurper".<ref>Riasanovsky, Nicholas ''Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 page 257.</ref> Britain was unwilling to join the anti-French coalition, but Nicholas was successful in cementing existing close ties with Austria and Prussia and the three imperial states regularly held joint military reviews during this time.<ref>Riasanovsky, Nicholas ''Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 pages 255–256</ref> For much of the 1830s, a sort of "cold war" existed between the liberal "western bloc" of France and Britain vs. the reactionary "eastern bloc" of Austria, Prussia and Russia.<ref>Riasanovsky, Nicholas ''Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 pages 255–256.</ref>

After the [[November Uprising]] broke out, in 1831 the [[Sejm of Congress Poland|Polish parliament]] deposed Nicholas as king of Poland in response to his repeated curtailment of its constitutional rights. Nicholas reacted by sending Russian troops into Poland and brutally crushed the rebellion. Nicholas then proceeded to abrogate the [[Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland|Polish constitution]] in virtual entirety and reduced Poland to the status of a province called [[Vistula Land]]. Soon after, Nicholas embarked on a policy of repressing Polish culture beginning with suppressing the [[Catholic Church in Poland|Polish Catholic Church]].<ref>An introduction to Russian history</ref> In the 1840s, Nicholas reduced 64,000 Polish nobles to commoner status.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Auty|first1=Robert|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xxREnBcMFcEC&q=partitions+of+Poland+absolute+monarchies&pg=PA180|title=Companion to Russian Studies: Volume 1: An Introduction to Russian History|last2=Obolensky|first2=Dimitri|date=7 July 1980|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|isbn=9780521280389|page=180|access-date=7 July 2018|via=Google Books}}</ref>

In 1848, when a [[Revolutions of 1848|series of revolutions]] convulsed Europe, Nicholas was at the forefront of reactionism. In 1849, he helped the [[House of Habsburg|Habsburgs]] to suppress the [[Hungarian Revolution of 1848|revolution in Hungary]], and he also urged [[Kingdom of Prussia|Prussia]] not to adopt a liberal constitution.<ref>W. B. Lincoln, "Russia and the European Revolutions of 1848" ''History Today'' (Jan 1973), Vol. 23 Issue 1, pp 53–59 online.</ref><ref>Ian W. Roberts, ''Nicholas I and the Russian Intervention in Hungary'' (1991).</ref>

=== Ottoman Empire and Persia ===
[[File:Navarino.jpg|thumb|270px|The [[Battle of Navarino]], in October 1827, marked the effective end of [[Ottoman Greece|Ottoman rule in Greece]].]]

While Nicholas was attempting to maintain the status quo in Europe, he followed a somewhat more aggressive policy toward the neighbouring empires to the south, the [[Ottoman Empire]] and [[Qajar Iran|Persia]]. Nicholas was widely believed at the time to be following the traditional Russian policy of resolving the so-called [[Eastern Question]] by seeking to partition the Ottoman Empire and establish a protectorate over the Orthodox population of the [[Balkans]], still largely under Ottoman control in the 1820s.<ref name="Rendall pages 37-63">Rendall, Matthew "Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832–1841" pp. 37–63 from ''The International History Review'', Volume 24, Issue #1, March 2002 p. 38.</ref> In fact, Nicholas was deeply committed to upholding the status quo in Europe and feared any attempt to devour the decaying Ottoman Empire would both upset his ally Austria, which also had interests in the Balkans, and bring about an Anglo-French coalition in defense of the Ottomans.<ref name="Rendall pages 37-63"/> Furthermore, in the war of 1828–29, the Russians defeated the Ottomans in every battle fought in the field and advanced deep into the Balkans, but the Russians discovered that they lacked the necessary logistical strength to take Constantinople.<ref>Rendall, Matthew "Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832–1841" pp. 37–63 from ''The International History Review'', Volume 24, Issue #1, March 2002 p. 47.</ref>

Nicholas' policy towards the Ottoman Empire was to use the [[Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca|1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca]] which gave Russia a vague right as protector of Orthodox peoples in the Balkans, as a way of placing the Ottoman Empire into the Russian sphere of influence, which was felt to be a more achievable goal than conquering the entire Ottoman Empire.<ref name="Rendall pages 37-63"/> Nicholas actually wanted to preserve the Ottoman Empire as a stable but weak state that would be unable to stand up to Russia, which was felt to serve Russia's interests. Nicholas always thought of Russia as first and foremost a European power and regarded Europe as more important than the Middle East.<ref name="ReferenceA">Rendall, Matthew "Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832–1841" pp. 37–63 from ''The International History Review'', Volume 24, Issue #1, March 2002 p. 48.</ref> The Russian Foreign Minister [[Karl Nesselrode]] wrote in letter to his ambassador in Constantinople Nikolai Muravyov that the victory of [[Muhammad Ali of Egypt]] over Mahmud II would lead to a new dynasty ruling the Ottoman Empire.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Nesselrode continued that if the able Muhammad Ali became sultan then it "could, with the elevation of a new personage to the Turkish throne, revive new strength in that declining empire and distract our attention and forces from European affairs, and thus the monarch [Nicholas] is especially concerned to keep the sultan on his tottering throne."<ref name="ReferenceA"/> At the same time, Nicholas argued that because of the economic importance to Russia of the Turkish straits, through which Russia exports its grain, that Russia had the "right" to intervene in Ottoman affairs.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> In 1833, Nicholas told the Austrian ambassador [[Karl Ludwig von Ficquelmont]] that "Oriental affairs are above all a matter for Russia."<ref>Rendall, Matthew "Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832–1841" pp. 37–63 from ''The International History Review'', Volume 24, Issue #1, March 2002 pp. 48–49.</ref> At the same time that Nicholas claimed the Ottoman Empire was within the Russian sphere of influence, he made it clear that he had no interest in annexing the empire. At another meeting with Ficquelmont in 1833, Nicholas, speaking with the "Greek Project" of Catherine the Great in mind said: "I know everything that has been said of the projects of the Empress Catherine, and Russia has renounced the goal she had set out. I wish to maintain the Turkish empire... It if falls, I do not desire its debris. I need nothing."<ref>Rendall, Matthew "Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832–1841" pp. 37–63 from ''The International History Review'', Volume 24, Issue #1, March 2002 p. 50.</ref> Ultimately, Nicholas's policies in the Near East proved to be both costly and largely futile.
[[File:Siege of Erivan Fortress on 1 October 1827.jpg|thumb|270x270px|[[Capture of Erivan]] fortress by Russian troops under leadership of [[Ivan Paskevich]] in 1827 during the [[Russo-Persian War (1826–28)|Russo-Persian War]]]]
In 1826–28, Nicholas fought the [[Russo-Persian War (1826–28)]], which ended with Persia forced to cede its last remaining territories in the [[Caucasus]]. Russia [[Russo-Persian Wars|had conquered]] all the territories of Iran in both the [[North Caucasus]] and [[South Caucasus]], comprising modern-day [[Georgia (country)|Georgia]], [[Dagestan]], [[Armenia]], and [[Azerbaijan]], through the course of the 19th century.<ref>Timothy C. Dowling [https://books.google.com/books?id=KTq2BQAAQBAJ&pg=PA728 ''Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond''] p. 728 ABC-CLIO, 2 December 2014 {{ISBN|1598849484}}</ref> The treaty further conceded extraterritoriality to Russian subjects in Iran (capitulation).<ref>{{cite book|last1=Yarshater|first1=Ehsan|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vBQZAQAAIAAJ&q=treaty+of+turkmenchay+capitulation|title=Encyclopædia Iranica, Volume 13|date=2004|publisher=Routledge & Kegan Paul|isbn=978-0-93327-395-5|page=260}}</ref> As Professor Virginia Aksan adds, the 1828 [[Treaty of Turkmenchay]] "removed Iran from the military equation."<ref>Aksan, Virginia. (2014). ''Ottoman Wars, 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged'' p. 463. Routledge. {{ISBN|978-1317884033}}</ref>

Russia fought a successful war against the Ottomans in [[Russo-Turkish War (1828–29)|1828–29]], but it did little to increase Russian power in Europe. Only a small Greek state became independent in the Balkans, with limited Russian influence. In 1833, Russia negotiated the [[Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi]] with the Ottoman Empire. The major European parties mistakenly believed that the treaty contained a secret clause granting Russia the right to transit warships through the [[Bosphorus]] and [[Dardanelles]] straits. This misconception led to the [[London Straits Convention]] of 1841, which affirmed Ottoman control over the straits and forbade any power, including Russia, from sending warships through them. Buoyed by his role in suppressing the revolutions of 1848 as well as his mistaken belief he could rely on British diplomatic support, Nicholas moved against the Ottomans, who declared war on Russia on 8 October 1853. On 30 November, Russian [[Pavel Nakhimov|Admiral Nakhimov]] caught the Turkish fleet in the harbor at Sinope and destroyed it.<ref>Edward Crankshaw, ''The Shadow of the Winter Palace'', p. 133.</ref>

[[File:Mirror Case Depicting the Meeting of Nasir al-Din Mirza and Tsar Nicholas I in Erivan, dated A.D. 1854 (interior panel, zoomed in).jpg|thumb|right|Interior panel of a mirror case commemorating the 1838 meeting of Iranian crown prince [[Naser al-Din Shah Qajar|Naser al-Din Mirza]] (later, [[Shah]]) and Tsar Nicholas I of Russia in [[Yerevan|Erivan]] in the [[Armenian Oblast]]. The scene at the center shows the seven-year-old prince sitting on the tsar's lap, accompanied by an entourage. Created by Mohammad Esmail Esfahani in [[Tehran]], dated 1854]]

Fearing the results of a total Ottoman defeat by Russia, in 1854 [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|Britain]], [[French Second Empire|France]], the [[Kingdom of Sardinia (1720–1861)|Kingdom of Sardinia]] formed a military coalition and joined forces with the Ottoman Empire against Russia. The preceding conflict became known as the [[Crimean War]] in the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe, but was labelled in Russia the "Eastern War" (Russian: Восточная война, ''Vostochnaya Vojna''). In April 1854, Austria signed a defensive pact with Prussia.<ref>Edward Crankshaw, ''The Shadow of the Winter Palace'', pp. 135–136</ref> Thus, Russia found herself in a war with every Great Power of Europe either allied against her militarily or diplomatically.<ref>Edvard Radzinsky, ''Alexander II: The Last Great Tsar'', p. 94.</ref>

In 1853 [[Mikhail Pogodin]], professor of history at Moscow University, wrote a memorandum to Nicholas. Nicholas himself read Pogodin's text and approvingly commented: "That is the whole point."<ref name="slate"/> According to historian [[Orlando Figes]], "The memorandum clearly struck a chord with Nicholas, who shared Pogodin's sense that Russia's role as the protector of the Orthodox had not been recognized or understood and that Russia was unfairly treated by the West." Pogodin wrote:<ref>{{cite book|last1=Figes|first1=Orlando|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dimVhWPx_88C&pg=PA134|title=The Crimean War: A History|date=2011|isbn=9781429997249|page=134|publisher=Henry Holt and Company }}</ref>
{{Blockquote|France takes Algeria from Turkey, and almost every year England annexes another Indian principality: none of this disturbs the balance of power; but when Russia occupies Moldavia and Wallachia, albeit only temporarily, that disturbs the balance of power. France occupies Rome and stays there several years during peacetime: that is nothing; but Russia only thinks of occupying Constantinople, and the peace of Europe is threatened. The English declare war on the Chinese, who have, it seems, offended them: no one has the right to intervene; but Russia is obliged to ask Europe for permission if it quarrels with its neighbor. England threatens Greece to support the [[Don Pacifico affair|false claims]] of a miserable Jew and burns its fleet: that is a lawful action; but Russia demands a treaty to protect millions of Christians, and that is deemed to strengthen its position in the East at the expense of the balance of power. We can expect nothing from the West but blind hatred and malice...|Mikhail Pogodin's memorandum to Nicholas I, 1853<ref name="slate">{{cite news |title=The Long History of Russian Whataboutism |url=https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/03/russia-and-western-double-standards-the-long-history-of-russian-complaints-about-unfair-treatment.html |work=Slate |date=March 21, 2014}}</ref>}}

Austria offered the Ottomans diplomatic support, and Prussia remained neutral, thus leaving Russia without any allies on the continent. The European allies landed in [[Crimea]] and laid siege to the well-fortified Russian [[Sevastopol Naval Base]]. The Russians lost battles at Alma in September 1854<ref name="l425">W. Bruce Lincoln, ''The Romanovs'', p. 425.</ref> and then at Inkerman.<ref name=l425/> After the prolonged [[Siege of Sevastopol (1854–55)]] the base fell, exposing Russia's inability to defend a major fortification on its own soil. On the death of Nicholas I, Alexander II became emperor. On 15 January 1856, the new emperor took Russia out of the war on very unfavorable terms, which included the loss of a naval fleet on the Black Sea.