Editing Nguyễn Khánh (section)

==Rule==
As with the Minh junta, Khánh's ascension resulted in the replacement of a large number of province and district chiefs, causing disruption to the functioning of the government. Khánh initially appointed some pro-Diệm officials who had been relieved by Minh, but after protests from Buddhists, who decried what they saw as a reversion to Diệmism, Khánh stopped this practice, and removed some of the Diệm supporters that he had reappointed. He then jailed some Diệm supporters.<ref name=mo754>Moyar (2004), p. 754.</ref><ref name=m296/> Khánh installed some officers based on loyalty rather than competency as he feared a coup.<ref name=m296/> This compounded the already problematic lack of trained civil servants, a problem that had existed since the French era.<ref name=showdown/> Khánh adopted some of Diệm's conservative social policies, reinstating the ban on dancing "The Twist".<ref name=m295>Moyar (2006), p. 295.</ref> Karnow wrote that Khánh as leader "...spent most of his time maneuvering against internal rivals, with the result that he neglected his administrative duties, which bored him anyway".<ref name="Karnow p.363">Karnow p. 363</ref>

By 1964, the United States was giving South Vietnam aid worth some $2&nbsp;million per day, yet owing to rampant corruption in the government most South Vietnamese civil servants were paid late if at all.<ref name="Karnow p.363"/> The ambitious plans for "rural pacification" which called for the United States to provide free medical care, new wells, and ultimately hydroelectricity in the rural areas collapsed in 1964 as the money intended for "rural pacification" was instead stolen by corrupt officials.<ref name="Karnow p.363"/> As it was repeatedly promised that with American assistance South Vietnam would be soon making the transition from a Third World to a First World country, the collapse of the "rural pacification" schemes left many ordinary people disillusioned. Khánh promised McNamara during his visit that he would put South Vietnam on a "war footing" by mobilizing the entire male population of military age to fight against the Vietcong.<ref name="Karnow p.363"/> Khánh passed a national service law which in theory would have conscripted all South Vietnamese men of military age, but he never fully implemented it, blaming "complicated bureaucratic procedures" left over from French rule.<ref name="Karnow p.363"/> In fact, Khánh came under pressure from the many wealthy South Vietnamese families to spare their sons from being drafted, and to keep their support, Khánh provided many exemptions in his national service law to allow the sons of middle and upper-class families from being conscripted.<ref name="Karnow p.363"/> The way in which the burden of conscription fell only upon the sons of poorer families made Khánh unpopular with the poor who complained about the way in which the sons of better off families escaped military service.<ref name="Karnow p.363"/>

The activist Buddhist leader [[Thích Trí Quang]] continued to criticise Khánh and accused him of jailing Buddhists.<ref name=mo754/> Khánh was in a quandary, as he could be perceived as being too soft on Diệm supporters, or being vindictive towards Roman Catholics.<ref name=mc760/> To placate Trí Quang, Khánh agreed to remove all Roman Catholic chaplains from the military. Khánh sentenced Major [[Đặng Sỹ]], the Roman Catholic officer who had overseen the [[Huế Vesak shootings]] of Buddhists protesting Diệm's ban on the [[Buddhist flag]] on 8 May 1963 to a life sentence of hard labour, and sentenced Diệm's younger brother, [[Ngô Đình Cẩn]], the ''de facto'' warlord of central Vietnam,<ref name=mo755>Moyar (2004), p. 755.</ref> to death. This occurred over the private objections of US Ambassador [[Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.]], who thought that it was best for Khánh to take a mild line to dampen religious tensions.<ref name=mc760>McAllister, p. 760.</ref> Cẩn was executed by firing squad on 9 May. Thích Trí Quang remained critical of what he saw as a lack of vigour on the part of Khánh in removing Diệmists from positions of authority.<ref name=mc761>McAllister, p. 761.</ref>

Khánh had no prior political experience and turned to Lodge for advice. Lodge advised him to pursue a policy of inclusion of the various groups in Vietnamese society, and Khánh followed this counsel.<ref name=m295/> Upon American advice,<ref name=m295/> Khánh tried to generate a popular rapport by engaging in Western-style political campaigning and community meetings. He frequently flew around the countryside, meeting peasants, shaking hands and making speeches. In August, he became the first leader of South Vietnam to tour the central coast; Diệm had never bothered to visit the public.<ref name=showdown/> He made appearances on the streets of Saigon, speaking to the by passers and asking them for their opinions on the state of the nation.<ref name=m295/> However, Khánh remained hesitant on democracy, saying, "we cannot achieve full democracy for some time, perhaps for another generation or two".<ref name=m295/> Lodge agreed and privately said that the war effort had to come first, and thus a police state, curtailment of civil rights and crackdowns on opposition politicians were reasonable in order to effectively counter the communists.<ref name=m296>Moyar (2006), p. 296.</ref> During this time, Khánh's régime suffered several military setbacks, such as the [[Battle of Long Dinh]].{{Citation needed|date=August 2019}}

In March, Khánh began privately advocating that the US attack jungle areas in [[Laos]] and North Vietnam near the border with South Vietnam to stop communist infiltration, saying that it was pointless to keep fighting defensively within the country without taking the initiative to stop incoming forces.<ref name=m307>Moyar (2006), p. 307.</ref> Khánh made plans with conservative Laotian General [[Phoumi Nosovan]] for anti-communist incursions into eastern Laos, but the Americans stopped him and leaked false reports to the media that he was reluctant to attack. As a result, Khánh concluded that a military victory might not be feasible and one of his officials made contacts with the communists to see if negotiation was possible, but nothing came of this approach.<ref name=m307/>

In July, Khánh called for the expansion of the war into North Vietnam.<ref name=showdown/> At a rally on 19 July in Saigon that attracted around 100,000 people, he said that the "Communists are the aggressors, not us ... If we were to go back to the north, it should be termed a counterattack."<ref name=showdown/> He symbolically took soil from two containers representative the divided nation, and mixed them together to promote his reunification plan, under anti-communist rule. He said, "We have often heard that the people have called for the war to be carried to the North ... The government cannot remain indifferent before the firm determination of all the people who are considering the push northward as an appropriate means to fulfil out national history."<ref name=m308>Moyar (2006), p. 308</ref> He then led the demonstrators in shouting, "To the North" repeatedly. Khánh's call for an invasion of North Vietnam, deeply worried President Johnson, who feared an invasion of North Vietnam would cause a war with China in the same way that the approach of U.S. forces upon the Yalu river caused China to intervene in the Korean War in 1950.<ref name="Karnow p.363"/> Johnson told Khánh that he should focus on "pacifying" his own country and the United States was opposed to his plans to invade North Vietnam.<ref name="Karnow p.363"/> In a radio broadcast, the North Vietnamese leader [[Ho Chi Minh]] mocked Khánh for his "sheer stupidity", sneeringly asking "How can he talk about marching north when he cannot even control areas in the immediate vicinity of Saigon?"<ref name="Karnow p.363"/> At the time, the US had no ambassador in Saigon, as Lodge had returned home to campaign for the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]]'s presidential nomination, and his successor, [[Maxwell Taylor]], was yet to arrive.<ref name=m308/> When Taylor arrived, the US tried to publicly distance itself from Khánh's demands to invade North Vietnam and to downplay it, as it wanted to portray the communists as the only aggressors and that they had no intentions of going on the attack in any form,<ref name=m308/> but they were sympathetic to his sentiment.<ref name=showdown/> Privately, they did not rule out a policy along Khánh's line.<ref name=showdown/>

In part, the American reluctance to escalate was due to the impending elections and a desire to not scare the electorate.<ref name=m309>Moyar (2006), p. 309.</ref> In a meeting with Ambassador Taylor, Khánh assured the American envoy that his was a political gesture that should be seen as a show. However, it spread to the government-moderated press, and some generals expressed similar sentiments. Khánh then told Taylor that he had to allow Southerners to express their aspirations to unify Vietnam on their own terms and that plans were being explored.<ref name=showdown/> He thus refused to publicly renege from his calls for an attack on North Vietnam.<ref name=m308/> In August, the Vietnam War expanded with the [[Gulf of Tonkin incident]], a disputed encounter between North Vietnamese and American naval vessels in which Washington accused the communists of attacking their boats in international waters.<ref name=mo757>Moyar (2004), p. 757.</ref><ref>Moyar (2006), pp. 310–311.</ref> Khánh publicly called on the Americans to strike back in order to project a strong image and avoid resembling a "[[paper tiger]]".<ref name=m311>Moyar (2006), p. 311.</ref>

US President [[Lyndon Johnson]] was given more military powers as a result of the incident.<ref name=mo757/> After the second incident (which is believed to have been false), Johnson replied with air strikes, which Khánh praised.<ref name=m313>Moyar (2006), p. 313.</ref> Seeing the tense situation as an opportunity to concentrate more power in his hands, Khánh declared a state of emergency on 7 August, empowering the police to ban protests, search properties under any circumstances and arbitrarily jail "elements considered as dangerous to national security".<ref name=mo757/> He imposed censorship to stop "the circulation of all publications, documents, and leaflets considered as harmful to public order".<ref name=mo757/> Taylor reported to President Johnson that Khánh regime was "an ineffective government beset by inexperienced ministers who are also jealous and suspicious of each other"."<ref name="Karnow p.367">Karnow p. 367</ref> However, Taylor despite his doubts, advised Johnson that Khánh was the best leader for South Vietnam at the present and to change the leadership again would be a "disaster".<ref name="Karnow p.367"/>

===Vũng Tàu Charter===
Khánh drafted a new constitution, known as the "[[Vũng Tàu Charter]]",<ref name=mc762>McAllister, p. 762.</ref> which would have augmented his personal power and hamstrung Minh of what authority he had left. However, this only served to weaken Khánh as large demonstrations and riots broke out in the cities, with the Buddhists prominent, calling for an end to the state of emergency and the new constitution.<ref name=mo757/> Thích Trí Quang thought that, as Khánh would not use his power to remove Diệmists, it was merely an expression of megalomania.<ref name=mc762/> Some of the riots were sectarian, resulting in several deaths.<ref>Moyar (2004), p. 758.</ref> Information Ministry buildings and radio stations were set on fire.<ref name=m316>Moyar (2006), p. 316.</ref>

During one protest in which thousands of people were chanting "down with military dictatorship", Khánh confronted the crowd and joined the opposition in their shouting, claiming that he was not what they claimed him to be, rather than cracking down on them.<ref>Moyar (2004), pp. 760–761.</ref> Fearing he could be toppled by the momentum of the protests, Khánh asked Quang, [[Thich Tam Chau|Chau]] and [[Thich Thien Minh|Minh]] to hold talks with him at Vũng Tàu on 24 August. They refused and Khánh had to go to Saigon to try to get them to stop protesting against him, demonstrating his weakness.<ref name=mo761>Moyar (2004), p. 761.</ref> They asked him to repeal the new constitution, reinstate civilian rule, and remove [[Cần Lao Party|Cần Lao]] members from power.<ref name=mo761/> They asked Khánh to announce these measures publicly, else they would organize a widespread movement of passive resistance.<ref name=mo761/> US Ambassador [[Maxwell Taylor]] recommended that Khánh ignore the demands, as he regarded the Buddhist activists as a minority group, but Khánh thought to dampen religious tensions by agreeing to the Buddhist proposals.<ref name=mo761/> Khiêm claimed "Khánh felt there was no choice but to accept, since the influence of Trí Quang was so great that he could not only turn the majority of the people against the government but could influence the effectiveness of the armed forces".<ref name=mc763>McAllister, p. 763.</ref>

Needing support to stay afloat, Khánh released a ''communiqué'' after the meeting, promising to revise the constitution, liberalise the press, permit protests and start special courts to look into past grievances.<ref name=mo762>Moyar (2004), p. 762.</ref> This prompted more protests by activists and Khánh responded with wider concessions, which he convinced the Military Revolutionary Council to assent to. Under this plan, the new constitution would be repealed, and the MRC would dissolve itself. He then paid US$300,000 to Buddhist groups in return for their public endorsement, which Khánh publicly used to highlight his support. In return, Khánh promised to create a National Assembly within a year.<ref name=mo762/> Many senior officers decried what they viewed as a handing of power to the Buddhist leaders, who alleged that the concessions were playing into the hands of neutralists, easing the pressure on communist activities.<ref>Moyar (2004), pp. 762–763.</ref>