Editing Neutral monism (section)

== Arguments in favour ==
Russell was attracted to neutral monism due to its [[Occam's razor|parsimony]]. In his view, neutral monism offered an "immense simplification" for metaphysics.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Russell, Bertrand|url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/159650978|title=My philosophical development|date=2007|publisher=Spokesman|isbn=978-0-85124-736-6|oclc=159650978}}</ref> The upshot of this is that neutral monism provides a solution to the hard problem of consciousness. Annaka Harris formulated the hard problem as "how experience arises out of non-sentient matter";<ref>{{Cite web|last=Harris|first=Annaka|date=2020-02-27|title=Consciousness Isn't Self-Centered|url=http://nautil.us/issue/82/panpsychism/consciousness-isnt-self_centered|access-date=2021-10-04|website=Nautilus}}</ref> the neutral monist solves the problem by arguing that if matter is neutral and contains some level of sentience, then one has perceptual contact with the world without needing to explain how experience mysteriously arises from physical matter.<ref>{{Citation|last=Stubenberg|first=Leopold|title=Neutral Monism|date=2018|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/neutral-monism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Fall 2018|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-10-04}}</ref>

An account for how this works relies on creating a distinction between ''[[extrinsic]]'' properties and ''[[Intrinsic and extrinsic properties|intrinsic]]'' properties.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Marshall|first1=Dan|title=Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties|date=2018|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Spring 2018|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-10-04|last2=Weatherson|first2=Brian}}</ref> Extrinsic properties are properties that exist by virtue of how they interact the world and are outwardly observable, such as structures and form.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lewis|first=David|date=1983|title=Extrinsic Properties|journal=[[Philosophical Studies]]|volume=44|issue=2|pages=197–200|doi=10.1007/BF00354100|s2cid=189794380}}</ref> Intrinsic properties are properties exist by virtue of the way they are and are not necessarily outwardly observable.{{NoteTag|If it helps, extrinsic properties can be thought of as "symptoms" and intrinsic properties can be thought of as a "disease". This analogy breaks down fairly quickly, however.}} Astrophysicist [[Arthur Eddington]] notes that physics can only provide metrical indicators but tells us nothing about the intrinsic nature of things.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Sir|url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/891446893|title=The Nature of the Physical World : Gifford Lectures of 1927|date=2014|publisher=Cambridge Scholars Publishing|isbn=978-1-4438-6703-0|pages=257|oclc=891446893}}</ref> In other words, most of the positive claims in science are related to the extrinsic properties of reality; that is, with their relationships. However, just because the intrinsic properties of matter are unknown does not mean they do not exist, and in fact may be required.{{NoteTag|Though there some [[Mathematical universe hypothesis|radical Platonists]], such as [[Max Tegmark]], who believe reality has no intrinsic properties. By Tegmark's account, the universe is made of math without anything to ground it.}} As Chalmers puts it, a world of "pure causal flux" may be logically impossible, for there is "nothing for causation to relate."<ref name=":0" />

Extrapolating from this, philosopher [[Philip Goff (philosopher)|Philip Goff]] argues in ''[[Galileo's Error]]'' (2019) that consciousness may be the only feature of the universe that we are certain of.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Galileo's Error by Philip Goff {{!}} Issue 135 {{!}} Philosophy Now|url=https://philosophynow.org/issues/135/Galileos_Error_by_Philip_Goff|access-date=2021-10-04|website=philosophynow.org}}</ref> It cannot be seen through extrinsic signatures (as is evidenced by the [[problem of other minds]]), but we know from first-hand experience that it exists. So if (1) consciousness is the only intrinsic property of matter there is evidence for, and (2) matter must necessarily have intrinsic properties, then one can inductively infer that all matter has intrinsic conscious properties.<ref name=":2" />