Editing NORAD (section)

===False alarms===
On at least three occasions, NORAD systems failed, such as on 9 November 1979, when a technician in NORAD loaded a test tape, but failed to switch the system status to "test", causing a stream of constant false warnings to spread to two "[[continuity of government]]" bunkers as well as command posts worldwide.<ref>{{cite journal|title=The 3am Phone Call: False Warnings of Soviet Missile Attacks during 1979–80 Led to Alert Actions for U.S. Strategic Forces|journal=National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 371 |publisher=National Security Archive, George Washington University |location=Washington D.C. |date=1 March 2012 |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb371/index.htm}}</ref> On 3 June 1980, and again on 6 June 1980, a [[Computer network|computer communications]] device failure caused warning messages to sporadically flash in U.S. Air Force command posts around the world that a [[Nuclear warfare|nuclear attack]] was taking place.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://archive.gao.gov/f0102/115265.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://archive.gao.gov/f0102/115265.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live |title=NORAD's Missile Warning System: What Went Wrong? (MASAD-81-30)|date=15 May 1981|publisher=U.S. Government Accountability Office |access-date=3 November 2010}}<br />{{cite web |url=http://archive.gao.gov/d25t7/139055.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://archive.gao.gov/d25t7/139055.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live |title=Attack Warning: Better Management Required to Resolve NORAD Integration Deficiencies (IMTEC-89-26)|date=7 July 1989 |publisher=U.S. Government Accountability Office |access-date=3 November 2010}}</ref> 

During these incidents, [[Pacific Air Forces]] (PACAF) properly had their planes loaded with nuclear bombs in the air. [[Strategic Air Command]] (SAC) did not and received criticism,{{By whom|date=February 2017}} because they did not follow procedure, even though the SAC command knew these were almost certainly [[false alarm]]s, as did PACAF.{{Citation needed|date=November 2010}} Both command posts had recently begun receiving and processing direct reports from the various radar, satellite, and other missile attack detection systems, and those direct reports simply did not match the erroneous data received from NORAD.{{Citation needed|date=November 2010}}