Editing Leonid Brezhnev (section)

== 1964–1982: Leader of the Soviet Union ==
{{further|History of the Soviet Union (1964–1982)}}

===Consolidation of power===
{{further|Collective leadership in the Soviet Union}}
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Upon replacing Khrushchev as the party's First Secretary, Brezhnev became the [[de jure]] supreme authority of the Soviet Union. However, he was initially forced to govern as part of an unofficial [[Triumvirate#Soviet Union|Triumvirate]] (also known by its Russian name ''[[List of leaders of the Soviet Union#List of troikas|Troika]]'') alongside the country's [[Premier of the Soviet Union|Premier]], [[Alexei Kosygin]], and [[Nikolai Podgorny]], a [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union#Secretariat|Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee]] and later [[List of heads of state of the Soviet Union|Chairman of the Presidium]].<ref>{{harvnb|Bacon|2002|p=32}}: "In the mid-1960s appraisals of Brezhnev centered on the new leadership of the Soviet Union as a whole. Just as in the early Khrushchev years, it was not immediately apparent after 1964 who wielded how much power in the Soviet hierarchy. The immediate talk was of a triumvirate of Brezhnev at the head of the Communist Party, Kosygin as prime minister (Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers), and ― after December 1965 ― Podgorny as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet."</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Daniels|1998|p=36}}: "Podgorny, a longtime member of the [party] apparatus, joined the Secretariat in 1963 with Brezhnev, which made him also figure as a candidate for supreme power. At first number-three in the post-Khrushchev troika, along with the new Secretary-General Brezhnev and Prime Minister Kosygin, Podgorny rose more recently to the number-two position in Communist protocol, after Brezhnev but ahead of Kosygin. Overall, this history indicates that the post of President of the Republic, long a merely honorary one, ha[d] acquired growing importance and influence in the Communist hierarchy."</ref> Due to Khrushchev's disregard for the rest of the Politburo upon combining his leadership of the party with that of the Soviet government, a plenum of the Central Committee in October 1964 forbade any single individual from holding both the offices of [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary]] and [[Premier of the Soviet Union|Premier]].{{sfn|Service|2009|p=378}} This arrangement would persist until the late 1970s when Brezhnev firmly secured his position as the most powerful figure in the Soviet Union.

During his consolidation of power, Brezhnev first had to contend with the ambitions of [[Alexander Shelepin]], the former chairman of the [[KGB]] and current head of the [[People's Control Commission|Party-State Control Committee]]. In early 1965, Shelepin began calling for the restoration of "obedience and order" within the Soviet Union as part of his own bid to seize power.{{sfn|Service|2003|p=379}} Towards this end, he exploited his control over both state and party organs to leverage support within the regime. Recognizing Shelepin as an imminent threat to his position, Brezhnev mobilized the Soviet collective leadership to remove him from the Party-State Control Committee before having the body dissolved altogether on 6 December 1965.{{sfn|Roeder|1993|p=110}}

[[File:RIAN archive 36535 Secretary general of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev after speaking at the VLKSM Central Committee plenary session.jpg|thumb|upright=1.45|Brezhnev following a speech to the 1968 Komsomol Central Committee plenary session in his capacity as General Secretary. By then, he had reestablished the post as the top authority in both name and practice.]]

By the end of 1965, Brezhnev had Podgorny removed from the Secretariat, thereby significantly curtailing the latter's ability to build support within the party apparatus.{{sfn|Roeder|1993|pp=79–80}} In the ensuing years, Podgorny's network of supporters was steadily eroded as the protégés he cultivated in his rise to power were removed from the Central Committee.<ref>{{harvnb|Willerton|1992|p=68}}: "Podgorny's Khar'kov network was among the largest of the Brezhnev period. Its size reflected both Podgorny's important role in Ukraine during the 1950s and early 1960s as well as his status as Brezhnev's main political rival. Podgorny developed this network not only while he was moving up in the Ukrainian party apparatus, but also during his career as Ukrainian party boss (1957 to 1963)...An investigation of the Khar'kov party organization and publication of a CPSU [Central Committee] declaration on its deficiencies in 1965 severely weakened this elite cohort. Highly placed protégés only moved downward during the Brezhnev period. [Vitaly] Titov, who had headed the Party Organs Department and had been promoted as a party Secretary in 1962, was quickly demoted in 1965 from the CPSU Secretariat and transferred to head the troubled Kazakh party organization. Podgorny's successor in Ukraine, Piotr Shelest, was ultimately ousted in favor of Brezhnev's longtime protégé, Shcherbitsky. Shelest's position in the all-union party hierarchy was never an especially important one, although his position had merited a brief membership in the Politburo. [¶]Those Podgorny associates who became CC members had moved up from Khar'kov and Kiev in the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. Some advanced to Moscow with Podgorny...Nearly all were 'retired' either when Shelest was ousted or when Podgorny was removed in 1977."</ref> By 1977, Brezhnev was secure enough in his position to replace Podgorny as head of state and remove him from the Politburo.<ref>{{harvnb|Brown|2009|p=403}}: "[In 1965] Podgorny took Mikoyan’s place as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, combining that with his Politburo membership. He held both offices until Brezhnev felt strong enough unceremoniously to remove him in 1977. By then Brezhnev decided he had waited long enough to add the dignity of becoming formal head of state to his party leadership."</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Guerrier|2020|p=1314}}: "In 1977 Brezhnev engineered Podgorny's removal from the Politburo and then from the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet on June 16. Brezhnev assumed the chairmanship himself while remaining first secretary, thus gaining diplomatic status as head of state while also maintaining the real power that came as leader of the CPSU."</ref>

After sidelining Shelepin and Podgorny as threats to his leadership in 1965, Brezhnev directed his attentions to his remaining political rival, Alexei Kosygin. In the 1960s, U.S. National Security Advisor [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]] initially perceived Kosygin to be the dominant leader of [[Soviet foreign policy]] in the Politburo. Within the same timeframe, Kosygin was also in charge of economic administration in his role as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. However, his position was weakened following his enactment of several economic reforms in 1965 that collectively came to be known within the Party as the "[[Kosygin reform]]s". Due largely to coinciding with the [[Prague Spring]] (whose sharp departure from the Soviet model led to its armed suppression in 1968), the reforms provoked a backlash among the party's old guard who proceeded to flock to Brezhnev and strengthened his position within the Soviet leadership.{{sfn|Brown|2009|p=403}} In 1969, Brezhnev further expanded his authority following a clash with Second Secretary Mikhail Suslov and other party officials who thereafter never challenged his supremacy within the Politburo.<ref>{{harvnb|Bacon|2002|pp=13–14}}: "By the end of the [1960s], T.H. Rigby argued that a stable oligarchic system had developed in the Soviet Union, centered around Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin[;] plus Central Committee secretaries Mikhail Suslov and Andrei Kirilenko. Accurate though this assessment was at the time, its publication coincided with the further strengthening of Brezhnev's position by means of an apparent clash with Suslov. [¶] At a Central Committee plenum in December 1969, Brezhnev gave a frank speech on economic matters, which had not been agreed with other Politburo members in advance. This independent line both surprised and angered colleagues, particularly Suslov, Shelepin, and first deputy prime minister Kiril Mazurov, who wrote a joint letter critical of the speech which they intended to be discussed at the next Plenum in March 1970. Brezhnev, however, exerted pressure on Suslov and his colleagues, the Plenum was postponed, the letter withdrawn, and the General Secretary emerged with greater authority and pledges of authority from his erstwhile critics."</ref>

Brezhnev was adept at politics within the Soviet power structure. He was a team player and never acted rashly or hastily. Unlike Khrushchev, he did not make decisions without substantial consultation from his colleagues, and was always willing to hear their opinions.{{sfn|Bacon|2002|p=10}} During the early 1970s, Brezhnev consolidated his domestic position. In 1977, he forced the retirement of Podgorny and became once again Chairman of the Presidium of the [[Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union]], making this position equivalent to that of an executive president. While Kosygin remained Premier until shortly before his death in 1980 (replaced by [[Nikolai Tikhonov]] as Premier), Brezhnev was the dominant figure in the Soviet Union from the mid-1970s<ref>{{harvnb|Willerton|1992|pp=62–63}}: "The Brezhnev network constituted a broad coalition of politicians and interests which was in an organizational position to structure the [Soviet] policy agenda. Trusted subordinates guided those state organizations critical to the realization of the Brezhnev program. Meanwhile, members of this network linked a number of important regional party organizations, both within the RSFSR and outside it, to the regime in Moscow...In general, network members headed the [Central Committee] departments responsible for cadres, party work, and important sectors of the economy. By the mid-1970s, the Politburo members and CPSU secretaries supervising these departments were all Brezhnev protégés. From an organizational standpoint, the Brezhnev-led network of patronage factions was the dominant element in the [Soviet] national leadership..."</ref> until his death in 1982.{{sfn|Brown|2009|p=403}}

===Domestic policies===

====Ideological Development====
{{Main|Real socialism}}

Brezhnev has defined the iconic "Developed Socialism" as the [[Soviet socialism|Soviet-style socialism]], which he believed had successfully constructed socialism in the Soviet Union and reached [[Vladimir Lenin]]'s transition stage from socialism to communism. Brezhnev emphasized the advanced technological developments in the USSR with full electrification of the country, the use of nuclear power in production, computer planning, as well as a highly mechanized agriculture. He believed that all social strata within the USSR were closer to each other than ever before due to the highly developed productive force in the country. Therefore, the [[dictatorship of the proletariat]] has, according to Brezhnev, moved towards a people's government. Brezhnev believed that all socialist countries would go through the same socialist development and social transformation of the Soviet model regardless of their national and material conditions.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Leonid |first1=Brezhnev |date=2 September 2015 |title=Brezhnev on the Theory of Developed Socialism |url=https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1980-2/our-little-father/our-little-father-texts/brezhnev-on-the-theory-of-developed-socialism/ |access-date=29 October 2023 |website=Seventeen Moments in Soviet History |publisher=World Marxist Review}}</ref>

====Repression====
[[File:RIAN archive 101740 Yury Andropov, Chairman of KGB.jpg|thumb|[[Yuri Andropov]], the [[List of Chairmen of the KGB|chairman of the KGB]] who presided over the pervasive crackdown under Brezhnev's regime]]

Brezhnev's stabilization policy included ending the [[Liberalization|liberalizing]] reforms of Khrushchev, and clamping down on cultural freedom.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=380}} During the Khrushchev years, Brezhnev had supported the leader's denunciations of Stalin's arbitrary rule, the rehabilitation of many of the victims of Stalin's purges, and the cautious liberalization of Soviet intellectual and cultural policy. However, as soon as he became leader of the Soviet Union, he began to reverse this process, and developed an increasingly authoritarian and conservative attitude.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=381}}{{sfn|Sakwa|1999|p=339}}

By the mid-1970s, there were an estimated 5,000 political and religious prisoners across the Soviet Union, living in grievous conditions and suffering from malnutrition. Many of these prisoners were [[political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union|considered by the Soviet state to be mentally unfit]] and were hospitalized in [[mental asylum]]s across the Soviet Union. Under Brezhnev's rule, the KGB infiltrated most, if not all, anti-government organisations, which ensured that there was little to no opposition against him or his power base. However, Brezhnev refrained from the all-out violence seen under Stalin's rule.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=382}} The trial of the writers [[Yuli Daniel]] and [[Andrei Sinyavsky]] in 1966, the first such public trials since Stalin's reign, marked the reversion to a repressive cultural policy.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=381}} Under [[Yuri Andropov]] the state security service (in the form of the [[KGB]]) regained some of the powers it had enjoyed under Stalin, although there was no return to the purges of the 1930s and 1940s, and Stalin's legacy remained largely discredited among the Soviet [[intelligentsia]].{{sfn|Service|2009|p=382}}

====Economics====

=====Economic growth until 1973=====
{| class="wikitable" style="float:right; margin:0 15px;"
! Period
! style="line-height:100%" | Annual GNP growth <br /><small>(according to<br />the [[CIA]])</small>
! style="line-height:100%" | [[Net material product|Annual NMP growth]]<br /><small>(according to<br />[[Grigorii Khanin]])</small>
! style="line-height:100%" | Annual NMP growth<br /><small>(according to<br />the USSR)</small>
|-
| 1960–1965
| 4.8{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
| 4.4{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
| 6.5{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
|-
| 1965–1970
| 4.9{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
| 4.1{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
| 7.7{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
|-
| 1970–1975
| 3.0{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
| 3.2{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
| 5.7{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
|-
| 1975–1980
| 1.9{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
| 1.0{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
| 4.2{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
|-
| 1980–1985
| 1.8{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
| 0.6{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
| 3.5{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=40}}
|-
| colspan=4|{{refn|Western specialists believe that the [[net material product]] (NMP; Soviet version of [[gross national product]] [GNP]) contained distortions and could not accurately determine a country's economic growth; according to some, it greatly exaggerated growth. Because of this, several specialists created GNP figures to estimate Soviet growth rates and to compare Soviet growth rates with the growth rates of capitalist countries.{{sfn|Kotz|Weir|2007|p=35}} Grigorii Khanin published his growth rates in the 1980s as a "translation" of NMP to GNP. His growth rates were (as seen above) much lower than the official figures, and lower than some Western estimates. His estimates were widely publicized by conservative [[think tank]]s as, for instance, [[The Heritage Foundation]] of Washington, D.C. After the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] in 1991, Khanin's estimates led several agencies to criticize the estimates made by the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA). Since then the CIA has often been accused over overestimating Soviet growth. In response to the criticism of CIA's work, a panel led by economist [[James R. Millar]] was established to check out if this was in fact true. The panel concluded that the CIA were based on facts, and that "Methodologically, Khanin's approach was naive, and it has not been possible for others to reproduce his results."{{sfn|Kotz|Weir|2007|p=39}} Michael Boretsky, a [[Department of Commerce]] economist, criticized the CIA estimates to be too low. He used the same CIA methodology to estimate West German and American growth rates. The results were 32% below the official GNP growth for West Germany, and 13 below the official GNP growth for the United States. In the end, the conclusion is the same, the Soviet Union grew rapidly economically until the mid-1970s, when a systematic crisis began.{{sfn|Kotz|Weir|2007|p=40}}
:Growth figures for the Soviet economy varies widely (as seen below):
;[[Eighth Five-Year Plan (Soviet Union)|Eighth Five-Year Plan]] (1966–1970)
* Gross national product (GNP): 5.2%{{sfn|Kort|2010|p=322}} or 5.3%{{sfn|Bergson|1985|p=192}}
* [[Gross national income]] (GNI): 7.1%{{sfn|Pallot|Shaw|1981|p=51}}
* [[Investment|Capital investment]]s in agriculture: 24%{{sfn|Wegren|1998|p=252}}
;[[Ninth Five-Year Plan (Soviet Union)|Ninth Five-Year Plan]] (1971–1975)
* GNP: 3.7%{{sfn|Kort|2010|p=322}}
* GNI: 5.1%{{sfn|Pallot|Shaw|1981|p=51}}
* Labour productivity: 6%{{sfn|Arnot|1988|p=67}}
* Capital investments in agriculture: 27%{{sfn|Wegren|1998|p=252}}
;[[Tenth Five-Year Plan (Soviet Union)|Tenth Five-Year Plan]] (1976–1980)
* GNP: 2.7%{{sfn|Kort|2010|p=322}}
* GNP: 3%{{sfn|Bergson|1985|p=192}}
* Labour productivity: 3.2%{{sfn|Arnot|1988|p=67}}
;[[Eleventh Five-Year Plan (Soviet Union)|Eleventh Five-Year Plan]] (1981–1985)
* 
|group=note}}
|}

Between 1960 and 1970, Soviet agriculture output increased by 3% annually. Industry also improved: during the [[Eighth Five-Year Plan (Soviet Union)|Eighth Five-Year Plan]] (1966–1970), the output of factories and mines increased by 138% compared to 1960. While the Politburo became aggressively [[Reformism|anti-reformist]], Kosygin was able to convince both Brezhnev and the politburo to leave the reformist communist leader [[János Kádár]] of the [[Hungarian People's Republic]] alone because of an economic reform entitled [[New Economic Mechanism]] (NEM), which granted limited permission for the establishment of retail markets.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=385}} In the [[Polish People's Republic]], another approach was taken in 1970 under the leadership of [[Edward Gierek]]; he believed that the government needed Western loans to facilitate the rapid growth of heavy industry. The Soviet leadership gave its approval for this, as the Soviet Union could not afford to maintain its massive subsidy for the [[Eastern Bloc]] in the form of cheap oil and gas exports. The Soviet Union did not accept all kinds of reforms, an example being the [[Warsaw Pact]] [[Prague Spring|invasion of Czechoslovakia]] in 1968 in response to [[Alexander Dubček]]'s reforms.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=386}} Under Brezhnev, the Politburo abandoned Khrushchev's [[decentralization]] experiments. By 1966, two years after taking power, Brezhnev abolished the [[Sovnarkhoz|Regional Economic Councils]], which were organized to manage the regional economies of the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=389}}

The [[Ninth Five-Year Plan (Soviet Union)|Ninth Five-Year Plan]] delivered a change: for the first time industrial consumer products out-produced industrial capital goods. Consumer goods such as watches, furniture and radios were produced in abundance. The plan still left the bulk of the state's investment in industrial capital-goods production. This outcome was not seen as a positive sign for the future of the Soviet state by the majority of top party functionaries within the government; by 1975 consumer goods were expanding 9% slower than industrial capital-goods. The policy continued despite Brezhnev's commitment to make a rapid shift of investment to satisfy Soviet consumers and lead to an even higher standard of living. This did not happen.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=407}}

During 1928–1973, the Soviet Union was growing economically at a faster pace than the United States and Western Europe.{{citation needed|date=October 2024}} However, objective comparisons are difficult. The USSR was hampered by the effects of World War II, which had left most of the western USSR in ruins; however, Western aid and Soviet espionage in the period 1941–1945 (culminating in cash, material and equipment deliveries for military and industrial purposes) had allowed the Russians to leapfrog many Western economies in the development of advanced technologies, particularly in the fields of nuclear technology, radio communications, agriculture and heavy manufacturing. By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had the world's second largest industrial capacity, and produced more steel, oil, [[pig-iron]], cement and tractors than any other country.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=397}} Before 1973, the Soviet economy was expanding at a faster rate than that of the American economy (albeit by a very small margin). The USSR also kept a steady pace with the economies of Western Europe. Between 1964 and 1973, the Soviet economy stood at roughly half the output per head of Western Europe and a little more than one third that of the U.S.{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=47}} In 1973, the process of catching up with the rest of the West came to an end as the Soviet Union fell further and further behind in computer technology, which proved decisive for the Western economies.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Richard W. Judy |author2=Robert W. Clough|title=in Marshall C. Yovits, ed. "Advances in Computers" vol. 29|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M2vUopRmnXcC&pg=PA252|year=1989|page=252|publisher=Academic Press |isbn=9780080566610}}</ref> By 1973 the [[Era of Stagnation]] was apparent.<ref>{{cite book|author=William J. Tompson|title=The Soviet Union under Brezhnev|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F8UeBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA78|year=2014|publisher=Routledge|pages=78–82|isbn=9781317881728}}</ref>

===Economic stagnation until 1982===
The [[Era of Stagnation]], a term coined by [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], was attributed to a compilation of factors, including the ongoing [[Cold War|"arms race"]]; the Soviet Union's decision to participate in [[international trade]] (thus abandoning the idea of economic isolation) while ignoring changes occurring in Western societies; increased authoritarianism in Soviet society; the invasion of [[Afghanistan]]; the bureaucracy's transformation into an undynamic [[gerontocracy]]; lack of economic reform; pervasive political corruption, and other structural problems within the country.{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|pp=1–2}} Domestically, social stagnation was stimulated by the growing demands of unskilled workers, labor shortages and a decline in productivity and labor discipline. While Brezhnev, albeit "sporadically",{{sfn|Sakwa|1999|p=339}} through [[Alexei Kosygin]], attempted to reform the [[Economy of the Soviet Union|economy]] in the late 1960s and 1970s, he failed to produce any positive results. One of these reforms was the [[1965 Soviet economic reform|economic reform of 1965]], initiated by Kosygin, though its origins are often traced back to the Khrushchev Era. The reform was ultimately cancelled by the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Central Committee]], though the Committee admitted that economic problems did exist.{{sfn|Sakwa|1999|p=341}} After becoming leader of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev would characterize the economy under Brezhnev's rule as "the lowest stage of socialism".{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=28}}

Based on its surveillance, the CIA reported that the Soviet economy peaked in the 1970s upon reaching 57% of American GNP. However, beginning around 1975, economic growth began to decline at least in part due to the regime's sustained prioritization of heavy industry and military spending over [[Consumer goods in the Soviet Union|consumer goods]]. Additionally, Soviet agriculture was unable to feed the urban population, let alone provide for a rising standard of living which the government promised as the fruits of "mature socialism" and on which industrial productivity depended. Ultimately, the GNP growth rate slowed to 1% to 2% per year. As GNP growth rates decreased in the 1970s from the level held in the 1950s and 1960s, they likewise began to lag behind that of Western Europe and the United States. Eventually, the stagnation reached a point that the United States began growing an average of 1% per year above the growth rate of the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Oliver|Aldcroft|2007|p=275}}

The stagnation of the Soviet economy was fueled even further by the Soviet Union's ever-widening technological gap with the West. Due to the cumbersome procedures of the centralized planning system, Soviet industries were incapable of the innovation needed to meet public demand.<ref name=ScottChapter3>{{cite book|last=Shane|first=Scott|title=Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union|year=1994|publisher=Ivan R. Dee|location=Chicago|isbn=978-1-56663-048-1|pages=75 to 98|chapter=What Price Socialism? An Economy Without Information|quote=It was not the gas pedal but the steering wheel that was failing}}</ref> This was especially notable in the field of computers. In response to the lack of uniform standards for peripherals and digital capacity in the Soviet computer industry, Brezhnev's regime ordered an end to all independent computer development and required all future models to be based on the [[IBM/360]].<ref name="rbth14"/> However, following the adoption of the IBM/360 system, the Soviet Union was never able to build enough platforms, let alone improve on its design.<ref>James W. Cortada, "Public Policies and the Development of National Computer Industries in Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, 1940—80." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' (2009) 44#3 pp: 493–512, especially page 509-10.</ref><ref>Frank Cain, "Computers and the Cold War: United States restrictions on the export of computers to the Soviet Union and Communist China." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' (2005) 40#1 pp: 131–147. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/30036313 in JSTOR]</ref> As its technology continued to fall behind the West, the Soviet Union increasingly resorted to pirating Western designs.<ref name="rbth14">{{cite news|last1=Ter-Ghazaryan|first1=Aram|title=Computers in the USSR: A story of missed opportunities|url=https://www.rbth.com/science_and_tech/2014/09/24/computers_in_the_ussr_a_story_of_missed_opportunities_40073.html|access-date=22 October 2017|work=Russia Beyond the Headlines|date=24 September 2014|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171023155446/https://www.rbth.com/science_and_tech/2014/09/24/computers_in_the_ussr_a_story_of_missed_opportunities_40073.html|archive-date=23 October 2017}}</ref>

The last significant reform undertaken by the [[Kosygin's fifth government|Kosygin government]], and some believe in the pre-''[[perestroika]]'' era, was a joint decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers named "Improving planning and reinforcing the effects of the economic mechanism on raising the effectiveness in production and improving the quality of work", more commonly known as the [[1979 Soviet economic reform|1979 reform]]. The reform, in contrast to the 1965 reform, sought to increase the central government's economic involvement by enhancing the duties and responsibilities of the ministries. With Kosygin's death in 1980, and due to his successor [[Nikolai Tikhonov]]'s conservative approach to economics, very little of the reform was actually carried out.<ref>{{cite news |author=Andrey Kolesnikov |title=30 лет назад умер Алексей Косыгин |trans-title=A reformer before Yegor Gaidar? Kosygin died for 30 years ago |language=ru |work=Forbes Russia |url=https://www.forbes.ru/ekonomika-column/vlast/61265-predshestvennik-gaidara?page=0,0 |access-date=29 December 2010 |date=17 December 2010 }}</ref>

The [[Eleven–th Five-Year Plan (Soviet Union)|Eleventh Five-Year Plan]] of the Soviet Union delivered a disappointing result: a change in growth from 5 to 4%. During the earlier [[Tenth Five-Year Plan (Soviet Union)|Tenth Five-Year Plan]], there had been target of 6.1% growth, but this was not met. Brezhnev was able to defer economic collapse by trading with Western Europe and the [[Arab World]].{{sfn|Oliver|Aldcroft|2007|p=275}} The Soviet Union still outproduced the United States in the heavy industry sector during the Brezhnev era. Another dramatic result of Brezhnev's rule was that certain [[Eastern Bloc]] countries became more economically advanced than the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Oliver|Aldcroft|2007|p=276}}

====Agricultural policy====
[[File:25th anniversary of conquering virgin land. USSR block. 1979.jpg|thumb|200px|USSR postage stamp of 1979, celebrating the 25th anniversary of the [[Virgin Lands Campaign]]]]
Brezhnev's agricultural policy reinforced traditional ways of organizing collective farms and enforced output quotas centrally. Although there was a record-high state investment in farming during the 1970s, the evaluation of agricultural output continued to focus on the grain harvest. Despite some improvement, there were still problems such as insufficient domestic production of fodder crops and a declining sugar beet harvest. Brezhnev attempted to address these issues by increasing state investment and allowing privately owned plots to be larger. However, these actions were not effective in solving fundamental problems like a shortage of skilled workers, a ruined rural culture, and inappropriate farm machinery for small collective farms. A significant reform was necessary, but it was not supported due to ideological and political considerations.

Brezhnev's agricultural policy reinforced the conventional methods for organizing the [[Collective farming|collective farms]]. Output quotas continued to be imposed centrally.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=400}} Khrushchev's policy of amalgamating farms was continued by Brezhnev, because he shared Khrushchev's belief that bigger [[kolkhozes]] would increase productivity. Brezhnev pushed for an increase in state investments in farming, which amounted to an all-time high in the 1970s of 27% of all state investment&nbsp;– this figure did not include investments in farm equipment. In 1981 alone, 33&nbsp;billion [[United States dollar|U.S. dollars]] (by contemporary exchange rate) was invested into agriculture.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=401}}

Agricultural output in 1980 was 21% higher than the average production rate between 1966 and 1970. [[Cereal crop]] output increased by 18%. These improved results were not encouraging. In the Soviet Union the criterion for assessing agricultural output was the grain harvest. The import of cereal, which began under Khrushchev, had in fact become a normal [[phenomenon]] by Soviet standards. When Brezhnev had difficulties sealing commercial trade agreements with the United States, he went elsewhere, such as to [[Argentina]]. Trade was necessary because the Soviet Union's domestic production of [[fodder crop]]s was severely deficient. Another sector that was hitting the wall was the [[sugar beet]] harvest, which had declined by 2% in the 1970s. Brezhnev's way of resolving these issues was to increase state investment. Politburo member [[Gennady Voronov]] advocated for the division of each farm's workforce into what he called "links".{{sfn|Service|2009|p=401}} These "links" would be entrusted with specific functions, such as to run a farm's dairy unit. His argument was that the larger the work force, the less responsible they felt.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=401}} This program had been proposed to [[Joseph Stalin]] by [[Andrey Andreyevich Andreyev|Andrey Andreyev]] in the 1940s and had been opposed by Khrushchev before and after Stalin's death. Voronov was also unsuccessful; Brezhnev turned him down, and in 1973 he was removed from the Politburo.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=402}}

Experimentation with "links" was not disallowed on a local basis, with [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], the then First Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee, experimented with links in his region. In the meantime, the Soviet government's involvement in agriculture was, according to Robert Service, otherwise "unimaginative" and "incompetent".{{sfn|Service|2009|p=402}} Facing mounting problems with agriculture, the Politburo issued a resolution titled, "On the Further Development of Specialisation and Concentration of Agricultural Production on the Basis of Inter-Farm Co-operation and Agro-Industrial Integration".{{sfn|Service|2009|p=402}} The resolution ordered [[kolkhoz]]es close to each other to collaborate in their efforts to increase production. In the meantime, the state's subsidies to the food-and-agriculture sector did not prevent bankrupt farms from operating and rises in the price of produce were offset by rises in the cost of oil and other resources. By 1977, oil cost 84% more than it did in the late 1960s. The cost of other resources had also climbed by the late 1970s.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=402}}

Brezhnev's answer to these problems was to issue two decrees, one in 1977 and one in 1981, which called for an increase in the maximum size of privately owned plots within the Soviet Union to half a hectare. These measures removed important obstacles for the expansion of agricultural output but did not solve the problem. Under Brezhnev, private plots yielded 30% of the national agricultural production when they cultivated only 4% of [[agriculture in the Soviet Union|the land]]. This was seen by some as proof that de-collectivization was necessary to prevent Soviet agriculture from collapsing, but leading Soviet politicians shrank from supporting such drastic measures due to ideological and political interests.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=402}} The underlying problems were the growing shortage of skilled workers, a wrecked rural culture, the payment of workers in proportion to the quantity rather than the quality of their work, and too large farm machinery for the small collective farms and the roadless countryside. In the face of this, Brezhnev's only options were schemes such as large land reclamation and irrigation projects, or of course, radical reform.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=403}}

====Society====
[[File:RIAN archive 734809 Members of Moscow's Soviets, Communist and civic organisations attend International Women's Day meeting.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|Brezhnev at International Women's Day celebrations, 1973]]

Over the eighteen years that Brezhnev ruled the Soviet Union, average income per head increased by half; three-quarters of this growth came in the 1960s and early 1970s. During the second half of Brezhnev's premiership, the average income per head grew by one-quarter.{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=45}} In the first half of the Brezhnev period, income per head increased by 3.5% per annum; slightly less growth than what it had been the previous years. This can be explained by Brezhnev's reversal of most of Khrushchev's policies.{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=47}} Consumption per head rose by an estimated 70% under Brezhnev, but with three-quarters of this growth happening before 1973 and only one-quarter in the second half of his rule.{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=48}} Most of the increase in consumer production in the early Brezhnev era can be attributed to the [[Kosygin reform]].<ref>{{cite web |script-title=ru:Анализ динамики показателей уровня жизни населения |language=ru |publisher=[[Moscow State University]] |url=http://www.hist.msu.ru/Labs/Ecohist/OB8/slavkina.htm |access-date=5 October 2010 }}</ref>

When the USSR's economic growth stalled in the 1970s, the [[standard of living]] and [[Eastern Bloc economies#Housing quality|housing quality]] improved significantly.{{sfn|Sakwa|1998|p=28}}<ref name="Miller 1989 p. ">{{cite book | last=Miller | first=W.G. | title=Toward a More Civil Society?: The USSR Under Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev : an Assessment by the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations | publisher=Ballinger | year=1989 | isbn=978-0-88730-220-6 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OFFpAAAAMAAJ | quote=Brezhnev's economic programs had led to increases of industrial productivity as well as higher standards of living for most Soviet citizens. | page=58}}</ref> Instead of paying more attention to the economy, the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev tried to improve the living standard in the Soviet Union by extending [[social benefits]]. This led to an increase, though a minor one, in public support.{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=28}} The standard of living in the [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic]] (RSFSR) had fallen behind that of the [[Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic]] (GSSR) and the [[Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic]] (ESSR) under Brezhnev; this led many Russians to believe that the policies of the [[Soviet Government]] were hurting the [[Population of Russia|Russian population]].{{sfn|Service|2009|p=423}} The state usually moved workers from one job to another, which ultimately became an ineradicable feature in the Soviet industry.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=416}} Government industries such as factories, mines and offices were staffed by undisciplined personnel who put a great effort into not doing their jobs; this ultimately led, according to Robert Service, to a "work-shy workforce".{{sfn|Service|2009|p=417}} The Soviet Government had no effective counter-measure; it was extremely difficult, if not impossible to replace ineffective workers because of the country's lack of unemployment.

While some areas improved during the Brezhnev era, the majority of civilian services deteriorated and living conditions for Soviet citizens fell rapidly. Diseases were on the rise{{sfn|Service|2009|p=417}} because of the decaying healthcare system. The living space remained rather small by [[First World]] standards, with the average Soviet person living on 13.4 square metres. Thousands of Moscow inhabitants became homeless, most of them living in shacks, doorways and parked trams. Nutrition ceased to improve in the late 1970s, while rationing of staple food products returned to [[Yekaterinburg|Sverdlovsk]] for instance.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=418}}

The state provided recreation facilities and annual holidays for hard-working citizens. [[Trade unions in the Soviet Union|Soviet trade unions]] rewarded hard-working members and their families with beach vacations in [[Crimea]] and [[Georgia (country)|Georgia]].{{sfn|Service|2009|p=421}}

Social rigidification became a common feature of Soviet society. During the [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]] era in the 1930s and 1940s, a common labourer could expect promotion to a [[White collar workers|white-collar]] job if he studied and obeyed Soviet authorities. In Brezhnev's Soviet Union this was not the case. Holders of attractive positions clung to them as long as possible; mere incompetence was not seen as a good reason to dismiss anyone.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=422}} In this way, too, the Soviet society Brezhnev passed on had become static.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=427}}

===Foreign and defense policies===

====Invasion of Czechoslovakia====
[[File:(Srpen68)Horici sovetsky tank.jpg|thumb|upright=1.27|A Soviet T-55 tank catches fire while battling Czech protesters during the [[Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia|1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia]].]]
The first crisis for Brezhnev's regime came in 1968, with the attempt by the Communist leadership in [[Czechoslovakia]], under [[Alexander Dubček]], to liberalize the Communist system ([[Prague Spring]]).{{sfn|Herd|Moroney|2003|p=5}} In July, Brezhnev publicly denounced the Czechoslovak leadership as "[[Revisionism (Marxism)|revisionist]]" and "anti-Soviet". Despite his hardline public statements, Brezhnev was not the one pushing hardest for the use of military force in Czechoslovakia when the issue was before the Politburo.{{sfn|Brown|2009|p=398}} Archival evidence suggests that Brezhnev{{sfn|Brown|2009|p=398}} initially sought a temporary compromise with the reform-friendly Czechoslovak government when their dispute came to a head. However, in the end, Brezhnev concluded that he would risk growing turmoil domestically and within the Eastern bloc if he abstained or voted against Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.{{sfn|Brown|2009|p=399}}

As pressure mounted on him within the Soviet leadership to "re-install a revolutionary government" within Prague, Brezhnev ordered the [[Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia]], and Dubček's removal in August. Following the Soviet intervention, he met with Czechoslovak reformer [[Bohumil Šimon]], then a member of the Politburo of the [[Communist Party of Czechoslovakia|Czechoslovak Communist Party]], and said, "If I had not voted for Soviet armed assistance to Czechoslovakia you would not be sitting here today, but quite possibly I wouldn't either."{{sfn|Brown|2009|p=398}} However, contrary to the stabilizing effect envisioned by Moscow, the invasion served as a catalyst for further dissent in the [[Eastern Bloc]].{{citation needed|date=October 2024}}

====The Vietnam War====
[[File:North Vietnamese SA-2.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|North Vietnamese troops pose in front of a Soviet [[S-75 Dvina|S-75]] missile launcher.]]
Under the rule of Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union initially supported [[North Vietnam]] out of "fraternal solidarity". However, as the war escalated, Khrushchev urged the North Vietnamese leadership to give up the quest of liberating [[South Vietnam]]. He continued by rejecting an offer of assistance made by the North Vietnamese government, and instead told them to enter negotiations in the [[United Nations Security Council]].{{sfn|Loth|2002|pp=85–86}} After Khrushchev's ousting, Brezhnev resumed aiding the communist resistance in Vietnam. In February 1965, Premier Kosygin visited [[Hanoi]] with a dozen Soviet air force generals and economic experts.{{sfn|Loth|2002|p=86}} Over the course of the war, Brezhnev's regime would ultimately ship $450&nbsp;million worth of arms annually to [[North Vietnam]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Sarin|first1=Oleg|last2=Dvoretsky|first2=Lev|title=Alien Wars: The Soviet Union's Aggressions Against the World, 1919 to 1989|url=https://archive.org/details/alienwarssovietu00sari|url-access=registration|publisher=Presidio Press|year=1996|isbn=978-0891414216|pages=[https://archive.org/details/alienwarssovietu00sari/page/93 93–4]}}</ref>

[[Lyndon B. Johnson]] privately suggested to Brezhnev that he would guarantee an end to [[South Vietnam]]ese hostility if Brezhnev would guarantee a North Vietnamese one. Brezhnev was interested in this offer initially but rejected the offer upon being told by [[Andrei Gromyko]] that the North Vietnamese were not interested in a diplomatic solution to the war. The [[Lyndon B. Johnson Administration|Johnson administration]] responded to this rejection by expanding the American presence in Vietnam, but later invited the USSR to negotiate a treaty concerning arms control. The USSR did not respond, initially because of the power struggle between Brezhnev and Kosygin over which figure had the right to represent Soviet interests abroad, and later because of the escalation of the "dirty war" in Vietnam.{{sfn|Loth|2002|p=86}}

In early 1967, Johnson offered to make a deal with [[Ho Chi Minh]], and said he was prepared to end U.S. bombing raids in North Vietnam if Ho ended his infiltration of South Vietnam. The U.S. bombing raids halted for a few days and Kosygin publicly announced his support for this offer. The North Vietnamese government failed to respond, and because of this, the U.S. continued its raids in North Vietnam. After this event, Brezhnev concluded that seeking diplomatic solutions to the ongoing war in Vietnam was hopeless. Later in 1968, Johnson invited Kosygin to the United States to [[Glassboro Summit Conference (1967)|discuss ongoing problems]] in Vietnam and the arms race. The summit was marked by a friendly atmosphere, but there were no concrete breakthroughs by either side.{{sfn|Loth|2002|pp=86–87}}

In the aftermath of the Sino–Soviet border conflict, the Chinese continued to aid the [[North Vietnamese]] regime. However, with the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, China's strongest link to North Vietnam was gone. In the meantime, [[Richard Nixon]] had been elected President of the United States. While having been known for his anti-communist rhetoric, Nixon said in 1971 that the U.S. "''must'' have relations with Communist China".{{sfn|Anderson|Ernst|2007|pp=50–51}} His plan was for a slow withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam, while still retaining the government of South Vietnam. The only way he thought this was possible was by improving relations with both Communist China and the USSR. He later made a visit to Moscow to negotiate a treaty on [[arms control]] and the [[Vietnam War]], but on Vietnam nothing could be agreed.{{sfn|Anderson|Ernst|2007|pp=50–51}} Ultimately, years of Soviet military aid to North Vietnam finally bore fruit when collapsing morale among U.S. forces ultimately compelled their complete withdrawal from South Vietnam by 1973,<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XaIc8X-Lc48C|title=The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1963–1973|last=Stanton|first=Shelby L.|date=18 December 2007|publisher=Random House Publishing Group|isbn=9780307417343|pages=358–362}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Kolko|first=Gabriel|title=Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience|url=https://archive.org/details/anatomyofwarviet00kolk|url-access=registration|publisher=Pantheon Books|year=1985|page=457|isbn=978-0394747613}}</ref> thereby making way for the country's unification under communist rule two years later.

====Sino–Soviet relations====
[[File:Ceausescu.jpg|thumb|upright=1.25|[[Deng Xiaoping]] (left) and Brezhnev (right) with [[Nicolae Ceaușescu]] in Bucharest, 1965]]
Soviet [[Diplomacy|foreign relations]] with the People's Republic of China quickly deteriorated after [[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s attempts to reach a ''rapprochement'' with more liberal Eastern European states such as [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]] and with the west.<ref name="obit">{{cite news |last=Whitman |first=Alden |title=Khrushchev's human dimensions brought him to power and to his downfall |newspaper=The New York Times |date=12 September 1971 |url=http://select.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F30B1FF7355B137A93C0A81782D85F458785F9 |access-date=5 October 2010}} (fee for article, but available free [https://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0417.html here])</ref> When Brezhnev consolidated his power base in the 1960s, China was descending into crisis because of [[Mao Zedong]]'s [[Cultural Revolution]], which led to the decimation of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] and other ruling offices. Brezhnev, a pragmatic politician who promoted the idea of "stabilization", could not comprehend why Mao would start such a "self-destructive" drive to finish the [[socialist revolution]], according to himself.{{sfn|Kornberg|Faust|2005|p=103}} However, Brezhnev had problems of his own in the form of Czechoslovakia whose sharp deviation from the Soviet model prompted him and the rest of the Warsaw Pact to invade their Eastern Bloc ally. In the aftermath of the [[Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia|Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia]], involving the overthrow of the [[Reformist Marxism|reformist]] government there, the Soviet leadership proclaimed the [[Brezhnev Doctrine]]: any threat to "socialist rule" in any state of the [[Eastern Bloc|Soviet Bloc]] in [[Central Europe|Central]] and [[Eastern Europe]] was a threat to all of them, and would justify the intervention of fellow socialist states to forcibly remove the threat. The references to "[[socialism]]" meant control by the [[communist parties]] that were loyal to the [[Kremlin]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Glazer |first=Stephen G. |title=The Brezhnev Doctrine |journal=International Lawyer |volume=5 |issue=1 |date=1971 |pages=169–179 |url=https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4221&context=til |jstor=40704652}}</ref>{{sfn|Kornberg|Faust|2005|p=103}} This new policy increased tension not only with the Eastern Bloc, but also the Asian communist states. By 1969, relations with other communist countries had deteriorated to a level where Brezhnev was not even able to gather five of the fourteen ruling communist parties to attend an international conference in Moscow. In the aftermath of the failed conference, the Soviets concluded, "there was no leading center of the international communist movement."{{sfn|Kornberg|Faust|2005|p=104}} Soviet leader [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] repudiated the Brezhnev Doctrine in the late 1980s, as the Kremlin accepted the peaceful overthrow of Soviet rule in all its [[Satellite state#Post-World War II|satellite countries]] in Eastern Europe.<ref>{{Cite book |editor-last=Jentleson |editor-first=Bruce W. |editor-last2=Paterson |editor-first2=Thomas G. |title=Encyclopedia of US foreign relations |date=1997 |volume=1 |pages=180–181}}</ref>

Later in 1969, the deterioration in bilateral relations culminated in the [[Sino–Soviet border conflict]].{{sfn|Kornberg|Faust|2005|p=104}} The Sino–Soviet split had chagrined Premier [[Alexei Kosygin]] a great deal, and for a while he refused to accept its irrevocability; he briefly visited Beijing in 1969 due to the increase of [[Suspense|tension]] between the USSR and China.{{sfn|Zubok|2007|pp=194–195}} By the early 1980s, both the Chinese and the Soviets were issuing statements calling for a normalization of relations between the two states. The conditions given to the Soviets by the Chinese were the reduction of Soviet military presence in the Sino–Soviet border, the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the [[Mongolian People's Republic]]; furthermore, China also wanted the Soviets to end their support for the [[Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia]]. Brezhnev responded in his March 1982 speech in [[Tashkent]] where he called for the normalization of relations. Full Sino–Soviet normalization of relations would prove to take years, until the last Soviet ruler, [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], came to power.{{sfn|Kornberg|Faust|2005|p=105}}

====Soviet–U.S. relations====
[[File:Ford signing accord with Brehznev, November 24, 1974.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|Brezhnev (seated right) and [[President of the United States|U.S. President]] Gerald Ford signing a joint [[Message|communiqué]] on the [[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks|SALT]] treaty in Vladivostok]]
During his eighteen years as [[List of leaders of the Soviet Union|Leader of the USSR]], Brezhnev's signature foreign policy innovation was the promotion of [[détente]]. While sharing some similarities with approaches pursued during the [[Khrushchev Thaw]], Brezhnev's policy significantly differed from Khrushchev's precedent in two ways. The first was that it was more comprehensive and wide-ranging in its aims, and included signing agreements on arms control, crisis prevention, East–West trade, European security and human rights. The second part of the policy was based on the importance of equalizing the military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union.<ref name="z265">{{cite book | last=Charen | first=Mona|authorlink=Mona Charen | title=Useful Idiots: How Liberals Got It Wrong in the Cold War and Still Blame America First | publisher=Skyhorse Publishing | year=2018 | isbn=978-1-62157-914-4 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9ZleDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT186 | page=186}}</ref> Defense spending under Brezhnev between 1965 and 1970 increased by 40%, and annual increases continued thereafter. In the year of Brezhnev's death in 1982, 12% of GNP was [[Soviet Armed Forces|spent on the military]].{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=90}} Under Brezhnev the Soviet Union's military budget increased eightfold, resulting in the possession of the largest number of ICBMs, nuclear warheads, aircraft, tanks, conventional forces and more military assets.{{citation needed|date=May 2025}} This build up led numerous observers – including Western ones – to argue that by the mid-1970s the USSR had surpassed the United States as the world's strongest military power.<ref name="b449">{{cite book | last=Brement | first=M. | title=Reaching Out to Moscow: From Confrontation to Cooperation | publisher=Bloomsbury Academic | year=1991 | isbn=978-0-275-94073-7 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=d-cRkl_kq-AC | authorlink=Marshall Brement| page=23}}</ref><ref name="Shlapentokh 2017 p. 118">{{cite book | last=Shlapentokh | first=V. | title=A Normal Totalitarian Society: How the Soviet Union Functioned and How It Collapsed | publisher=Taylor & Francis | year=2017 | isbn=978-1-315-48272-9 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RjwrDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA118 | page=118}}</ref><ref name="Economist Publications 1982 p. ">{{cite book | title=Pakistan & Gulf Economist | publisher=Economist Publications | issue=v. 1, nos. 27-40 | year=1982 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wMbsAAAAMAAJ |quote=Leonid Brezhnev was the builder of militarily the most powerful country of the world that USSR is today - a fact that even its adversary, the United States of America acknowledges. | page=7}}</ref>

At the [[Moscow Summit (1972)|1972 Moscow Summit]], Brezhnev and U.S. president [[Richard Nixon]] signed the [[SALT I]] Treaty.<ref>{{cite web |title=SALT 1 |url=https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt1.html |publisher=[[Department of State (United States)|Department of State]] |access-date=11 April 2010 }}</ref> The first part of the agreement set limits on each side's development of nuclear missiles.<ref>{{cite book|last=Axelrod|first=Alan|title=The Real History of the Cold War A New Look at the Past|publisher=Sterling Publishing Co., Inc.|isbn=978-1-4027-6302-1|page=380|date=2009}}</ref> The second part of the agreement, the [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty]], banned both countries from designing systems to intercept incoming missiles so neither the U.S. or the Soviet Union would be emboldened to strike the other without fear of nuclear retaliation.<ref name=fonertreaty>{{cite book|last=Foner|first=Eric|title=Give Me Liberty!: An American History|publisher=[[W. W. Norton & Company]]|isbn=978-0393935530|edition=3|page=815|date=1 February 2012}}</ref>

By the mid-1970s, [[Henry Kissinger]]'s policy of détente towards the Soviet Union was faltering.{{According to whom|date=December 2018}} The détente had rested on the assumption that a "linkage" of some type could be found between the two countries, with the U.S. hoping that the signing of [[SALT I]] and an increase in Soviet–U.S. trade would stop the aggressive growth of communism in the third world. This did not happen, as evidenced by Brezhnev's continued military support for the [[Viet Cong|communist guerillas]] fighting against the U.S. during the [[Vietnam War]].{{sfn|McCauley|2008|p=75}}

[[File:Henry Kissinger, Leonid Brezhnev, President Gerald Ford, and Andrei Gromyko.jpg|thumb|upright=1.38|Brezhnev (second from left in front row) poses for the press in 1975 during negotiations for the [[Helsinki Accords]].]]

After [[Gerald Ford]] lost the presidential election to [[Jimmy Carter]],{{sfn|McCauley|2008|p=76}} American foreign policies became more overtly aggressive in vocabulary towards the Soviet Union and the [[communist bloc|communist world]]. Attempts were also made to stop funding for repressive anti-communist governments and organizations the United States supported.{{sfn|McCauley|2008|p=77}} While at first standing for a decrease in all defense initiatives, the later years of Carter's presidency would increase spending on the U.S. military.{{sfn|McCauley|2008|p=76}} When Brezhnev authorized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Carter, following the advice of his [[National Security Adviser (United States)|National Security Adviser]] [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], denounced the intervention, describing it as the "most serious danger to peace since 1945".{{sfn|McCauley|2008|p=77}} The U.S. stopped all grain exports to the Soviet Union and boycotted the [[1980 Summer Olympics]] held in Moscow. The Soviet Union responded by boycotting the [[1984 Summer Olympics]] held in Los Angeles.{{sfn|McCauley|2008|p=77}}

During Brezhnev's rule, the Soviet Union reached the peak of its political and strategic power in relation to the United States. As a result of the limits agreed to by both superpowers in the first SALT Treaty, the Soviet Union obtained parity in nuclear weapons with the United States for the first time in the Cold War.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/thelife/apolitician/thepresident/index.php|title=The President|access-date=11 May 2010|publisher=Richard Nixon Presidential Library|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090827045220/http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/thelife/apolitician/thepresident/index.php|archive-date=27 August 2009}}</ref> Additionally, as a result of negotiations during the Helsinki Accords, Brezhnev succeeded in securing the legitimization of Soviet hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe.{{sfn|Hiden|Made|Smith|2008|p=209}}

====Intervention in Afghanistan====
{{main|Soviet–Afghan War}}
After the [[Saur Revolution|communist revolution]] in Afghanistan in 1978, authoritarian actions forced upon the populace by the Communist regime led to the [[War in Afghanistan (1978–present)|Afghan civil war]], with the [[mujahideen]] leading the popular backlash against the regime.{{sfn|Kakar|1997|p=15}} The Soviet Union was worried that they were losing their influence in [[Soviet Central Asia|Central Asia]], so after a KGB report claimed that Afghanistan could be taken in a matter of weeks, Brezhnev and several top party officials agreed to a [[Soviet–Afghan War|full intervention]].{{sfn|McCauley|2008|p=77}} Contemporary researchers tend to believe that Brezhnev had been misinformed on the situation in Afghanistan.His health had decayed, and proponents of direct military intervention took over the majority group in the Politburo by cheating and using falsified evidence. {{according to whom|date=October 2024}} They advocated a relatively moderate scenario, maintaining a cadre of 1,500 to 2,500 Soviet military advisers and technicians in the country (which had already been there in large numbers since the 1950s),<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=5L8CnWkACQkC&pg=PA33 ''Afghanistan: A Modern History''], 2005, p. 33.</ref> but they disagreed on sending regular army units in hundreds of thousands of troops. Some believe that Brezhnev's signature on the decree was obtained without telling him the full story, otherwise he would have never approved such a decision. Soviet ambassador to the U.S. [[Anatoly Dobrynin]] believed that the real mastermind behind the invasion, who misinformed Brezhnev, was Mikhail Suslov.<ref>Страницы истории (фрагменты из книги А.Ф. Добрынина "Особо доверительно") // ''Дипломатический вестник''. 5(1997):77–78, ISSN 0869-4869.</ref> Brezhnev's personal physician Mikhail Kosarev later recalled that Brezhnev, when he was in his right mind, in fact resisted the full-scale intervention.<ref>[https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/350138 "К 75 годам Леонид Ильич совсем расслабился"]. [[Kommersant]].</ref> [[Deputy Chairmen of the State Duma|Deputy Chairman of the State Duma]] [[Vladimir Zhirinovsky]] stated officially that despite the military solution being supported by some, hardline Defense Minister [[Dmitry Ustinov]] was the only Politburo member who insisted on sending regular army units.<ref>[http://api.duma.gov.ru/api/transcriptFull/2009-12-25 Хроника заседания Государственной Думы 25 декабря 2009 года] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180731093328/http://api.duma.gov.ru/api/transcriptFull/2009-12-25 |date=31 July 2018 }}. [[State Duma]] Official Web site.</ref> Parts of the [[Soviet military]] establishment were opposed to any sort of active Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, believing that the Soviet Union should leave [[Politics of Afghanistan|Afghan politics]] alone.

====The Brezhnev Doctrine====
{{main|Brezhnev Doctrine}}
{{further|Soviet reaction to the Polish crisis of 1980–1981}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-F0418-0001-020, Berlin, VII. SED-Parteitag, 2.Tag.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|Brezhnev at a [[Socialist Unity Party of Germany|Party congress]] in East Berlin in 1967]]
In the aftermath of the [[Prague Spring|Prague Spring's]] suppression, Brezhnev announced that the Soviet Union had the right to interfere in the internal affairs of its satellites to "safeguard socialism". This became known as the [[Brezhnev Doctrine]],{{sfn|McCauley|2008|p=XXIV}} although it was really a restatement of existing Soviet policy, as enacted by Khrushchev in [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|Hungary in 1956]]. Brezhnev reiterated the doctrine in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the [[Polish United Workers' Party]] on 13 November 1968:{{sfn|Herd|Moroney|2003|p=5}}

{{blockquote|When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries.|sign=Brezhnev|source=Speech to the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in November 1968}}

Later in 1980, a [[Polish crisis of 1980–1981|political crisis]] emerged in [[Polish People's Republic|Poland]] with the emergence of the [[Solidarity (Polish trade union)|Solidarity]] movement. By the end of October, Solidarity had 3 million members, and by December, had 9&nbsp;million. In a public opinion poll organised by the Polish government, 89% of the respondents supported Solidarity.{{sfn|Byrne|Paczkowski|2008|p=11}} With the Polish leadership split on what to do, the majority did not want to impose [[martial law]], as suggested by [[Wojciech Jaruzelski]]. The Soviet Union and other states of the [[Eastern Bloc]] were unsure how to handle the situation, but [[Erich Honecker]] of [[East Germany]] pressed for military action. In a formal letter to Brezhnev, Honecker proposed a joint military measure to control the escalating problems in Poland. A [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] report suggested the [[Soviet Armed Forces|Soviet military]] were mobilizing for an invasion.{{sfn|Byrne|Paczkowski|2008|p=14}}

In 1980–81 representatives from the [[Eastern Bloc]] nations met at the [[Kremlin]] to discuss the Polish situation. Brezhnev eventually concluded on {{nowrap|10 December}} 1981 that it would be better to leave the domestic matters of Poland alone, reassuring the Polish delegates that the USSR would intervene only if asked to.{{sfn|Byrne|Paczkowski|2008|p=21}} This effectively marked the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Notwithstanding the absence of a Soviet military intervention, [[Wojciech Jaruzelski]] ultimately gave in to Moscow's demands by imposing a [[Martial law in Poland|state of war]], the Polish version of martial law, on 13 December 1981.<ref>{{cite news |title=Martial Law |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/iron_curtain/timelines/poland_81.stm |publisher=[[BBC News]] |access-date=17 April 2010}}</ref>

===Cult of personality===
[[File:BrezhnevPortrait2.png|thumb|Official portrait of Brezhnev during his years in power]]
The last years of Brezhnev's rule were marked by a growing [[cult of personality|personality cult]]. His love of medals (he received over 100) was well known, so in December 1966, on his 60th birthday, he was awarded the [[Hero of the Soviet Union]]. Brezhnev received the award, which came with the [[Order of Lenin]] and the Gold Star, three more times in celebration of his birthdays.{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=8}} On his 70th birthday he was awarded the rank of [[Marshal of the Soviet Union]], the Soviet Union's highest military honour. After being awarded the rank, he attended an 18th Army Veterans meeting, dressed in a long coat and saying "Attention, the Marshal is coming!" He also conferred upon himself the rare [[Order of Victory]] in 1978, which was posthumously revoked in 1989 for not meeting the criteria for citation. A promotion to the rank of [[Generalissimo of the Soviet Union]], planned for Brezhnev's seventy-fifth birthday, was quietly shelved due to his ongoing health problems.{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=9}}

Brezhnev's eagerness for undeserved glory was shown by his poorly written memoirs recalling his military service during World War II, which treated the [[Malaya Zemlya|minor battles]] near [[Novorossiysk]] as a decisive military theatre.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=403}} Despite his book's apparent weaknesses, it was awarded the [[Lenin Prize for Literature]] and was hailed by the [[Printed media in the Soviet Union|Soviet press]].{{sfn|Bacon|Sandle|2002|p=9}} The book was followed by [[Brezhnev's trilogy|two other books]], one on the [[Virgin Lands campaign]].<ref>{{cite news |author=Abdullaev, Nabi |title=Brezhnev Remembered Fondly 100 Years Since Birth |url=http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=19803 |work=[[The St. Petersburg Times (Russia)|The St. Petersburg Times]] |access-date=11 April 2010 |date=19 December 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120121072945/http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=19803 |archive-date=21 January 2012 |url-status=dead}}</ref>

===Health problems===
Brezhnev's personality cult was growing at a time when his health was in rapid decline. His physical condition was deteriorating; he had been a heavy smoker until the 1970s,<ref name=":0">{{cite news |title=When Will Brezhnev Meet His Maker? |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1982/04/11/when-will-brezhnev-meet-his-maker/0100879c-d4bc-4f70-8e73-0304bb43088a/ |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=11 April 1982 |access-date=22 January 2019 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> had become addicted to [[Hypnotic|sleeping pills]] and [[Sedative|tranquilizers]],{{sfn|Schattenberg|2017|pp=585–589}} and had begun [[Alcoholism|drinking to excess]]. His niece [[Lyubov Brezhneva]] attributed his dependencies and overall decline to severe depression caused by, in addition to the stress of his job and the general situation of the country, an extremely unhappy family life, with near-daily conflicts with his wife and children, in particular his troubled daughter [[Galina Brezhneva|Galina]], whose erratic behavior, failed marriages and involvement in corruption took a heavy toll on Brezhnev's mental and physical health. Brezhnev had considered divorcing his wife and disowning his children many times, but intervention from his extended family and the Politburo, fearing negative publicity, managed to dissuade him. 

Over the years Brezhnev had become [[Obesity|overweight]]. From 1973 until his death, his [[central nervous system]] underwent chronic deterioration and he had several minor strokes as well as [[insomnia]]. In 1975 he suffered his first heart attack.<ref>Post, Jerrold M. ''Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior (Psychoanalysis & Social Theory)'', p. 96.</ref> When receiving the [[Order of Lenin]], Brezhnev walked shakily and fumbled his words. According to one American intelligence expert, United States officials knew for several years that Brezhnev had suffered from severe [[arteriosclerosis]] and believed he had suffered from other unspecified ailments as well.<!-- Source? --> In 1977, American intelligence officials publicly suggested that Brezhnev had also been suffering from [[gout]], [[leukemia]] and [[emphysema]] from decades of heavy smoking,<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/13/world/4-serious-ailments-plagued-brezhnev.html |work=The New York Times |first=Lawrence K. |last=Altman |title=4 Serious Ailments Plagued Brezhnev |date=13 November 1982}}</ref> as well as chronic [[bronchitis]].<ref name=":0" /> He was reported to have been fitted with a [[Artificial cardiac pacemaker|pacemaker]] to control his heart rhythm abnormalities. On occasion, he was known to have suffered from [[Amnesia|memory loss]], speaking problems and had difficulties with coordination.<ref>{{cite news |title=Russian leaders: Their illnesses and deaths |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20171951 |date=1 November 2012 |access-date=22 January 2019}}</ref> According to ''[[The Washington Post]]'', "All of this is also reported to be taking its toll on Brezhnev's mood. He is said to be depressed, despondent over his own failing health and discouraged by the death of many of his long-time colleagues. To help, he has turned to regular counseling and hypnosis by an [[Eugenia Davitashvili|Assyrian woman]], a sort of modern-day [[Grigori Rasputin|Rasputin]]."<ref name=":0" />

According to [[Nursultan Nazarbayev]]’s memoir, My Life, an incident occurred in [[Almaty|Alma-Ata]] during a reception for Brezhnev at the [[Auezov Theater]]. About a thousand guests had gathered, and after they were seated, [[Dinmukhamed Kunaev]] proposed a toast to Brezhnev. However, as soon as the guests raised their glasses, Brezhnev unexpectedly stood up and headed toward the exit, prompting the entire republic’s leadership to follow him. Brezhnev walked outside, approached his car, and within a minute, the motorcade was on its way. Nazarbayev noted that it was evident Brezhnev had forgotten the purpose of his visit, but those around him pretended not to notice his frail state.<ref>{{cite book| author = Назарбаев Н. Н. | chapter = | chapter-url = | format = | url =  | title = Моя жизнь: От зависимости к свободе | orig-year = | agency =  | edition =  {{nowrap|7500 экз}} |location= Астана |date = 2023 |publisher= Фолиант |volume=  | pages = 127| series =  | isbn = 978-601-271-803-4}}</ref>

Upon suffering a stroke in 1975, Brezhnev's ability to lead the Soviet Union was significantly compromised. As his ability to define Soviet foreign policy weakened, he increasingly deferred to the opinions of a hardline [[brain trust]] comprising KGB Chairman [[Yuri Andropov]], longtime foreign minister [[Andrei Gromyko]], and Defense Minister [[Andrei Grechko]] (who was succeeded by [[Dmitriy Ustinov]] in 1976).{{sfn|Brutents|1998|p=502}}{{sfn|Schattenberg|2017|p=533}}

The Ministry of Health kept doctors by Brezhnev's side at all times, and he was brought back from near death on several occasions. At this time, most senior officers of the CPSU wanted to keep Brezhnev alive. Even though an increasing number of officials were frustrated with his policies, no one in the regime wanted to risk a new period of domestic turmoil which might be caused by his death.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=404}} Western commentators started guessing who Brezhnev's heir apparent was. The most notable candidates were Mikhail Suslov and [[Andrei Kirilenko (politician)|Andrei Kirilenko]], who were both older than Brezhnev, and [[Fyodor Kulakov]] and [[Konstantin Chernenko]], who were younger; Kulakov died of [[natural causes]] in 1978.{{sfn|Wesson|1978|p=252}}

===Last years and death===
{{main|Death and state funeral of Leonid Brezhnev}}
[[File:Prunariu with Brezhnev.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|Photo of an ailing Brezhnev (second from left) on 1 June 1981, a year before his death]]
Brezhnev's health worsened in the winter of 1981–82. While the Politburo was pondering the question of who would succeed, all signs indicated that the ailing leader was dying. The choice of the successor would have been influenced by Suslov, but he died at the age of 79 in January 1982. Andropov took Suslov's seat in the [[Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Central Committee Secretariat]]; by May, it became obvious that Andropov would make a bid for the office of the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary]]. With the help of fellow [[KGB]] associates, he started circulating rumors that political corruption had become worse during Brezhnev's tenure as leader, in an attempt to create an environment hostile to Brezhnev in the Politburo. Andropov's actions showed that he was not afraid of Brezhnev's wrath.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=426}}{{additional citations needed|date=October 2024}}

In March 1982 Brezhnev received a [[concussion]] and fractured his right [[clavicle]] while touring a factory in Tashkent, after a metal [[baluster|balustrade]] collapsed under the weight of a number of factory workers, falling on top of Brezhnev and his security detail.{{sfn|Schattenberg|2017|pp=591,593}} This incident was reported in Western media as Brezhnev having suffered a [[stroke]].<ref>{{cite news |last=Doder |first=Dusko |title=Brezhnev Reported to Be Seriously Ill |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/04/02/brezhnev-reported-to-be-seriously-ill/6d0d96b5-c23c-40a3-ba62-ddcac96dc7fd/ |newspaper=Washington Post |date=2 April 1982 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211108210850/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/04/02/brezhnev-reported-to-be-seriously-ill/6d0d96b5-c23c-40a3-ba62-ddcac96dc7fd/ |archive-date=8 November 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Schmemann |first=Serge |title=Brezhnev At Rally, Scotching 4 Weeks of Mystery and Rumor |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/23/world/brezhnev-at-rally-scotching-4-weeks-of-mystery-and-rumor.html |work=The New York Times |issue=45292 |volume=131 |date=23 April 1982}}</ref> After a month-long recovery, Brezhnev worked intermittently through November. On 7 November 1982, he was present standing on the [[Lenin's Mausoleum]]'s balcony during the annual military parade and demonstration of workers commemorating the 65th anniversary of the [[October Revolution]].<ref>{{cite web |title=USSR: MARKING THE 65TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION |url=https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/1048187 |access-date=15 August 2023 |publisher=Reuters}}</ref> The event marked Brezhnev's final public appearance before dying three days later after suffering a [[Myocardial infarction|heart attack]].{{sfn|Service|2009|p=426}} He was honored with a state funeral after a three-day period of nationwide mourning. He was buried in the [[Kremlin Wall Necropolis]] in [[Red Square]],<ref>{{cite news |title=1982: Brezhnev rumors sweep Moscow |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/10/newsid_2516000/2516417.stm |publisher=[[BBC]] |date=10 November 1982 |access-date=15 April 2010}}</ref> in one of the twelve individual tombs located between the Lenin's Mausoleum and the [[Moscow Kremlin Wall]]. A number of countries including Cuba, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Afghanistan, India and others had declared national mourning over his death.<ref>{{cite news |title=World Praises, Condemns Brezhnev |url=https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/11/12/World-praises-condemns-Brezhnev/9560405925200 |publisher=UPI |date=12 November 1982}}</ref><ref>{{cite book | title=Data India | publisher=Press Institute of India | year=1982 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5H1DAAAAYAAJ | page=569}}</ref>

National and international statesmen from around the globe attended his funeral. His wife and family were also present.<ref>{{cite news |title=At Brezhnev's Bier, Grandeur, Gloom, and the Lurking Presence of the KGB |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/13/world/at-brezhnev-s-bier-grandeur-gloom-and-the-lurking-presence-of-the-kgb.html |work=The New York Times |volume=132 |issue=45496 |date=13 November 1982 |page=A4}}</ref> Brezhnev was dressed for burial in his Marshal's uniform along with his medals.{{sfn|Service|2009|p=426}}