Editing Korean People's Army (section)

==Organization==
[[File:North Korean soldier Demilitarized Zone of Korea 2005.jpg|thumb|A North Korean soldier at the [[Korean Demilitarized Zone|DMZ]], 2005]]

===Commission and leadership===
The charter of the WPK states that the KPA is "the revolutionary armed forces of the Workers' Party of Korea and shall uphold the guidance of the party". The charter also states that the [[Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea|WPK Central Military Commission]] (CMC) is "the party's supreme institution on military guidance" and has "command over the armed forces of the republic". The CMC is headed by the [[General Secretary and Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea|general secretary of the WPK]], who is also CMC chairman ''ex officio''.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web |last=Lee |first=Gee-dong |title=The Changing Status and Role of the North Korean Military |url=https://www.globalasia.org/v16no3/cover/the-changing-status-and-role-of-the-north-korean-military_gee-dong-lee |access-date=2023-06-25 |website=[[Global Asia]] |language=en |archive-date=25 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230625162610/https://www.globalasia.org/v16no3/cover/the-changing-status-and-role-of-the-north-korean-military_gee-dong-lee |url-status=live }}</ref> The state constitution also names the [[President of the State Affairs of North Korea|president of the State Affairs]] as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and stipulates that the mission of the armed forces is to "defend unto death the Party Central Committee headed by the great Comrade Kim Jong Un".<ref name=":4">{{Cite news |last=Atsuhito |first=Isozaki |date=26 August 2019 |title=North Korea Revamps Its Constitution |work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/north-korea-revamps-its-constitution/ |access-date=25 June 2023 |archive-date=25 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230625162609/https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/north-korea-revamps-its-constitution/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Almost all officers of the KPA began their military careers as privates; only very few people are admitted to a military academy without prior service. The result is supposed to be an egalitarian military system where officers are familiar with the life of a military private and "military nobility" is all but nonexistent.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tertitskiy |first=Fyodor |date=6 June 2016 |title=The good things in North Korea |url=https://www.nknews.org/2016/06/the-good-things-in-north-korea/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617153436/https://www.nknews.org/2016/06/the-good-things-in-north-korea/ |archive-date=17 June 2016 |access-date=20 July 2016 |work=[[NK News]]}}</ref>

==== History ====
{{more citations needed section|date=May 2023}}
Since 1990, numerous and dramatic transformations within North Korea have led to the current command and control structure. The details of the majority of these changes are simply unknown to the world. What little is known indicates that many changes were the natural result of the deaths of the aging leadership including [[Kim Il Sung]] (July 1994), Minister of People's Armed Forces [[O Jin-u]] (February 1995) and Minister of Defence [[Choe Kwang]] (February 1997).

The vast majority of changes were undertaken to secure the power and position of [[Kim Jong Il]]. Formerly, what is now the [[State Affairs Commission]] - formerly the [[National Defence Commission]] - was part of the {{ill|Central People's Committee|ja|中央人民委員会}} (CPC) while the [[Ministry of Defence (North Korea)|Ministry of Defence]], from 1982 onward, was under direct presidential control. At the Eighteenth session of the sixth Central People's Committee, held on 23 May 1990, the SAC became established as its own independent commission, rising to the same status as the CPC (now the [[Cabinet of North Korea]]) and not subordinated to it, as was the case before. Concurrent with this, Kim Jong Il was appointed first vice-chairman of the National Defence Commission. The following year, on 24 December 1991, Kim Jong Il was appointed [[Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army]]. Four months later, on 20 April 1992, Kim Jong Il was awarded the rank of [[Wonsu|Marshal]] and his father, in virtue of being the KPA's founding commander in chief, became [[Taewonsu|Grand Marshal]] as a result and one year later he became the chairman of the National Defence Commission, by now under [[Supreme People's Assembly]] control under the then 1992 constitution as amended.

Within the KPA, between December 1991 and December 1995, nearly 800 high officers (out of approximately 1,200) received promotions and preferential assignments. Three days after Kim Jong Il became Marshal, eight generals were appointed to the rank of Vice-Marshal. In April 1997, on the 85th anniversary of [[Day of the Sun|Kim Il Sung's birthday]], Kim Jong Il promoted 127 general and admiral grade officers. The following April he ordered the promotions of another 22 generals and flag officers. Along with these changes, many KPA officers were appointed to influential positions within the WPK. These promotions continue today, simultaneous with the celebration of Kim Il Sung's birthday and the KPA anniversary celebrations every April and since recently in July to honour the end of the Korean War. Under Kim Jong Il's leadership, political officers dispatched from the party monitored every move of a general's daily life, according to analysts<ref name="nytimes.com"/> similar to the work of Soviet [[political commissar]]s during the early and middle years of the military establishment.

Under Kim Jong Il, the KPA effectively exercised full control of both the [[Politburo of the Workers' Party of Korea|Politburo]] and the CMC, the KPA General Political and General Staff Departments and the [[Ministry of Defence (North Korea)|Ministry of Defence]], all having KPA representatives with a minimum general officer rank. During this period the primary path for command and control of the KPA extended through the [[National Defence Commission]] which was led by its chairman [[Kim Jong Il]] until 2011, to the Ministry of Defence and its General Staff Department.<ref>[http://merln.ndu.edu/merln/mipal/reports/NorthKoreaPrimer03Nov05.doc United States Department of Defense Virtual Information Center, ''North Korea Primer''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110927152211/http://merln.ndu.edu/merln/mipal/reports/NorthKoreaPrimer03Nov05.doc|date=27 September 2011}} accessed 27 June 2011.</ref> From there on, command and control flowed to the various bureaus and operational units. A secondary path, to ensure political control of the military establishment, extended through the CMC. The party's power was diluted; the CMC was stripped of its authority to command the KPA in 2010. The KPA party committee outranked provincial party committees, while KPA's [[General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army|General Political Bureau]] (GPB) had equal status to the WPK Central Committee.<ref name=":6" />

The organization of the KPA leadership was reformed again under [[Kim Jong Un]]. The [[Supreme People's Assembly]] (SPA) amended the [[Constitution of North Korea|constitution]] in June 2016, abolishing the National Defence Commission (NDC) except in times of war, and replacing it with the [[State Affairs Commission of North Korea|State Affairs Commission]] (SAC), which was named the "supreme policy-oriented leadership body of State power". Kim became the [[President of the State Affairs of North Korea|chairman of the State Affairs Commission]] on 29 June 2016. These amendments marked the decrease of the military's influence, with the newly established SAC including more civilian and less military members than the NDC.<ref name=":5">{{Cite news |last=Aoki |first=Naoko |date=21 December 2021 |title=A Decade of the Kim Jong Un Doctrine |work=[[Foreign Policy]] |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/21/north-korea-kim-jong-un-doctrine-decade-10-years/ |access-date=25 June 2023 |archive-date=25 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230625162609/https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/21/north-korea-kim-jong-un-doctrine-decade-10-years/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The constitution was further amended in 2019.<ref name=":4" /> The constitution now stipulated that the mission of North Korea's armed forces was to "defend unto death the Party Central Committee headed by the great Comrade Kim Jong Un". The chairman of the State Affairs Commission was named as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces as well as the "supreme representative of all the Korean people".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Smith |first=Josh |date=2019-08-29 |title=North Korea changes constitution to solidify Kim Jong Un's rule |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-korea-constitution-idUSKCN1VJ1JQ |access-date=2023-06-25 |archive-date=25 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230625162609/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-korea-constitution-idUSKCN1VJ1JQ |url-status=live }}</ref>

The [[8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea|8th WPK Congress]] held in 2021 marked the consolidation of WPK control over the army, as well as a further decrease in the army's power; the number of military delegates dropped from 719 in the 7th Congress to 408.<ref name=":6" /> Politburo members increased from 28 to 30, though incumbent military elite membership decreased from eight to six. "Military-first policy" was also removed from the charter, being replaced by "people-first politics".<ref name=":5"/> During the speech to the Congress, Kim Jong Un did not mention "army of the leader" to refer to the KPA, as it has been referred as before, instead naming it as an "army of the party", thus moving the party-army relations in the country closer to the ones typically found in other socialist states.<ref name=":6" />

The influence of the KPA Party Committee and the GPB was decreased; with the committee now ranking equal to provincial party committees. The GPB was also no longer equal to the Central Committee, while the CMC was again given effective command of the armed forces.<ref name=":6" /> The Military Affairs Department of the WPK Central Committee was abolished, with its functions being transferred to the Department of Military-Political Leadership.<ref name=":6" />

===Ground force formations===
*[[I Corps (North Korea)|I Corps]] ([[Hoeyang County]], [[Kangwon Province (North Korea)|Kangwon Province]])
*[[II Corps (North Korea)|II Corps]] ([[Pyongsan County]], [[North Hwanghae Province]])
*[[III Corps (North Korea)|III Corps]] ([[Nampo]], [[South Pyongan Province]])
*[[IV Corps (North Korea)|IV Corps]] ([[Haeju]], [[South Hwanghae Province]])
*[[V Corps (North Korea)|V Corps]] ([[Sepo County]], [[Kangwon Province (North Korea)|Kangwon Province]])
*[[VII Corps (North Korea)|VII Corps]] ([[Hamhung]], [[South Hamgyong Province]])
*[[Pyongyang Defense Command]]
*[[XII Corps (North Korea)|XII Corps]]
*[[IX Corps (North Korea)|IX Corps]] ([[Chongjin]], [[North Hamgyong Province]])
*[[X Corps (North Korea)|X Corps]] ([[Hyesan]], [[Ryanggang Province]])
*[[XI Corps (North Korea)|XI Corps]] ([[Tokchon]], [[South Pyongan Province]])
*Mechanised infantry divisions:
**[[108th Division (North Korea)|108th Division]]
**[[425th Division (North Korea)|425th Division]]
**[[806th Division (North Korea|806th Division]]
**[[815th Division (North Korea)|815th Division]]
*[[820th Tank Corps (North Korea)|820th Tank Corps]]

===Conscription and terms of service===
[[File:Korean People's Army Soldiers prepare to repatriate remains during a repatriation ceremony at the Panmunjom Joint Security Area on 981106-F-AF179-013.jpg|thumb|North Korean soldiers at Panmunjom]]
{{Further|Conscription in North Korea}}
[[Conscription in North Korea|North Korea has conscription]] for males for 10 years. Females are conscripted up until the age of 23.<ref>{{Cite web|last=network|first=Choi Song Min for DailyNK, part of the North Korea|date=2015-01-31|title=North Korea introduces 'mandatory military service for women'|url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/31/north-korea-mandatory-military-service-women|access-date=2021-10-02|website=the Guardian|language=en}}</ref> Article 86 of the [[Constitution of North Korea|North Korean Constitution]] states: "National defence is the supreme duty and honour of citizens.
Citizens shall defend the country and serve in the armed forces as
required by law."<ref>{{cite book|chapter=Chapter V, Article 86 |title=Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea |url=http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/book/download.php?4+4047#.pdf |year=2014 |publisher=[[Foreign Languages Publishing House (North Korea)|Foreign Languages Publishing House]] |location=Pyongyang |isbn=978-9946-0-1099-1 |page=18 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160608030306/http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/book/download.php?4+4047 |archive-date=8 June 2016|postscript=&nbsp; }} Amended and supplemented on 1 April, Juche 102 (2013), at the Seventh Session of the Twelfth Supreme People's Assembly.</ref>

KPA soldiers serve three years of military service in the KPA, which also runs its own factories, farms and trading arms.<ref name="nytimes.com">{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/world/asia/kim-jong-un-hailed-as-supreme-commander-of-north-koreas-military.html |title=Kim Jong-un Hailed as Supreme Commander of North Korea's Military |first=Choe |last=Sang-hun |date=24 December 2011 |access-date=11 June 2017 |work=[[The New York Times]] |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220060517/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/world/asia/kim-jong-un-hailed-as-supreme-commander-of-north-koreas-military.html |archive-date=20 December 2016 }}</ref>

====Paramilitary organisations====
The [[Red Youth Guards]] are the youth cadet corps of the KPA for secondary level and university level students. Every Saturday, they hold mandatory 4-hour military training drills, and have training activities on and off campus to prepare them for military service when they turn 18 or after graduation, as well as for contingency measures in peacetime.

Under the [[Ministry of Social Security (North Korea)|Ministry of Social Security]] and the wartime control of the [[Ministry of Defence (North Korea)|Ministry of Defence]], and formerly the Korean People's Security Forces, the Korean People's Social Security Forces (KPSSF) forms the national gendarmerie and civil defence force of the KPA. The KPSSF has its units in various fields like civil defence, traffic management, civil disturbance control, and local security. It has its own special forces units. The service shares the ranks of the KPA (with the exception of Marshals) but wears different uniforms.

The [[Reserve Military Training Units]] or RMTUs constitute the primary reserve force component of the KPA.

The [[Worker-Peasant Red Guards]] (WPRG; {{Korean|hangul=로농적위군|labels=no}}), also translated as Workers and Peasants' Red Militia (WPRM), is a paramilitary force in North Korea. It is the largest civil defense force in North Korea. It is not only under State Affairs Commission (until 2016 National Defence Commission) and Ministry of Defence control, but is also attached to the Workers' Party of Korea under its Military Leadership Department. It is thus responsible to the Supreme Leader in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The militia is organized on a provincial/city/town/village level, and structured on a brigade, battalion, company, and platoon basis. The militia maintains infantry small arms, with some mortars, field guns and anti-aircraft guns and even modernized older equipment such as multiple rocket launchers like the BM-13 and older Ural D-62 motorcycles, although some units are unarmed indicating status as logistics and medical units. Its strength is estimated at 5 million personnel.

===Budget and commercial interests===
[[File:Tank in the DPRK Victory Day Parade.jpg|thumb|Korean People's Army [[BTR-80]]-vehicles on parade]]
The KPA's annual budget is approximately US$6&nbsp;billion. In 2009, the U.S. [[Institute for Science and International Security]] reported that North Korea may possess [[fissile material]] for around two to nine [[nuclear warheads]].<ref>[http://isis-online.org/mapproject/country_pages/northkorea.html ISIS Fast Facts on North Korea] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090417012341/http://www.isis-online.org/mapproject/country_pages/northkorea.html |date=17 April 2009 }}. Retrieved 21 April 2009.</ref>{{Update inline|date=June 2022}} The North Korean ''[[Songun]]'' ("Military First") policy elevates the KPA to the primary position in the government and society.

According to [[Korean Central News Agency|North Korea's state news agency]], military expenditures for 2010 made up 15.8 percent of the state budget.<ref name= "kcna2010budget">{{cite web|title=Report on Implementation of 2009 Budget and 2010 Budget |url=http://kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201004/news09/20100409-10ee.html |agency=[[Korean Central News Agency]] |date=9 April 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110429044154/http://kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201004/news09/20100409-10ee.html |archive-date=29 April 2011 }}</ref> Most analyses of North Korea's defence sector, however, estimate that defence spending constitutes between one-quarter and one-third of all government spending. {{As of|2003}}, according to the [[International Institute of Strategic Studies]], North Korea's defence budget consumed some 25 percent of central government spending.<ref>{{cite book|title = Military Balance, 2004–2005|pages = 353–357|editor-first = Christopher |editor-last =Langton|author = International Institute for Strategic Studies| year=2004 |publisher = Oxford University Press|isbn = 9780198566229}}</ref> In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, according to figures released by the Polish Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, between 32 and 38 percent of central government expenditures went towards defence.<ref>{{cite book|last = Scobell|title =Going Out of Business: Divesting the Commercial Interests of Asia's Socialist Soldiers|pages = 14, Table 2, p. 17|first = Andrew|publisher =East-West Center|date = 2000}}</ref>

[[File:Cho Myong-nok and Bill Clinton.jpg|thumb|upright|left|Vice Marshal [[Jo Myong-rok]] meets [[Bill Clinton]] at the White House, October 2000]]
North Korea sells missiles and military equipment to many countries worldwide.<ref name="IAR 26 March">{{cite web |last1=Bradley Martin |first1=Bradley Martin |title=The Regime That Will Not Die: The North Korean Hybrid Threat |url=http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/476 |publisher=International Affairs Review |access-date=26 March 2013 |date=25 March 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130328102710/http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/476 |archive-date=28 March 2013 }}</ref> In April 2009, the [[United Nations]] named the [[Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation]] (KOMID) as North Korea's primary arms dealer and main exporter of equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. It also named [[Ryonbong|Korea Ryonbong]] as a supporter of North Korea's military related sales.<ref name="komid-un">{{cite web|url=https://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/List%2016%20July%202009.pdf |title=UN Listing of KOMID and Ryonbong |access-date=11 June 2017 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121103050830/http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/List%2016%20July%202009.pdf |archive-date=3 November 2012 }}</ref>

Historically, North Korea has assisted a vast number of revolutionary, insurgent and terrorist groups in more than 62 countries. A cumulative total of more than 5,000 foreign personnel have been trained in North Korea, and over 7,000 military advisers, primarily from the [[Reconnaissance General Bureau]], have been dispatched to some forty-seven countries. Some of the organisations which received North Korean aid include the [[Polisario Front]], [[Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna]], the [[Communist Party of Thailand]], the [[Palestine Liberation Organization]] and the [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]]. The [[5th Brigade (Zimbabwe)|Zimbabwean Fifth Brigade]] received its initial training from KPA instructors.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+kp0156)|title=Relations with the Third World|work=North Korea Country Study|publisher=[[Library of Congress]] Country Studies|year=1993|access-date=2 September 2012|archive-date=4 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150704050821/http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+kp0156)|url-status=live}}</ref> North Korean troops allegedly saw combat during the [[Libyan–Egyptian War]] and the [[Angolan Civil War]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-663.html |title=Angola – Foreign Influences |publisher=Country-data.com |access-date=17 August 2012 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120510222544/http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-663.html |archive-date=10 May 2012 }}</ref> Up to 200 KPAF pilots took part in the [[Vietnam War]],<ref>''Asia Times'', 18 August 2006, Richard M Bennett [https://web.archive.org/web/20060923224111/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HH18Dg02.html Missiles and madness].</ref> scoring several kills against U.S. aircraft.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_245.shtml |title=Vietnamese Air-to-Air Victories, Part 1 |access-date=11 June 2017 |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130209163433/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_245.shtml |archive-date=9 February 2013 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_246.shtml |title=Vietnamese Air-to-Air Victories, Part 2 (ACIG.org) |access-date=11 June 2017 |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130304225827/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_246.shtml |archive-date=4 March 2013 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_177.shtml |title=Far Eastern Air-to-Air Victories (ACIG.org) |access-date=11 June 2017 |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140226133922/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_177.shtml |archive-date=26 February 2014 }}</ref> Two KPA anti-aircraft artillery regiments were sent to [[North Vietnam]] as well.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Pribbenow|first=Merle|title=The 'Ology War: technology and ideology in the defense of Hanoi, 1967|journal=Journal of Military History|volume=67|number=1|year=2003|page=183|doi=10.1353/jmh.2003.0066|s2cid=154785819|doi-access=free}}</ref>

North Korean instructors trained [[Hezbollah]] fighters in [[guerrilla warfare]] tactics around 2004, prior to the [[Second Lebanon War]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Farquhar |first=Scott |title=Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD |publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press |page=9 |url=http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/farquhar.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111013021642/http://cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/farquhar.pdf |archive-date=13 October 2011 |accessdate=2 September 2012 }}</ref> During the [[Syrian Civil War]], Arabic-speaking KPA officers may have assisted the [[Syrian Army|Syrian Arab Army]] in military operations planning and have supervised artillery bombardments in the [[Battle of Aleppo (2012–2016)|Battle of Aleppo]].<ref>{{cite news|url=http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/06/05/2013060501134.html |title=N.Korean Officers 'Helping Syrian Gov't Forces' |newspaper=[[The Chosun Ilbo]] |date=5 June 2013 |access-date=26 August 2013 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130813023441/http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/06/05/2013060501134.html |archive-date=13 August 2013}}</ref>