Editing Joseph Stilwell (section)

===Conflict with Chennault===
One of the most significant conflicts to emerge during the war was between General Stilwell and General [[Claire Chennault]], the commander of the famed "[[Flying Tigers]]" and later air force commander. As adviser to the [[Republic of China Air Force]], Chennault proposed a limited air offensive against the Japanese in China in 1943 by using a series of forward air bases. Stilwell insisted that the idea was untenable and that any air campaign should not begin until fully fortified air bases, supported by large ground forces, had been established. Stilwell then argued for all air resources to be diverted to his forces in India for an early conquest of northern Burma.<ref name="Samson, Jack 2005 p. 190"/>

In following Chennault's advice, Chiang rejected the proposal, and British commanders sided with Chennault since they were aware that they could not launch a co-ordinated Allied offensive into Burma in 1943 with the resources that were available.<ref name="Samson, Jack 2005 p. 190"/> During the summer of 1943, Stilwell's headquarters concentrated on plans to rebuild the Chinese Army for an offensive in northern Burma despite Chiang's insistence on support to Chennault's air operations.

Stilwell believed that after forcing a supply route through northern Burma by a ground offensive against the Japanese, he could train and equip 30 Chinese divisions with modern combat equipment. A smaller number of Chinese forces would transfer to India, where two or three new Chinese divisions would also be raised. That plan then remained only theoretical since the limited available airlift capacity for deliveries of supplies to China over the Hump was being used to sustain Chennault's air operations, instead of equipping Chinese ground units.<ref name="cbi-history.com"/>

In 1944, the Japanese launched the counteroffensive, [[Operation Ichi-Go]], designed to knock China out of the war once and for all. It saw half a million men and 800 tanks, supplied by 70,000 to 100,000 horses dragging wagons and 12,000 to 15,000 vehicles. The operation quickly overran Chennault's forward air bases and proved Stilwell to be correct. By then, Allied supply efforts via the Hump airlift were steadily improving in tonnage supplied per month. With the replacement of Chinese war losses, Chennault now saw little need for a ground offensive in northern Burma to reopen a ground supply route to China. Augmented with increased military equipment and additional troops and concerned about defense of the approaches to India, British authorities now sided with Stilwell.<ref>Masters, John, ''The Road Past Mandalay'', Bantam Press (1979), pp. 155–157</ref>

In co-ordination with a southern offensive by Nationalist Chinese forces under General [[Wei Lihuang]], Allied troops under Stilwell's command launched the long-awaited invasion of northern Burma. After heavy fighting and casualties, both forces linked up in January 1945. Stilwell's strategy remained unchanged: opening a new ground supply route from India to China would allow the Allies to equip and train new Chinese army divisions to be used against the Japanese. The new road network, later called the [[Ledo Road]], would link the northern end of the [[Burma Road]] as the primary supply route to China. Stilwell's staff planners had estimated the route would supply 65,000 tons of supplies per month.<ref name="cbi-history.com"/>
[[File:Stillwell road map usarmy.jpg|thumb|355x355px|Displayed in the Coal Heritage Park & Museum, [[Margherita, Assam]], map of Ledo Road (later renamed Stilwell Road) approved by the US Forces India Burma theater engineer.]]
Using those figures, Stilwell argued that the Ledo Road network would greatly surpass the tonnage being airlifted over the Hump.<ref name="Samson, Jack 2005 p. 190" /> Chennault doubted that such an extended network of trails through difficult jungle could ever match the tonnage that could be delivered with modern cargo transport aircraft that were then being deployed in the theater.<ref name="War Wings 2001 p. 191">Guangqiu Xu, ''War Wings: The United States and Chinese Military Aviation, 1929–1949'', Greenwood Publishing Group (2001), {{ISBN|0-313-32004-7}}, {{ISBN|978-0-313-32004-0}}, p. 191</ref> Progress on the Ledo Road was slow and could not be completed until the linkup of forces in January 1945.

In the end, Stilwell's plans to train and to modernize 30 Chinese divisions in China and two or three divisions from forces that were already in India was never fully realized. As Chennault predicted, the supplies carried over the Ledo Road never approached in tonnage the levels of supplies airlifted monthly into China by the Hump.<ref>CBI Hump Pilots Association, http://www.cbi-history.com/part_xii_hump5.html {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225012225/http://www.cbi-history.com/part_xii_hump5.html |date=2021-02-25 }}</ref> In July 1945, 71,000 tons of supplies were flown over the Hump, compared to 6,000 tons using the Ledo Road, and the airlift operation continued in operation until the end of the war.<ref name="War Wings 2001 p. 191"/><ref>''The Burma Front'' {{cite web |url=http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/Pacific06b.html |title=The Burma Front |access-date=2008-09-13 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080509060125/http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/Pacific06b.html |archive-date=2008-05-09}}</ref>

When supplies were flowing over the Ledo Road in large quantities, operations in other theaters had shaped the course of the war against Japan.<ref name="cbi-history.com"/> Stilwell's drive into northern Burma, however, allowed Air Transport Command to fly supplies into China more quickly and safely by allowing American planes to fly a more southerly route without fear of Japanese fighters. American airplanes no longer had to make the dangerous venture over the Hump, which raised the delivery of supplies from 18,000 tons in June 1944 to 39,000 tons in November 1944.<ref>Tuchman 1985, p. 484</ref> On 1 August 1945, planes crossed the Hump a minute and twelve seconds apart from one another.<ref>Air Force Magazine, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1991/March%201991/0391hump.aspx {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201122193523/http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1991/March%201991/0391hump.aspx |date=2020-11-22 }}</ref>

In acknowledgment of Stilwell's efforts, the [[Ledo Road]] was later renamed the Stilwell Road by Chiang.<ref>Bernstein (2014), p. 38</ref>