Editing Hussein of Jordan (section)

===Samu Incident===
{{Main|Samu Incident}}
[[File:Nasser and Hussein at 1964 Arab Summit.jpg|thumb|180px|left|King Hussein and Egyptian president [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] at the [[1964 Arab League summit (Alexandria)|1964 Arab League Summit]] in Egypt, 11 September 1964]]

Hussein later stated that during one of his meetings with Israeli representatives: "I told them I could not absorb a serious retaliatory raid, and they accepted the logic of this and promised there would never be one."<ref>Bowen 2003, p.&nbsp;26 (citing Amman Cables 1456, 1457, 11 December 1966, National Security Files (Country File: Middle East), LBJ Library (Austin, Texas), Box 146).</ref> The Palestinian nationalist organization [[Fatah]] started organizing cross-border attacks against Israel in January 1965, often drawing [[Reprisal operations|Israeli reprisals]] on Jordan.<ref name="BBC1970">{{cite web|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/17/newsid_4575000/4575159.stm|title=1970: Civil war breaks out in Jordan|publisher=[[BBC]]|access-date=9 August 2017|date=1 January 2010}}</ref> One such reprisal was the [[Samu Incident]], an attack launched by Israel on 13 November 1966 on the Jordanian-controlled West Bank town of [[As-Samu]] after three Israeli soldiers were killed by a Fatah landmine.{{sfn|Shlaim|2009|p=223–224}} The assault inflicted heavy Arab casualties.{{sfn|Shlaim|2009|p=223–224}} Israeli writer [[Avi Shlaim]] argues that Israel's disproportionate retaliation exacted revenge on the wrong party, as Israeli leaders knew from their coordination with Hussein that he was doing everything he could to prevent such attacks.{{sfn|Shlaim|2009|p=223–224}} The incident drew fierce local criticism of Hussein amid feelings he had been betrayed by the Israelis; Hussein also suspected that Israel had changed its attitude towards Jordan and had intended to escalate matters in order to capture the West Bank.{{sfn|Shlaim|2009|p=223–224}} [[Yitzhak Rabin]], the then [[Israel Defense Forces]] chief of staff, later admitted the disproportionate reaction by Israel, and that the operation would have been better directed at Syria, which was supporting such attacks: "We had neither political nor military reasons to arrive at a confrontation with Jordan or to humiliate Hussein."{{sfn|Shlaim|2009|p=223–224}}
{{quote box
| quote  = If we look at water, it was a problem that both of us suffered from. If we look at even a flu epidemic, it affected both of us. Every aspect of life was interrelated and interlinked in some way or another. And to simply ignore that was something I could not understand. Maybe others could, others who were distant, who were not equally aware or involved. By now there were Palestinians and Jordanians, and their rights, their future was at stake. One had to do something; one had to explore what was possible and what was not.
| source = Hussein recounting his secret meetings with Israeli representatives{{sfn|Shlaim|2009|p=222}}
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The events at Samu triggered large-scale anti-Hashemite protests in the West Bank for what they perceived as Hussein's incompetency for defending them against Israel: rioters attacked government offices, chanted pro-Nasser slogans, and called on Hussein to have the same fate as [[Nuri As-Said]]{{snd}}the Iraqi prime minister who had been killed and mutilated in 1958 along with the Iraqi royal family.{{sfn|Shlaim|2009|p=226–240}} Jordanians believed that after this incident, Israel would march on the West Bank whether or not Jordan joined the war.{{sfn|Shlaim|2009|p=226–240}} Perception of King Hussein's efforts to come to peaceful terms with Israel led to great dissatisfaction among some Arab leaders.<ref name="bbc onthisday"/> President Nasser of Egypt denounced Hussein as an "imperialist lackey".<ref name="bbc onthisday">BBC on this Day, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/30/newsid_2493000/2493177.stm Egypt and Jordan unite against Israel]. Retrieved 8 October 2005.</ref> In a meeting with American officials, Hussein, sometimes with tears in his eyes, said: "The growing split between the East Bank and the West Bank has ruined my dreams," and, "There is near despair in the army and the army no longer has confidence in me."{{sfn|Shlaim|2009|p=226–240}} Hussein travelled to Cairo on 30 May 1967 and hastily signed an Egyptian-Jordanian mutual defense treaty, returning home to cheering crowds.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461|title=1967 war: Six days that changed the Middle East|work=BBC News|date=5 June 2017|access-date=1 September 2017}}</ref> Shlaim argues that Hussein had possessed options, but had made two mistakes: the first was in putting the Jordanian army under Egyptian command; the second was in allowing the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan, which raised Israeli suspicions against Jordan.{{sfn|Shlaim|2009|p=226–240}} Egyptian general [[Abdul Munim Riad]] arrived in Jordan to command its army pursuant to the pact signed with Egypt.{{sfn|Shlaim|2009|p=226–240}}