Editing Human wave attack (section)

===People's Volunteer Army===
During the [[Korean War]], the term "human wave attack" was used to describe the Chinese '''short attack''', a combination of [[infiltration tactics|infiltration]] and [[shock tactics]] employed by the [[People's Volunteer Army]] (PVA).<ref name=appleman363>{{harvnb|Appleman|p=363|1990}}.</ref><ref name=roe435>{{harvnb|Roe|2000|p=435}}.</ref> According to some accounts, Marshal [[Peng Dehuai]]—the overall commander of the PVA forces in Korea—is said to have invented this tactic.<ref name=roe93>{{harvnb|Roe|2000|p=93}}.</ref>

A typical Chinese short attack was carried out at night by numerous [[fireteam]]s on a narrow front against the weakest point in enemy defenses.<ref name=roe435/> The PVA assault team would crawl undetected within grenade range, then launch surprise attacks against the defenders in order to breach the defenses by relying on maximum shock and confusion.<ref name=roe435/> If the initial shock failed to breach the defenses, additional fireteams would press on behind them and attack the same point until a breach was created.<ref name=roe435/> Once penetration was achieved, the bulk of the Chinese forces would move into the enemy rear and attack from behind.<ref name=alexander331>{{harvnb|Alexander|1986|p=311}}.</ref> During the attacks, the Chinese assault teams would disperse while masking themselves using the terrain, and this made it difficult for UN defenders to target numerous Chinese troops.<ref name=marshall5_6>{{harvnb|Marshall|1988|pp=5–6}}</ref> Attacks by the successive Chinese fireteams were also carefully timed to minimize casualties.<ref name=mahoney73>{{harvnb|Mahoney|2001|p=73}}.</ref> Due to primitive communication systems and tight political controls within the Chinese army, short attacks were often repeated indefinitely until either the defenses were penetrated or the attacker's ammunition supply were exhausted, regardless of the chances of success or the human cost.<ref name=roe435/>

This persistent attack pattern left a strong impression on UN forces that fought in Korea, giving birth to the description of "human wave."<ref name=appleman353>{{harvnb|Appleman|1989|p=353}}.</ref> U.S. Army historian Roy Edgar Appleman observed that the term "human wave" was later used by journalists and military officials to convey the image that the American soldiers were assaulted by overwhelming numbers of Chinese on a broad front.<ref name=appleman362>{{harvnb|Appleman|p=362|1990}}.</ref> [[S.L.A. Marshall]] also commented that the word "mass" was indiscriminately used by the media to describe Chinese infantry tactics, and it is rare for the Chinese to actually use densely concentrated infantry formations to absorb enemy firepower.<ref name=marshall5>{{harvnb|Marshall|1988|p=5}}.</ref> In response to the media's stereotype of Chinese assault troops deployed in vast "human seas", a joke circulated among the US servicemen was "How many hordes are there in a Chinese [[platoon]]?"<ref name=appleman353/><ref name=roe435/><ref name=george4_5>{{harvnb|George|1967|pp=4–5}}.</ref>

In Chinese sources, this tactic is referred to as "three-three fireteams," after the composition of the attack: three men would form one fireteam, and three fireteams would form one squad. A Chinese platoon, consisting of 33 to 50 soldiers (depending on if they had a heavy weapons team), would form their squads in ranks in a staggered arrowhead formation, which would be employed to attack "one point" from "two sides."<ref>林彪 (1948).《一点两面与班组的三三制战术》. 辽吉第五军分区.</ref>

Although abandoned by the PVA by 1953,{{sfn|O'Dowd|2007|p=148}} outside observers such as [[Allen S. Whiting]] expected China to use the tactic if necessary.<ref name="burr2001">{{Cite web |date=12 June 2001 |editor-last=Burr |editor-first=William |title=The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969 |url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091013105812/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/ |archive-date=13 October 2009 |access-date=19 July 2023 |website=National Security Archive |publisher=George Washington University}}</ref> The Chinese army re-adopted this tactic during the [[Vietnam War]] and [[Sino-Vietnamese War]] due to the stagnation of the Chinese military modernization programs during the [[Cultural Revolution]].{{sfn|O'Dowd|2007|pp=150, 165}} Their use in the Vietnam War and Sino-Vietnamese War is a rare example of an army with superior firepower, in this case the PLA, throwing away its advantage.{{sfn|O'Dowd|2007|pp=144, 164}}