Editing Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (section)

==Ambassador to South Vietnam (1963–1964)==
{{One source|section|date=January 2023}}
[[File:Cabot Lodge (1964).jpg|thumb|Lodge in 1964]]
Kennedy appointed Lodge [[List of ambassadors of the United States to South Vietnam|ambassador to South Vietnam]], which he held from 1963 to 1964. Lodge's appointment came as Kennedy began to lose confidence in South Vietnam's President [[Ngo Dinh Diem|Ngô Đình Diệm]], particularly after Diệm denied culpability for the [[Huế Phật Đản shootings]] and instead blamed the [[Viet Cong]].{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=280}} As the current ambassador, [[Frederick Nolting]], was a partisan of Diệm, Kennedy felt it was time for a new ambassador who would be tough on Diệm in a way that Nolting never could be. Furthermore, Nolting had considered it his duty to silence unfavourable press coverage of Diệm, causing him to feud with reporters who wrote that the Diem regime was corrupt and unpopular.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=296}} On June 27, 1963, Kennedy named Lodge as his ambassador to South Vietnam.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=280-282}} Lodge had visited Vietnam as a newsman in the 1930s, and though he spoke no Vietnamese, he was fluent in French, a language widely used by the South Vietnamese elite.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=281-282}} More importantly, Kennedy was haunted by the way that the "[[loss of China]]" had badly damaged the Truman administration, and feeling that South Vietnam might likewise now be lost, wanted a well-known Republican politician as his ambassador in South Vietnam to shield him from potential Republican attacks that he "lost" South Vietnam.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=281-282}}

Kennedy had chosen Lodge because he knew he would accept.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=217}} The Cabot Lodges were one of the most distinguished Boston Brahmin families with a long history of public service, and that given his pride in his family's history, Lodge would never turn down an opportunity to serve the United States.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=217}} Lodge for his part believed that if he was successful as an ambassador to an important American ally in the middle of a crisis, that would help his presidential ambitions.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=281-282 & 345}} When Kennedy asked Lodge if he was willing to serve as an ambassador, Lodge replied: "If you need me, of course, I want to do it".{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=217}} Eisenhower warned Lodge against taking the job, believing that Kennedy only offered Republicans the more difficult jobs to damage their reputations.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=218}} Despite Eisenhower's advice, Lodge told him that he felt it was his patriotic duty to accept, saying that the Cabot Lodges had always served the United States regardless if the president was a Democrat or a Republican, and he was not going to break with his family's traditions.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=218}}

Lodge arrived in Saigon on August 22, 1963, finding a city gripped by protests in response to the [[Xá Lợi Pagoda raids]] that had taken place the night before.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=285-286}} Thrust into the crisis, Lodge received a cable from Kennedy demanding to know what was going on, and in his reply Lodge wrote that [[Ngô Đình Nhu]] had ordered the raids "probably" with the "full support" of Diem.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=286}} In his first press conference, Lodge gave a roistering talk about the freedom of the press, earning cheers from the reporters who resented Nolting's attempts to silence them.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=220}} Knowing that Lodge had been sent to Saigon to be tough with Diem, some of the reporters taunted South Vietnamese officials present by saying: "Our new mandarin is going to lick your old mandarin".{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=220}} One of Lodge's first acts as ambassador was to visit the [[United States Agency for International Development|Agency for International Development]] (AID) office in Saigon, where two Buddhist monks had taken refuge, and to whom he agreed to grant asylum.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=221}} When Lodge learned that the two monks were vegetarians, he ordered the AID workers to bring them only vegetables and fruits.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=221}}

Ever since July 1963, a group of senior South Vietnamese generals had been in contact with the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA), asking for American support for a [[coup d'état]]. Lodge advised caution, saying a coup would be a "shot in the dark".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=286}} On August 26, Lodge arrived at the [[Gia Long Palace]] to present his credentials to President Diem.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=288}} As Lodge spoke no Vietnamese and Diem no English, they talked in French. Lodge had a very poor working relationship with Diem, as both men were from wealthy and distinguished families and too used to having others defer to them.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=288}} Lodge gave Diem a list of reforms to carry out such as his dismissing Nhu; silencing his abrasive and bombastic wife, [[Madame Nhu]]; trying the officials responsible for the shootings in Hue; and providing greater religious tolerance, all of which were anathema to Diem.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=157-158}} 

=== Role in the 1963 coup d'état ===
{{Main|1963 South Vietnamese coup d'état}}
Lodge quickly determined that Diem was both inept and corrupt, and that South Vietnam was headed for disaster unless Diem reformed his administration or was replaced.<ref>
{{cite video
  | people = Lodge, Henry Cabot
  | title = Interview with Henry Cabot Lodge
  | url = http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-b93dd4-interview-with-henry-cabot-lodge-1979-part-1-of-5
  | medium = Video interview (part 1 of 5)
  | publisher = Open Vault, WGBH Media Library and Archives
  | date = 1979 }}
</ref> On August 29 Lodge wrote in a cable: "We are launched on a course from where there is no respectable turning back: the overthrow of the Diem government. There is no turning back because U.S. prestige is already publicly committed to this end in large measure, and will become more so as the facts leak out. In a more fundamental sense, there is no turning back because there is no possibility, in my view, that the war can be won under a Diem administration".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=289}}

Lodge, noting that the [[South Vietnamese Army]] was completely reliant upon American military aid, demanded that Kennedy halt all such aid as long as Diem was president, and to make an "all-out effort" to have the mutinous generals "move promptly", as the outcome of the coup would depend "at least as much on us as them".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=289-290}} Lodge warned that to allow Diem to continue would lead to a popular revolt that would bring in a "pro-Communist or at best neutralist set of politicians".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=290}} At the same time, French President [[Charles de Gaulle]] had launched a major diplomatic initiative to end the [[Vietnam War|war in Vietnam]] that called for a federation of North and South Vietnam, and for both Vietnams to be neutral in the Cold War.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=165}} Lodge was opposed to the peace plan, as he saw the proposed neutralization of South Vietnam as no different from Communist control of South Vietnam.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=165}}

Kennedy accepted Lodge's recommendations and gave him ''carte blanche'' to manage the affairs in Vietnam as he best saw fit, and gave him the power to cut off American aid if necessary.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=290}} Just why Kennedy delegated such to Lodge has remained a matter of debate. Historian [[Arthur Schlesinger, Jr]]. later wrote Lodge was "a strong man with the bit between his teeth" whom Kennedy could not manage.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=290}} In contrast, journalist [[Stanley Karnow]] speculated that Kennedy having embraced and praised Diem preferred that the "messy job" of overthrowing him be contracted out to Lodge, all the more so as there was always the possibility that the coup might fail, in which case the president would blame a "rogue ambassador".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=290}}

On October 5, Lodge cabled back to Kennedy that he learned that the generals were finally ready to proceed.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=294}} The CIA officer, [[Lucien Conein]] met with General [[Dương Văn Minh]], who asked that the United States "not thwart" a coup and promise to continue to provide the aid worth about $500 million per year after Diem was overthrown.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=294}} Lodge seized upon Minh's remark to argue to Kennedy that the United States should promise that it "will not attempt to thwart" a coup, a formula that Kennedy embraced.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=295}} Lodge himself later used this line as a defence against criticism, saying he did not promise to support a coup, only "not thwart" it.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=295}}

Kennedy had his National Security Adviser, [[McGeorge Bundy]], send Lodge a cable on October 25 saying that the United States should abandon the coup if there were "poor prospects of success".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=298}} Lodge in reply maintained "it seems at least an even bet that the next government would not bungle and fumble as the present one has".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=298}} Lodge also argued to stop a coup would be to take on "an undue responsibility for keeping the incumbents in office", which was a "judgment over the affairs of Vietnam".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=298}} In the next sentence, he ignored his principle of noninterference in South Vietnamese internal affairs by suggesting that in a post-Diem cabinet should include Tran Quoc Buu, a trade union leader who had long been funded by the CIA, and the Buddhist leader [[Trí Quang|Tri Quang]], who had impressed Lodge with his [[anticommunism]].{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=298}} On October 28, Lodge sent a dispatch to Kennedy saying a coup was "imminent", and that he would have only four hours notice before the coup started, which "rules out my checking with you".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=299}}

On October 29, Kennedy called a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss what to do.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=299}} Persuaded by [[Robert F. Kennedy|Robert Kennedy]] — his younger brother, Attorney General and right-hand man — President Kennedy changed his mind and decided against the coup.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}}  Writing on behalf of Kennedy, Bundy sent a message to Lodge warning the possibility of a civil war between pro-Diem and anti-Diem forces "could be serious or even disastrous for U.S. interests".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} Lodge was ordered to have Conein tell General [[Trần Văn Đôn]] that "we do not find that the presently revealed plans give a clear prospect of quick results" and to put General [[Paul D. Harkins]] in charge of the embassy in Saigon when the ambassador was due to leave shortly for a meeting in Washington.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}}

Lodge ignored this order from Bundy, stating in his reply that to have Harkins in charge of the embassy during an event "so profoundly political as a change of government" would violate the principle that the serving officers of the U.S. armed forces must always be non-political.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} He further argued that the only way of stopping the coup would be to inform Diem which officers had been plotting against him which would "make traitors out of us" and destroy the "civilian and military leadership needed to carry the war&nbsp;... to its successful conclusion" as Diem would have the rebel officers all shot.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} Lodge told Kennedy that when the coup started, he would grant asylum to Diem and the rest of the Ngo family should they ask for it, but felt that to stop the coup would be interference in South Vietnam's internal affairs.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} Lodge also argued that the money should be "discreetly" provided to the plotters to "buy off potential opposition" and for the United States to immediately recognize a post-Diem government.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} Finally, he argued that was needed for South Vietnam was "nation-building".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=300}} Lodge wrote: "My general view is that the United States is trying bring this medieval country into the twentieth century&nbsp;... We have made considerable progress in military and economic ways, but to gain victory we must also bring them into the twentieth century politically, and that can only be done by either a thoroughgoing change in the behaviour of the present government or another government".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=300-301}} Faced with stark warnings from Lodge that the majority of the South Vietnamese people hated the Ngo family and there no possibility of a victory over the Viet Cong as long as Diem continued in power, Kennedy changed his mind yet again.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=301}} In his final message to Lodge, Kennedy wrote: "If you should conclude that there is not clearly a high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to the generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are better&nbsp;... But once a coup under responsible leadership has begun&nbsp;... it is in the interest of the U.S. government that it should succeed".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=301}} Kennedy had essentially abdicated responsibility by leaving the final decision about whatever to back a coup to Lodge, who had no doubts in his mind that a coup was the best course of action.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=301}}

On November 1, 1963, at about 10 am, Lodge visited the Gia Long Palace to meet Diem who gave him a two-hour-long lecture about American ingratitude towards his regime.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=304}} At about noon, Lodge returned to the embassy for lunch.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=304}} At about 1 pm, the coup began.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=305}} Later that day, the Ngo brothers secretly fled into [[Chợ Lớn, Ho Chi Minh City|Cholon]], the Chinese district of Saigon.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=308}} Lodge attempted to get into touch with Diem with the aim of arranging for him to go into exile, but it was unclear just where he was, as Diem kept claiming that he was still at the Gia Long Palace. Finally, Diem revealed in a phone call to Đôn that he and his brother were at Saint Francis Xavier, and was willing to go into exile provided he, his brother and their families were promised safe conduct.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=309}} Despite the promise of safe conduct, the Ngo brothers were shot in the armored personnel carrier that was supposed to take them to the airport.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=310}} Lodge invited the generals to the embassy to congratulate them for what he saw as a job well done.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=311}} In a cable to Kennedy, he wrote: "The prospects now are for a shorter war".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=311}}

=== After the coup ===
On November 24, 1963, two days after Kennedy's assassination, Lodge arrived in Washington to meet the new president, [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Lyndon Johnson]].{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=323}} Johnson told Lodge he would not "lose" Vietnam, saying "tell those generals in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=323}} After Diem's assassination, Lodge seems to have lost interest in Vietnam as he became increasingly lethargic in performing his duties as ambassador.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=324}} After his high hopes that Diem's removal would spark improvements, he reported that the new leader, General Dương Văn Minh, was a "good, well intentioned man", but asked "Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?"{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=324}} In December 1963, the Secretary of Defense, [[Robert McNamara]], visited South Vietnam where he reported the American team in Saigon "lacks leadership, has been poorly informed and is not working to a common plan".{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=325}} McNamara described a dysfunctional atmosphere at the embassy as Lodge was still feuding with Harkins and had blocked him from using the embassy's cable room to communicate with Washington.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=325}} Lodge distrusted the diplomats at the embassy, and was noted for his secretive ways.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=346}}

The coup sparked a rapid succession of leaders in South Vietnam, each unable to rally and unify their people and in turn overthrown by someone new. These frequent changes in leadership caused political instability in the South, since no strong, centralized and permanent government was in place to govern the nation, while the [[Viet Minh]] stepped up their infiltration of the Southern populace and their pace of attacks in the South. Having supported the coup against President Diem, Lodge then realized it had caused the situation in the region to deteriorate, and he suggested to the State Department that South Vietnam should be made to relinquish its independence and become a [[protectorate]] of the United States (like the former status of the [[Philippines]]) so as to bring governmental stability. The alternatives, he warned, were either increased military involvement by the U.S. or total abandonment of South Vietnam by America.<ref>{{cite book |last=Moyar |title=Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 |location=New York |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2006 |isbn=0-521-86911-0 |page=273 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=phJrZ87RwuAC&pg=PA273 }}</ref>

In June 1964, Lodge resigned as ambassador to run to seek the Republican nomination to be the presidential candidate for the election of that year.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=345}} Lodge had been unpopular with his embassy staff, and most were happy to see him go.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=346}}