Editing Hannibal (section)

===Stalemate===
The war in Italy settled into a strategic stalemate. The Romans used the [[Attrition warfare|attritional]] strategy that Fabius had taught them, which, they finally realized, was the only feasible means of defeating Hannibal.<ref>Prevas, John, ''Hannibal Crosses the Alps: The Invasion of Italy and the Second Punic War'', p. [https://books.google.com/books?id=zgi7RMJSCxMC&dq=the+way+to+defeat+hannibal,+fabius+believed&pg=PA200 200]</ref> Fabius received the name "Cunctator" ("the Delayer") because of his policy of not meeting Hannibal in open battle, but through attrition.<ref>{{citation|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BiISDAAAQBAJ&q=Cunctator |title=The Elder Pliny on the Human Animal: Human History Book 7: Natural History |translator-first = Mary |translator-last =Beagon |author =Pliny the Elder |page= 361 |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0198150657 }}</ref> The Romans deprived Hannibal of a large-scale battle and instead assaulted his weakening army with multiple smaller armies in an attempt to both weary him and create unrest in his troops.<ref name="dodge" /> For the next few years, Hannibal was forced to sustain a [[scorched earth]] policy and obtain local provisions for protracted and ineffectual operations throughout southern Italy. His immediate objectives were reduced to minor operations centred mainly around the cities of [[Campania]].

The forces detached to his lieutenants were generally unable to hold their own, and neither his home government nor his new ally Philip V of Macedon helped to make up his losses. His position in southern Italy, therefore, became increasingly difficult and his chance of ultimately conquering Rome grew ever more remote. Hannibal still won a number of notable victories: completely destroying two Roman armies in 212&nbsp;BC, and killing two consuls, including the famed [[Marcus Claudius Marcellus]] in a battle in 208&nbsp;BC. However, Hannibal slowly began losing ground—inadequately supported by his Italian allies, abandoned by his government, either because of jealousy or simply because Carthage was overstretched, and unable to match Rome's resources. He was never able to bring about another grand decisive victory that could produce a lasting strategic change.

Carthaginian political will was embodied in the ruling [[oligarchy]]. There was a Carthaginian Senate, but the real power was with the inner "Council of 30 Nobles" and the board of judges from ruling families known as the "[[Hundred and Four]]". These two bodies came from the wealthy, commercial families of Carthage. Two political factions operated in Carthage: the war party, also known as the "[[Barcid]]s" (Hannibal's family name), and the peace party led by [[Hanno the Great#Hanno II the Great|Hanno II the Great]]. Hanno had been instrumental in denying Hannibal's requested reinforcements following the battle at Cannae.

Hannibal started the war without the full backing of Carthaginian oligarchy. His attack of Saguntum had presented the oligarchy with a choice of war with Rome or loss of prestige in Iberia. The oligarchy, not Hannibal, controlled the strategic resources of Carthage. Hannibal constantly sought reinforcements from either Iberia or North Africa. Hannibal's troops who were lost in combat were replaced with less well-trained and motivated mercenaries from Italy or Gaul. The commercial interests of the Carthaginian oligarchy dictated the reinforcement and supply of Iberia rather than Hannibal throughout the campaign.