Editing Hafizullah Amin (section)

===Leadership===

====Domestic policies====
Following Taraki's fall from power, Amin was elected Chairman of the Presidum of the [[Revolutionary Council (Afghanistan)|Revolutionary Council]] and [[General Secretary of the Communist Party|General Secretary]] of the [[Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan|PDPA Central Committee]] by the PDPA Politburo. The election of Amin as PDPA General Secretary and the removal of Taraki from all party posts was unanimous.{{sfn|Tripathi|Falk|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tDf8p060_JgC&pg=PA48 48]}} The only members of the cabinet replaced when Amin took power were the Gang of Four – Beverley Male saw this as "a clear indication that he had their [the ministers'] support".{{sfn|Male|1982|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-cYOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA185 185]}} Amin's rise to power was followed by a policy of moderation, and attempts to persuade the Afghan people that the regime was not [[Islamophobia|anti-Islamic]]. Amin's government began to invest in the reconstruction, or reparation, of mosques. He also promised the Afghan people [[freedom of religion]]. Religious groups were given copies of the [[Quran]], and Amin began to refer to [[Allah]] in speeches. He even claimed that the Saur Revolution was "totally based on the principles of Islam". The campaign proved to be unsuccessful, and many Afghans held Amin responsible for the regime's [[Totalitarianism|totalitarian behavior]].{{sfn|Gladstone|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aH_KCWVB6W0C&pg=PA118 118]}} Amin's rise to power was officially endorsed by the [[Jamiatul Ulama (Afghanistan)|Jamiatul Ulama]] on 20 September 1979. Their endorsement led to the official announcement that Amin was a pious Muslim – Amin thus scored a point against the counter-revolutionary propaganda which claimed the communist regime was [[atheist]]. Amin also tried to increase his popularity with tribal groups, a feat Taraki had been unable or unwilling to achieve. In a speech to tribal elders Amin was defensive about the Western way he dressed; an official biography was published which depicted Amin in traditional Pashtun clothes. During his short stay in power, Amin became committed to establishing a collective leadership; when Taraki was ousted, Amin promised "from now on there will be no [[Autocracy|one-man government]]..."{{sfn|Male|1982|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-cYOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA192 192]}}

{{Quote box
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|quote = We will not leave a backward country for future generations
|source = — Amin, as quoted in the ''[[New Kabul Times]]'', September 30, 1979<ref>{{Cite web |title=Archived copy |url=https://content.library.arizona.edu/digital/api/collection/p16127coll6/id/39191/download |access-date=23 July 2021 |archive-date=23 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210723161902/https://content.library.arizona.edu/digital/api/collection/p16127coll6/id/39191/download |url-status=live }}</ref>
}}
Attempting to pacify the population, Amin released a list of 18,000 people who had been executed, and blamed the executions on Taraki. The total number of arrested during Taraki's and Amin's combined reign number between 17,000 and 45,000.{{sfn|Amtstutz|1994|p=[https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_RUSNyMH1aFQC/page/n296 273]}} Amin was not liked by the Afghan people. During his rule, opposition to the communist regime increased, and the government lost control of the countryside. The state of the [[Afghan military]] deteriorated; due to desertions the number of military personnel in the Afghan army decreased from 100,000 in the immediate aftermath of the Saur Revolution, to somewhere between 50,000 and 70,000. Another problem Amin faced was the KGB's penetration of the PDPA, the military and the government bureaucracy.{{sfn|Tomsen|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zz9_Ve29eL0C&pg=PA160 160]}} While Amin's position in Afghanistan was becoming more perilous by the day, his enemies who were exiled in the Soviet Union and the [[Eastern Bloc]] were agitating for his removal. [[Babrak Karmal]], the Parchamite leader, met several leading Eastern Bloc figures during this period, and [[Mohammad Aslam Watanjar]], [[Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy]] and [[Assadullah Sarwari]] wanted to exact revenge upon Amin.{{sfn|Tomsen|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zz9_Ve29eL0C&pg=PA160 160–161]}}

====Foreign policy====
In July 1979, Hafizullah Amin announced that the [[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan|DRA]] was not bound by old treaties with Iran regarding the distribution of water from the Helmand River.{{sfn|Arnold|1983|p=77}} Iran interpreted this as Afghanistan using [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] backing to assert themselves in the region.{{sfn|Arnold|1983|p=77}} When Amin became leader, he tried to reduce Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet Union. The Soviets were concerned when they received reports that Amin had met personally with [[Gulbuddin Hekmatyar]], one of the leading anti-communists in Afghanistan. His general untrustworthiness and his unpopularity amongst Afghans made it more difficult for Amin to find new "foreign patrons".{{sfn|Tomsen|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zz9_Ve29eL0C&pg=PA159 159]}} Amin's involvement in the death of [[Adolph Dubs]], the [[United States Ambassador to Afghanistan|American Ambassador to Afghanistan]], strained his relations with the United States. He tried to improve relations by reestablishing contact, met with three different American [[chargé d'affaires]], and was interviewed by an American correspondent. But this did not improve Afghanistan's standing in the eyes of the United States Government. After the third meeting with Amin, [[J. Bruce Amstutz]], the American Ambassador to Afghanistan from 1979 to 1980, believed the wisest thing to do was to maintain "a low profile, trying to avoid issues, and waiting to see what happens".{{sfn|Tomsen|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zz9_Ve29eL0C&pg=PA160 160]}} In early December 1979, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed a joint summit meeting between Amin and [[Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq]], the [[President of Pakistan]]. The Pakistani Government, accepting a modified version of the offer, agreed to send [[Agha Shahi]], the Pakistani foreign minister, to [[Kabul]] for talks. In the meanwhile, the [[Inter-Services Intelligence]] (ISI), Pakistani's secret police, continued to train [[Mujahideen]] fighters who opposed Amin's regime.{{sfn|Tomsen|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zz9_Ve29eL0C&pg=PA160 160]}}

====Afghan-Soviet relations====
{{Quote box
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|quote = Any person and any element who harms the friendship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union will be considered the enemy of the country, enemy of our people and enemy of our revolution. We will not allow anybody in Afghanistan to act against the friendship of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.
|source = — Amin reassuring the Soviets about his intentions.{{sfn|Male|1982|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-cYOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA183 183]}}
}}

Contrary to popular belief, the Soviet leadership headed by [[Leonid Brezhnev]], [[Alexei Kosygin]] and the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Politburo]], were not eager to send troops to Afghanistan. The Soviet Politburo decisions were guided by a Special Commission on Afghanistan, which consisted of [[Yuri Andropov]] the [[KGB chairman]], [[Andrei Gromyko]] the [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Soviet Union)|Minister of Foreign Affairs]], Defence Minister [[Dmitriy Ustinov]], and [[Boris Ponomarev]], the head of the [[Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|International Department of the Central Committee]].{{sfn|Rasanayagam|2005|p= [https://books.google.com/books?id=5L8CnWkACQkC&pg=PA87 87]}} The Politburo was opposed to the removal of Taraki and his subsequent murder. According to Brezhnev, the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary]] of the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]], "Events developed so swiftly in Afghanistan that essentially there was little opportunity to somehow interfere in them. Right now our mission is to determine our further actions, so as to preserve our position in Afghanistan and to secure our influence there."{{sfn|Rasanayagam|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5L8CnWkACQkC&pg=PA89 89]}} Although Afghan–Soviet relations deteriorated during Amin's short stint in power, he was invited on an official visit to Moscow by [[Alexander Puzanov]], the [[List of Ambassadors of Russia and the Soviet Union to Afghanistan|Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan]], because of the Soviet leadership's satisfaction with his party and state-building policy. Not everything went as planned, and Andropov talked about "the undesirable turn of events" taking place in Afghanistan under Amin's rule.{{sfn|Rasanayagam|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5L8CnWkACQkC&pg=PA89 89]}} Andropov also brought up the ongoing political shift in Afghanistan under Amin; the Soviets were afraid that Amin would move Afghanistan's foreign policy from a pro-Soviet position to a pro-United States position.{{sfn|Rasanayagam|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5L8CnWkACQkC&pg=PA89 89–90]}} By early-to-mid December 1979, the Soviet leadership had established an alliance with [[Babrak Karmal]] and [[Assadullah Sarwari]].{{sfn|Rasanayagam|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5L8CnWkACQkC&pg=PA90 90]}}
{{Quote box
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|quote = Those who boast of friendship with us, they can really be our friend when they respect our independence, our soil and our prideful traditions.
|source = — Amin stressing the importance of Afghan independence.{{sfn|Male|1982|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-cYOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA183 183]}}
}}

Amin kept a portrait of [[Joseph Stalin]] on his desk. When Soviet officials criticized him of his brutality, Amin replied "Comrade Stalin showed us how to build socialism in a backward country."<ref name=":0">{{cite web|url=http://www.historynet.com/afghanistan-fiasco.htm|title=Afghanistan Fiasco – HistoryNet|website=historynet.com|date=15 March 2017|access-date=15 January 2018|archive-date=16 January 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180116004858/http://www.historynet.com/afghanistan-fiasco.htm|url-status=live}}</ref>

As it turned out, the relationship between Puzanov and Amin broke down. Amin started a smear campaign to discredit Puzanov. This in turn led to an assassination attempt against Amin, in which Puzanov participated. The situation was worsened by the [[KGB]] accusing Amin of misrepresenting the Soviet position on Afghanistan in the PDPA Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council. The KGB also noted an increase in anti-Soviet agitation by the government during Amin's rule, and harassment against Soviet citizens increased under Amin.{{sfn|Tripathi|Falk|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tDf8p060_JgC&pg=PA50 50]}} A group of senior politicians reported to the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet Central Committee]] that it was necessary to do "everything possible" to prevent a change in political orientation in Afghanistan. However, the Soviet leadership did not advocate intervention at this time, and instead called for increasing its influence in the Amin leadership to expose his "true intentions".{{sfn|Tripathi|Falk|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tDf8p060_JgC&pg=PA50 50–51]}} A Soviet Politburo assessment referred to Amin as "a power-hungry leader who is distinguished by brutality and treachery".{{sfn|Tomsen|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zz9_Ve29eL0C&pg=PA162 162]}} Amongst the many sins they alleged were his "insincerity and duplicity" when dealing with the Soviet Union, creating fictitious accusations against PDPA-members who opposed him, indulging in a policy of [[nepotism]], and his tendency to conduct a more "balanced policy" towards [[First World]] countries.{{sfn|Tomsen|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zz9_Ve29eL0C&pg=PA162 162–163]}}  According to the former senior Soviet diplomat, [[Oleg Grinevsky]], the KGB was becoming increasingly convinced that Amin couldn't be counted on to effectively deal with the insurgency and preserve the survival of the Afghan Marxist state.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/asia-july-dec06-soviet_10-10|title=The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan|website=PBS NewsHour|date=10 October 2006|access-date=27 March 2018|archive-date=27 March 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180327084500/https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/asia-july-dec06-soviet_10-10|url-status=live}}</ref>

By the end of October the Special Commission on Afghanistan, which consisted of Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov and Ponomarev, wanted to end the impression that the Soviet government supported Amin's leadership and policy. The KGB's [[First Chief Directorate]] was put under orders that something had to be done about Afghanistan, and several of its personnel were assembled to deal with the task.{{sfn|Tripathi|Falk|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tDf8p060_JgC&pg=PA54 54]}} Andropov fought hard for Soviet intervention, saying to Brezhnev that Amin's policies had destroyed the military and the government's capabilities to handle the crisis by use of mass repression. The plan, according to Andropov, was to assemble a small force to intervene and remove Amin from power and replace him with Karmal.{{sfn|Tripathi|Falk|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tDf8p060_JgC&pg=PA55 55]}} The Soviet Union declared its plan to intervene in Afghanistan on 12 December 1979; large numbers of Soviet airborne troops landed in Kabul on 25 December, with the approval of Amin who miscalculated their intentions. Soviet leadership initiated [[Operation Storm-333]] (the first phase of the intervention) on 27 December 1979.{{sfn|Camp|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yMmx1m_ZCqEC&pg=PA12 12–13]}}

====Attempted poisoning by Amin's chef====
The leadership of the USSR had no need for Amin to remain alive.<ref name=Popov11122019Gordonua>{{cite news |url=https://gordonua.com/publications/zapiski-byvshego-podpolkovnika-kgb-razvedchiki-specialnogo-naznacheniya-v-afganistane-1463248.html |title=Записки бывшего подполковника КГБ: Разведчики ''специального назначения'' в Афганистане: Владимир Попов – один из авторов книги "КГБ играет в шахматы". Он служил в Комитете госбезопасности с 1972–го по 1991 год, работал в отделах, которые курировали выезжающих за границу, творческие союзы и международное спортивное сотрудничество. В августе 1991 года отказался поддерживать путч, был уволен из спецслужбы в звании подполковника и вскоре эмигрировал в Канаду. Не так давно 72-летний Попов завершил работу над документальной книгой "Заговор негодяев. Записки бывшего подполковника КГБ", в которой рассказывает о становлении режима российского президента Владимира Путина, о его соратниках, а также о своей работе в комитете. Ранее книга не издавалась. С согласия автора издание "ГОРДОН" по средам эксклюзивно публикует главы из записок. |trans-title=Notes from Former KGB Lieutenant Colonel: 'Special Purpose' Scouts in Afghanistan: Vladimir Popov is one of the authors of the book "The KGB plays chess." He served in the State Security Committee from 1972 to 1991, worked in the departments that oversaw traveling abroad, creative unions and international sports cooperation. In August 1991, he refused to support the coup, was fired from the secret service with the rank of lieutenant colonel, and soon emigrated to Canada. Not so long ago, 72-year-old Popov completed work on the documentary book “Conspiracy of villains. Notes by the former KGB lieutenant colonel,” in which he talks about the formation of the regime of Russian President [[Vladimir Putin]], about his associates, as well as about his work on the committee. The book has not been previously published. With the consent of the author , GORDON exclusively publishes chapters from notes on Wednesdays. |work=[[:uk:ГОРДОН (інтернет-видання)|Gordonua]] |last=Popov |first=Vladimir |date=11 December 2019 |access-date=13 December 2019 |language=uk |archive-date=13 December 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191213194636/https://gordonua.com/publications/zapiski-byvshego-podpolkovnika-kgb-razvedchiki-specialnogo-naznacheniya-v-afganistane-1463248.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Andropov's special representative in Afghanistan, General Boris Ivanov, recommended for Amin to attend a conciliatory dinner with his political mentor, who had become an enemy of Amin, so that Amin's chef could poison Amin.<ref name=Popov11122019Gordonua/> However, Amin survived the poisoning after being treated by doctors at the Soviet embassy, who did not know that "special reconnaissance officers" were trying to kill Amin.<ref name=Popov11122019Gordonua/> Since Amin, who was very loyal to the USSR, had survived two attempted assassinations that had been approved by the USSR, the decision was made to eliminate him through a bloody coup at Amin's residence, the Tajbeg Palace.<ref name=Popov11122019Gordonua/>

====Death====
{{Further|Operation Storm-333}}
[[File:Dvorec 27 12 79.jpg|thumb|200px|The [[Tajbeg Palace]] on 27 December 1979, where Amin was killed]]
Amin trusted the Soviet Union until the very end, despite the deterioration of official relations, and was unaware that the tide in Moscow had turned against him since he ordered Taraki's death. When the Afghan intelligence service handed Amin a report that the Soviet Union would invade the country and topple him, Amin claimed that the report was a product of [[imperialism]]. His view can be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union, after several months, finally gave in to Amin's demands and sent troops into Afghanistan to secure the PDPA government.{{sfn|Garthoff|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mGG-x_tuNUcC&pg=PA1009 1009] }} Contrary to common Western belief, Amin was informed of the Soviet decision to send troops into Afghanistan.{{sfn|Garthoff|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mGG-x_tuNUcC&pg=PA1017 1017]}} General Tukharinov, commander of the 40th Army, met with Afghan Major General Babadzhan to talk about Soviet troop movements before the Soviet army's intervention.{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9FjkLLEyh1UC&pg=PA87 87]}} On 25 December, [[Dmitry Ustinov]] issued a formal order, stating that "[t]he state frontier of the [[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]] is to be crossed on the ground and in the air by forces of the 40th Army and the Air Force at 1500 hrs on 25 December". This was the formal beginning of the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet intervention in Afghanistan]].{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=86}}

Concerned for his safety, on 20 December Amin moved from the Presidential Palace, located in the centre of Kabul, to the [[Tajbeg Palace]], which had previously been the headquarters of the [[Central Corps]] of the [[Afghan Army]]. The palace was formidable, with walls strong enough to withstand artillery fire. According to [[Rodric Braithwaite]], "its defences had been carefully and intelligently organised".{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=89}} All roads to the palace had been mined, with the exception of one, which had heavy machine guns and artillery positioned to defend it. To make matters worse for the Soviets, the Afghans had established a second line of defence which consisted of seven posts, "each manned by four sentries armed with a machine gun, a mortar, and automatic rifles".{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=89}} The external defences of the palace were handled by the Presidential Guard, which consisted of 2,500 troops and three [[T-54 tank]]s.{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=89}} Several Soviet commanders involved in the assassination of Amin thought the plan to attack the palace was "crazy".{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=94}} Although the military had been informed by the Soviet leadership through their commanders, [[Yuri Drozdov (general)|Yuri Drozdov]] and Vasily Kolesnik, that the leader was a "CIA agent"{{sfn|Garthoff|1994|p=1046}} who had betrayed the Saur Revolution, many Soviet soldiers hesitated; despite what their commanders had told them, it seemed implausible that Amin, the leader of the PDPA government, was an American double agent. Despite several objections, the plan to assassinate Amin went ahead.{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=94}}

Before resorting to killing Amin by brute force, the Soviets had tried to poison him as early as 13 December (but nearly killed his nephew instead) and to kill him with a sniper shot on his way to work (this proved impossible as the Afghans had improved their security measures).{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=94}} They even tried to poison Amin just hours before the assault on the Presidential Palace on 27 December. Amin had organised a lunch for party members to show guests his palace and to celebrate [[Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri]]'s return from Moscow. Panjsheri's return improved the mood even further; he boasted that he and Gromyko always kept in contact with each other. During the meal, Amin and several of his guests lost consciousness as they had been poisoned. Amin survived his encounter with death, because the carbonation of the [[Coca-Cola]] he was drinking diluted the toxic agent.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Baker|first=Peter|date=29 January 2019 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/us/politics/afghanistan-trump-soviet-union.html |title=Why Did Soviets Invade Afghanistan? Documents Offer History Lesson for Trump|work=The New York Times |access-date=31 January 2019|issn=0362-4331|url-status=live |archive-date=30 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190130153551/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/us/politics/afghanistan-trump-soviet-union.html}}</ref> [[Mikhail Talybov]], a [[KGB]] agent, was given responsibility for the poisonings.{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=95}}

The assault on the palace began shortly afterward.{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=96}} During the attack Amin still believed the Soviet Union was on his side, and told his adjutant, "The Soviets will help us".{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=98}} The adjutant replied that it was the Soviets who were attacking them; Amin initially replied that this was a lie. Only after he tried but failed to contact the Chief of the General Staff, he muttered, "I guessed it. It's all true".{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=99}} There are various accounts of how Amin died, but the exact details have never been confirmed. Amin was either killed by a deliberate attack or died by a "random burst of fire".{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=99}} Amin's son was fatally wounded and died shortly after.{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=99}} His daughter was wounded, but survived.{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=104}} It was Gulabzoy who had been given orders to kill Amin and Watanjar who later confirmed his death.{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=99}} The men of Amin's family were all executed either immediately or shortly thereafter (his brother Abdullah and nephew [[Asadullah Amin|Asadullah]] were executed in June 1980).<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/06/09/afghanistan-says-140-died-in-riots-of-april-and-may/115e113f-c265-4a3a-81b2-d958e6ddddda/ |title=Afghanistan Says 140 Died in Riots Of April and May - The Washington Post<!-- Bot generated title --> |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |access-date=10 September 2021 |archive-date=28 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170828140123/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/06/09/afghanistan-says-140-died-in-riots-of-april-and-may/115e113f-c265-4a3a-81b2-d958e6ddddda/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The women including his daughter were imprisoned at [[Pul-e-Charkhi prison]] until being released by President [[Mohammad Najibullah|Najibullah]] in early 1992.{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p={{pn|date=September 2024}}}} After Amin's death on 27 December 1979, [[Radio Kabul]] broadcast [[Babrak Karmal]]'s pre-recorded speech to the Afghan people, saying: "Today the torture machine of Amin has been smashed". Karmal was installed by the Soviets as the new leader{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=103}} while the [[Soviet Army]] began its intervention in Afghanistan that would [[Soviet–Afghan War|last for nine years]].