Editing Gulf of Tonkin incident (section)

==Distortion of the event==
The U.S. government was still seeking evidence on the night of 4 August when Johnson gave his address to the American public on the incident; messages recorded that day indicate that neither Johnson nor McNamara was certain of an attack.<ref name="Wise">{{Cite book |last= Wise |first= David |title= The Politics of Lying: government deception, secrecy, and power |location= New York |publisher= Vintage Books |year= 1973 |isbn= 0-394-47932-7 |url= https://archive.org/details/politicsoflyingg004 }}</ref> Various news sources, including  [[Time (magazine)|''Time'']],  [[Life (magazine)|''Life'']] and ''[[Newsweek]]'', published articles throughout August on the Tonkin Gulf incident.<ref name="Bradlee">{{cite news |title=Deceit and dishonesty: Ben Bradlee's 1987 James Cameron memorial lecture |url=https://www.theguardian.com/media/from-the-archive-blog/2014/oct/22/ben-bradlee-james-cameron-lecture-1987 |access-date=20 March 2022 |work=[[The Guardian]] |date=29 April 1987 |language=en}}</ref> ''Time'' reported: "Through the darkness, from the West and south ... intruders boldly sped ... at least six of them ... they opened fire on the destroyers with automatic weapons, this time from as close as 2,000 yards."<ref name="Action in Tonkin Gulf">{{Cite news|url= http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,897225,00.html |archive-url= https://archive.today/20130105020142/http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,897225,00.html |url-status= dead |archive-date= January 5, 2013 |title= Action in Tonkin Gulf |newspaper= Time |date= August 14, 1964 |access-date= October 28, 2009 }}</ref> ''Time'' stated that there was "no doubt in Sharp's mind that the U.S. would now have to answer this attack", and that there was no debate or confusion within the administration regarding the incident.<ref name="Action in Tonkin Gulf" />

[[File:Advisors meeting at Camp David - NARA - 192569 crop William Bundy.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|left|William Bundy]]

The use of the set of incidents as a pretext for escalation of U.S. involvement followed the issuance of public threats against North Vietnam, as well as calls from American politicians in favor of escalating the war.<ref name="Moise">{{Harvnb|Moïse|1996}}.</ref> On 4 May 1964, [[William Bundy]] had called for the U.S. to "drive the communists out of South Vietnam", even if that meant attacking both North Vietnam and communist China.<ref name="Moise" /> Even so, the Johnson administration in the second half of 1964 focused on convincing the American public that there was no chance of war between the United States and North Vietnam.<ref name="Moise" />

North Vietnam's General Giáp suggested that the DESOTO patrol had been sent into the gulf to provoke North Vietnam into giving the U.S. an excuse for escalation of the war.<ref name="Moise" /> Various government officials and men aboard ''Maddox'' have suggested similar theories.<ref name="Moise" /> U.S. Undersecretary of State [[George Ball (diplomat)|George Ball]] told a British journalist after the war that "at that time ... many people ... were looking for any excuse to initiate bombing".<ref name="Moise" /> George Ball stated that the mission of the destroyer warship involved in the Gulf of Tonkin incident "was primarily for provocation."<ref>Fredrik Logevall, "Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam" (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 200</ref>

According to [[Ray McGovern]], CIA analyst from 1963 to 1990, the CIA, "not to mention President Lyndon Johnson, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy all knew full well that the evidence of any armed attack [...] was highly dubious....   During the summer of 1964, President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were eager to widen the war in Vietnam. They stepped up sabotage and hit-and-run attacks on the coast of North Vietnam." ''Maddox'', carrying electronic spying gear, was to collect signals intelligence from the North Vietnamese coast, and the coastal attacks were seen as a helpful way to get the North Vietnamese to turn on their coastal radars. For this purpose, it was authorized to approach the coast as close as 13 kilometers (8&nbsp;mi) and the offshore islands as close as four; the latter had already been subjected to shelling from the sea.<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/011108a.html|title= Consortiumnews.com|author= Robert Parry|access-date= May 20, 2014|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20140815113431/http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/011108a.html|archive-date= August 15, 2014|url-status= dead}}</ref>

In his book, ''[[Body of Secrets]]'', [[James Bamford]], who spent three years in the United States Navy as an intelligence analyst, writes that the primary purpose of the ''Maddox'' "was to act as a seagoing provocateur—to poke its sharp gray bow and the American flag as close to the belly of North Vietnam as possible, in effect shoving its five-inch cannons up the nose of the communist navy. ...   The ''Maddox{{'}}'' mission was made even more provocative by being timed to coincide with commando raids, creating the impression that the Maddox was directing those missions ..." Thus, the North Vietnamese had every reason to believe that ''Maddox'' was involved in these actions.<ref>Bamford, James in ''Body of Secrets'', Anchor, Reprint edition (April 30, 2002), {{ISBN| 978-0385499088}}</ref>

John McNaughton suggested in September 1964 that the U.S. prepared to take actions to provoke a North Vietnamese military reaction, including plans to use DESOTO patrols. William Bundy's paper dated 8 September 1964, suggested more DESOTO patrols as well.<ref name="Moise" />