Editing G. E. Moore (section)

====Moral knowledge====
Moore argued that, once arguments based on the [[naturalistic fallacy]] had been discarded, questions of intrinsic goodness could be settled only by appeal to what he (following [[Henry Sidgwick|Sidgwick]]) termed "moral intuitions": [[self-evidence|self-evident]] propositions which recommend themselves to moral thought, but which are not susceptible to either direct proof or disproof (''Principia'', [http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.45 § 45]). As a result of his opinion, he has often been described by later writers as an advocate of [[ethical intuitionism]]. Moore, however, wished to distinguish his opinions from the opinions usually described as "Intuitionist" when ''Principia Ethica'' was written:

{{quotation|In order to express the fact that ethical propositions of my ''first'' class [propositions about what is good as an end in itself] are incapable of proof or disproof, I have sometimes followed Sidgwick's usage in calling them 'Intuitions.' But I beg that it may be noticed that I am not an 'Intuitionist,' in the ordinary sense of the term. Sidgwick himself seems never to have been clearly aware of the immense importance of the difference which distinguishes his Intuitionism from the common doctrine, which has generally been called by that name. The Intuitionist proper is distinguished by maintaining that propositions of my ''second'' class—propositions which assert that a certain action is ''right'' or a ''duty''—are incapable of proof or disproof by any enquiry into the results of such actions. I, on the contrary, am no less anxious to maintain that propositions of ''this'' kind are ''not'' 'Intuitions,' than to maintain that propositions of my ''first'' class ''are'' Intuitions.|G. E. Moore|[http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/preface#s0p5 ''Principia Ethica'', Preface ¶ 5]}}

Moore distinguished his view from the opinion of [[deontological ethics|deontological]] intuitionists, who claimed that "intuitions" could determine questions about what ''actions'' are right or required by [[duty]]. Moore, as a [[consequentialist]], argued that "duties" and moral rules could be determined by investigating the ''effects'' of particular actions or kinds of actions (''Principia'', [http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.89 § 89]), and so were matters for empirical investigation rather than direct objects of intuition (''Principia'', [http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.90 § 90]). According to Moore, "intuitions" revealed not the rightness or wrongness of specific actions, but only what items were good in themselves, as ''ends to be pursued''.