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False Claims Act of 1863
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==Relevant decisions by the United States Supreme Court== In a 2000 case, ''[[Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens]]'', 529 U.S. 765 (2000),<ref name=Vermont/> the [[Supreme Court of the United States|United States Supreme Court]] held that a private individual may not bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States against a State (or state agency) under the FCA. In ''Stevens'', the Supreme Court also endorsed the "partial assignment" approach to ''qui tam'' relator [[standing (law)|standing]] to sue, which had previously been articulated by the Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals and is an exception to the general legal rule for standing.<ref name=Vermont/><ref name="auto"/><ref>For the general standing rule, ''see'' [[Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife]], 504 U.S. 555 (1992)</ref> In a 2007 case, ''[[Rockwell International Corp. v. United States]]'', the [[Supreme Court of the United States|United States Supreme Court]] considered several issues relating to the "original source" exception to the FCA's public-disclosure bar. The Court held that (1) the original source requirement of the FCA provision setting for the original-source exception to the public-disclosure bar on federal-court jurisdiction is jurisdictional; (2) the statutory phrase "information on which the allegations are based" refers to the relator's allegations and not the publicly disclosed allegations; the terms "allegations" is not limited to the allegations in the original complaint, but includes, at a minimum, the allegations in the original complaint as amended; (3) relator's knowledge with respect to the pondcrete fell short of the direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based required for him to qualify as an original source; and (4) the government's intervention did not provide an independent basis of jurisdiction with respect to the relator. In a 2008 case, ''[[Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders]]'', the [[Supreme Court of the United States|United States Supreme Court]] considered whether a false claim had to be presented directly to the Federal government, or if it merely needed to be paid with government money, such as a false claim by a [[subcontractor]] to a prime contractor. The Court found that the claim need not be presented directly to the government, but that the false statement must be made with the intention that it will be relied upon by the government in paying, or approving payment of, a claim.<ref>Opinion of the Court, [https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-214.pdf Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210411042710/https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-214.pdf |date=2021-04-11 }}, 553 U. S. __ (2008), part II(C).</ref> The [[Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009]] reversed the Court's decision and made the types of fraud to which the False Claims Act applies more explicit.<ref>{{cite web | title = Senate Report 111-10, part III | quote = This section amends the FCA to clarify and correct erroneous interpretations of the law that were decided in ''Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders'', 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008), and ''United States ex. rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp'', 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004). | author = Senate Judiciary Committee | date = March 23, 2009 | access-date = 2009-05-26 | url = http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp111&sid=cp11123vD4&refer=&r_n=sr010.111&item=&sel=TOC_17601& | archive-url = https://archive.today/20120714143149/http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp111&sid=cp11123vD4&refer=&r_n=sr010.111&item=&sel=TOC_17601& | url-status = dead | archive-date = July 14, 2012 }}</ref> In a 2009 case, ''[[United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York]]'',<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/08pdf/08-660.pdf |title=Supreme Court Of The United States. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, New York, et al. Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals for the Second Circuit No. 08–660. Argued April 21, 2009. Decided June 8, 2009. |access-date=June 27, 2017 |archive-date=February 2, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170202151403/https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/08pdf/08-660.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> the [[Supreme Court of the United States|United States Supreme Court]] considered whether, when the government declines to intervene or otherwise actively participate in a ''qui tam'' action under the False Claims Act, the United States is a "party" to the suit for purposes of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) (which requires that a notice of appeal in a federal civil action generally be filed within 30 days after entry of a judgment or order from which the appeal is taken). The Court held that when the United States has declined to intervene in a privately initiated FCA action, it is not a "party" for FRAP 4 purposes, and therefore, petitioner's appeal filed after 30 days was untimely. In a 2016 case, ''[[Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar]]'',<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-7_a074.pdf |title=Supreme Court Of The United States. Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar. Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals for the First Circuit No. 15–7. Argued April 19, 2016. Decided June 16, 2016 |access-date=October 12, 2017 |archive-date=May 2, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210502142246/https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-7_a074.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> the [[Supreme Court of the United States|United States Supreme Court]] sought to clarify the standard for materiality under the FCA. The court unanimously upheld the implied certification theory of FCA liability and strengthened the FCA's materiality requirement. In a 2023 combined case, ''[[wikisource:U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu|United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc.]]'' and ''United States ex rel. Proctor v. Safeway'', a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court opinion rejected an attempt to dilute the FCA's "knowledge standard."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Elberg |first=Jacob |date=June 1, 2023 |title=Supreme Court maintains focus on defendant's subjective beliefs in False Claims Act cases |url=https://www.scotusblog.com/2023/06/supreme-court-maintains-focus-on-defendants-subjective-beliefs-in-false-claims-act-cases/ |work=SCOTUS Blog}}</ref> Under the knowledge standard, a defendant is liable under the FCA if a false claim is "knowingly" submitted to the government for payment. The statute defines "knowingly" as acting with actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Palvia |first=Tanisha |date=July 6, 2023 |title=SCOTUS clarifies intent requirement for False Claims Act cases |url=https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/scotus-clarifies-intent-requirement-false-claims-act-cases-2023-07-06/ |work=Reuters}}</ref> The unanimous opinion found that a defendant is liable if it submits a false claim to the government based on its own knowledge and subjective beliefs — not what an objectively reasonable person may have thought. In a 2024 case, ''[[Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC]], et al.'' 601 U. S. 23 (2024), a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court endorsed a lower burden of proof for whistleblowers, holding that whistleblowers do not need to prove that an employer acted with "retaliatory intent" in order to be protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Supreme Court found that a whistleblower needs only to prove that their actions in making a whistleblower complaint were a "contributing factor" in the employer's unfavorable action.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Hughes |first=Melissa |date=February 15, 2024 |title=U.S. Supreme Court Endorses Low Burden of Proof for Whistleblowers |url=https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-supreme-court-endorses-low-burden-proof-whistleblowers |work=National Law Review}}</ref> The unanimous opinion found that liability hinges on a defendant's “knowledge and subjective beliefs” — not what an objective, reasonable person would have thought — at the time they submitted their claims to the government.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Palvia |first=Tanisha |date=June 6, 2023 |title=SCOTUS clarifies intent requirement for False Claims Act cases |url=https://reuters.com/legal/litigation/scotus-clarifies-intent-requirement-false-claims-act-cases-2023-07-06/ |work=Reuters}}</ref>
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