Editing Epicureanism (section)

====Pleasure====
{{blockquote|When we say ... that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not by an unbroken succession of drinking bouts and of revelry, not by sexual lust, nor the enjoyment of fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.|Epicurus|''"Letter to Menoeceus"''<ref name="ReferenceA">Epicurus, "Letter to Menoeceus", contained in Diogenes Laertius, ''Lives of Eminent Philosophers'', Book X</ref>}}
Epicureans had a very specific understanding of what the greatest pleasure was, and the focus of their ethics was on the avoidance of pain rather than seeking out pleasure.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010l" /> As evidence for this, Epicureans say that nature seems to command us to avoid pain, and they point out that all animals try to avoid pain as much as possible.<ref>{{harvnb|Wilson|2015|p=93}}</ref> Epicureanism divided pleasure into two broad categories: ''pleasures of the body'' and ''pleasures of the mind''.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010l">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=117–121}}</ref> ''Pleasures of the body'' involve sensations of the body, such as the act of eating delicious food or of being in a state of comfort free from pain, and exist only in the present.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010l" /> One can only experience pleasures of the body in the moment, meaning they only exist as a person is experiencing them.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010f">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=118–119}}</ref> ''Pleasures of the mind'' involve mental processes and states; feelings of joy, the lack of fear, and pleasant memories are all examples of pleasures of the mind.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010l" /> These pleasures of the mind do not only exist in the present, but also in the past and future, since memory of a past pleasant experience or the expectation of some potentially pleasing future can both be pleasurable experiences.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010f" /> Because of this, the pleasures of the mind are considered to be greater than those of the body.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010f" />

Emphasis was placed on pleasures of the mind rather than on physical pleasures.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010c">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=107–115}}</ref> The Epicureans further divided each of these types of pleasures into two categories: ''kinetic pleasure'' and ''katastematic pleasure''.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010b">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=119–120}}</ref><ref>Konstan, David, "Epicurus", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/epicurus/</ref><ref>J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor. Katastematic and Kinetic Pleasures, in The Greeks On Pleasure. Eds. J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor. Clarendon Press, 1982</ref> Absence of pain, [[aponia]], and lack of disturbance of mind, [[ataraxia]], are two of the katastematic pleasures and often seen as the focal ones to [[Epicurus]].<ref>Cicero, De Fin i 37-38</ref><ref>{{cite journal |first=Clay |last=Splawn |title=Updating Epicurus's Concept of ''Katastematic'' Pleasure |journal=Journal of Value Inquiry |year=2002 |volume=36 |issue=4 |page=473 |doi=10.1023/A:1021997823870|s2cid=146146475 }}</ref> ''Kinetic pleasure'' is the physical or mental pleasures that involve action or change.<ref name="Sharples-1996a">{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|pages=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n104 91]–92}}</ref> Eating delicious food, as well as fulfilling desires and removing pain, which is itself considered a pleasurable act, are all examples of kinetic pleasure in the physical sense.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010b" /><ref name="Warren-2002">{{Cite book|title=Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia|last=Warren|first=James|publisher=University of Cambridge|year=2002|location=New York, NY|page=4}}</ref> According to Epicurus, feelings of joy would be an example of mental kinetic pleasure.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010b" /> ''Katastematic pleasure'' is the pleasure one feels while in a state without pain.<ref name="Warren-2002" /> Like kinetic pleasures, katastematic pleasures can also be physical, such as the state of not being thirsty, or mental, such as freedom from a state of fear.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010b" /><ref name="Sharples-1996a" />

While the pursuit of pleasure formed the focal point of the philosophy, this was largely directed to the "static pleasures" of minimizing pain, anxiety and suffering. From this understanding, Epicureans concluded that the greatest pleasure a person could reach was the complete removal of all pain, both physical and mental.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010n">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|page=120}}</ref> The ultimate goal then of Epicurean ethics was to reach a state of ''aponia'' and ''ataraxia''.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010n" />