Editing Environmental ethics (section)

=== Consequentialism ===
[[Consequentialism|Consequentialist]] theories focus on the consequences of actions, this emphasizes not what is 'right', but rather what is of 'value' and 'good'. [[Act utilitarianism|Act Utilitarianism]], for example, expands this formulation to emphasize that what makes an action right is whether it maximises well-being and reduces pain. Thus, actions that result in greater well-being are considered obligatory and permissible. It has been noted that this is an 'instrumentalist' position towards the environment, and as such not fully adequate to the delicate demands of ecological diversity.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Hiller|first=Avram|editor1-first=Stephen M|editor1-last=Gardiner|editor2-first=Allen|editor2-last=Thompson|date=2017-01-26|title=Consequentialism in Ethics|url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199941339.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199941339-e-18|access-date=2021-03-14|website=The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics|pages=199–200|language=en|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199941339.013.18|isbn=978-0-19-994133-9}}</ref>[[Rule utilitarianism|Rule-utilitarianism]] is the view that following certain rules without exception is the surest way to bring about the best consequences. This is an important update to act-utilitarianism because agents do not need to judge about the likely consequences of each act; all they must do is determine whether or not a proposed course of action falls under a specific rule and, if it does, act as the rule specifies.

[[Aldo Leopold]]'s ''Land Ethic'' (1949) tries to avoid this type of instrumentalism by proposing a more holistic approach to the relationship between humans and their 'biotic community',<ref name=":0" /> so to create a 'limit' based on the maxim that "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it tends otherwise."<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Leopold|first=Aldo|title=A Sand County Almanac|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1949|location=New York|pages=224–225}}</ref> Thus, the use of natural resources is permissible as long as it does not disrupt the stability of the ecosystem. Some philosophers have categorised Leopold's views to be within a consequentialist framework, however it is disputed whether this was intentional.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Hiller|first=Avram|url=http://oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199941339.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199941339-e-18|title=Consequentialism in Environmental Ethics|date=2016-02-11|publisher=Oxford University Press|editor-last=Gardiner|editor-first=Stephen M.|volume=1|pages=202|language=en|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199941339.013.18|isbn=978-0-19-994133-9|editor-last2=Thompson|editor-first2=Allen}}</ref> Other consequentialist views such as that of [[Peter Singer]] tend to emphasis the inclusion of non-human sentient beings into ethical considerations. This view argues that all sentient creates which are by nature able to feel pleasure and pain, are of equal moral consideration for their intrinsic value. Nevertheless, non-sentient beings, such as plants, rivers and ecosystems, are considered to be merely instrumental.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Singer, Peter|url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/773539930|title=Practical ethics|date=2011|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-04150-8|oclc=773539930}}</ref>