Editing Egoism (section)

== Relation to altruism ==
In 1851, French philosopher [[Auguste Comte]] coined the term [[altruism]] ({{langx|fr|[[wikt:altruisme|altruisme]]}}; {{etymology|it|altrui}}, {{etymology|la|alteri|others}}) as an [[antonym]] for egoism.<ref name=":4">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Altruism |encyclopedia=The Catholic Encyclopedia |first=Timothy |last=Brosnahan |year=1907 |via=New Advent |access-date=August 19, 2020 |url=http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01369a.htm }}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Altriusm (ethics) |encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/altruism-ethics}}</ref> In this sense, altruism defined Comte's position that all self-regard must be replaced with only the regard for others.<ref name=":4" />

While [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] does not view altruism as a suitable antonym for egoism,<ref>Nietzsche, Friedrich. KSA. 9:11[7]</ref> Comte instead states that only two human motivations exist, egoistic and altruistic, and that the two cannot be mediated; that is, one must always predominate the other. For Comte, the total subordination of the self to altruism is a necessary condition to both social and personal benefit.<ref name=":4" /> Nietzsche, rather than rejecting the practice of altruism, warns that despite there being neither much altruism nor equality in the world, there is almost universal endorsement of their value and, notoriously, even by those who are its worst enemies in practice.<ref name=":3" /> Egoist philosophy commonly views the subordination of the self to altruism as either a form of domination that limits freedom, an unethical or irrational principle, or an extension of some egoistic root cause.<ref name=":1" />

In evolutionary theory, [[biological altruism]] is the observed occurrence of an organism acting to the benefit of others at the cost of its own [[reproductive fitness]]. While biological egoism does grant that an organism may act to the benefit of others, it describes only such when in accordance with reproductive self-interest. [[Kin altruism]] and [[selfish gene theory]] are examples of this division.<ref name=":8" /><ref name=":14">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Biological Altruism |first=Samir |last=Okasha |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |year=2020 |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-last=Zalta |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/altruism-biological/}}</ref> On biological altruism, the ''[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]'' states: "Contrary to what is often thought, an evolutionary approach to human behaviour does not imply that humans are likely to be motivated by self-interest alone. One strategy by which ‘selfish genes’ may increase their future representation is by causing humans to be ''non''-selfish, in the psychological sense."<ref name=":14"/> This is a central topic within contemporary discourse of psychological egoism.<ref name=":2" />

Philosophies of [[personal identity]] such as [[open individualism]] have implications for egoism and altruism. [[Daniel Kolak]] argues that closed individualism, the idea that one's identity consists of a line stretching across time and that a [[future self]] exists, is incoherent.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kolak |first=Daniel |url=https://digitalphysics.ru/pdf/Kaminskii_A_V/Kolak_I_Am_You.pdf |title=I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics |date=2007-11-03 |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-1-4020-3014-7 |language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240906163443/https://digitalphysics.ru/pdf/Kaminskii_A_V/Kolak_I_Am_You.pdf |archive-date=2024-09-06 |url-status=live}}</ref> Kolak instead argues that personal identity is an illusion, and the "self" doesn't actually exist, similar to the idea of [[anattā]] in Buddhist philosophy. Thus, it could be argued that egoism is incoherent, since there is no "self" in the first place. Similar arguments have been made by [[Derek Parfit]] in the book ''[[Reasons and Persons]]''<ref>{{Cite book |last=Parfit |first=Derek |url=https://archive.org/details/trent_0116300637661/page/n5/mode/2up |title=Reasons and persons |date=1984 |isbn=0-19-824615-3 |location=Oxford [Oxfordshire] |oclc=9827659}}</ref> with ideas such as the [[teletransportation paradox]].