Editing Dirty bomb (section)

== Detection and prevention ==
Dirty bombs may be prevented by detecting illicit radioactive materials in shipping with tools such as a [[Radiation Portal Monitor]].<ref name=":2">{{Cite book|title=United States Customs and Border Protection's Radiation Portal Monitors at Seaports|last=Richards|first=Anne|publisher=Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General|year=2013}}</ref> Similarly, unshielded radioactive materials may be detected at checkpoints by [[Geiger counter]]s, gamma-ray detectors, and even Customs and Border Patrol (CBS) pager-sized radiation detectors.<ref name=":12"/> Hidden materials may also be detected by x-ray inspection and heat emitted may be picked up by infrared detectors. Such devices, however, may be circumvented by simply transporting materials across unguarded stretches of coastline or other barren border areas.<ref name=":12" />

One proposed method for detecting shielded Dirty Bombs is Nanosecond Neutron Analysis (NNA).<ref name=":3">{{Cite book|title=Prevention, detection and response to nuclear and radiological threats|last1=Samuel.|first1=Apikyan|last2=J.|first2=Diamond, David|last3=Ralph.|first3=Way|last4=Organization.|first4=North Atlantic Treaty|date=2008-01-01|publisher=Springer|isbn=9781402066573|oclc=171556526}}</ref> Designed originally for the detection of explosives and hazardous chemicals, NNA is also applicable to fissile materials. NNA determines what chemicals are present in an investigated device by analyzing emitted γ-emission neutrons and α-particles created from a reaction in the neutron generator. The system records the temporal and spatial displacement of the neutrons and α-particles within separate 3D regions.<ref name=":3" /> A prototype dirty-bomb detection device created with NNA is demonstrated to be able to detect uranium from behind a 5&nbsp;cm-thick lead wall.<ref name=":3" /> Other radioactive material detectors include Radiation Assessment and Identification (RAID) and Sensor for Measurement and Analysis of Radiation Transients, both developed by Sandia National Laboratories.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Brown|first=Chad|date=February 2006|title=Transcendental Terrorism And Dirty Bombs: Radiological Weapons Threat Revisited|journal=Occasional Paper: Center for Strategy and Technology|volume=54|pages=24–27}}</ref> [[Sodium iodide]] [[scintillator]] based aerial radiation detection systems are capable to detect [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) defined dangerous quantities of radioactive material <ref name="gtd">{{cite arXiv |last=Ritter |first=Sebastian |eprint=2111.07756 |title=Detection Limits of NaI Scintillator Detector Based Aerial Source Detection Systems |class=physics.ins-det |date= 2021}}</ref> and have been deployed by the [[New York City Police Department]] (NYPD) [[Counterterrorism]] Bureau.<ref name="gtn">{{cite web |url=https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/secret-nypd-plane-radioactive-material-exclusive-ride-investigation/296190/ |title=I-Team: Inside the NYPD's New Radiation-Detecting Plane |last1=Dienst |first1=Jonathan |last2=Paredes|first2=David |last3=Strich|first3=Emily| publisher=NBC 4 New York |date=October 6, 2017 |website=NBC New York |access-date=December 3, 2021}}</ref>

The IAEA recommends certain devices be used in tandem at country borders to prevent transfer of radioactive materials, and thus the building of dirty bombs.<ref name=":5">{{Cite book|title=Detection of radioactive materials at borders|last=atomique.|first=Agence internationale de l'énergie|date=2002-01-01|publisher=IAEA|isbn=9201161026|oclc=856404390}}</ref> They define the four main goals of radiation detection instruments as detection, verification, assessment and localization, and identification as a means to escalate a potential radiological situation. The IAEA also defines the following types of instruments:<ref name=":5" />
* Pocket-Type Instruments: these instruments provide a low-power, mobile option to detection that allows for security officers to passively scan an area for radioactive materials. These devices should be easily worn, should have an alarm threshold of three times normal radiation levels, and should have a long battery life - over 800 hours.
* Handheld Instruments: these instruments may be used to detect all types of radiation (including neutron) and may be used to search specific targets flexibly. These instruments should aim for ease of use and speed, ideally weighing less than 2&nbsp;kg and being able to make measurements in less than a second.
* Fixed, installed instruments: these instruments provide a continuous, automatic detection system that can monitor pedestrians and vehicles that pass through. To work effectively pedestrians and vehicles should be led close to the detectors, as performance is directly related to range.
Legislative and regulatory actions can also be used to prevent access to materials needed to create a dirty bomb. Examples include the 2006 U.S. Dirty Bomb Bill, the Yucca Flats proposal, and the Nunn-Lungar act.<ref name=":4" /> Similarly, close monitoring and restrictions of radioactive materials may provide security for materials in vulnerable private-sector applications, most notably in the medical sector where such materials are used for treatments.<ref name=":02"/> Suggestions for increased security include isolation of materials in remote locations and strict limitation of access.

One way to mitigate a major effect of a radiological weapons may also be to educate the public on the nature of radioactive materials. As one of the major concerns of a dirty bomb is the public panic proper education may prove a viable counter-measure.<ref name=":12" /> Education on radiation is considered by some to be "the most neglected issue related to radiological terrorism".<ref name=":02" />