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==Appraisals== The immediate purpose of the agreement was to freeze the military confrontation and prevent it from resuming. It was therefore defined as a "construction of necessity".<ref>Rory Keane, ''Reconstructing sovereignty. Post-Dayton Bosnia uncovered'', London: Ashgate 2001, p. 61</ref> The Dayton Agreement was aimed at allowing Bosnia and Herzegovina to move from an early post-conflict phase through reconstruction and consolidation, adopting a [[consociationalism|consociational power-sharing]] approach.<ref>{{cite book|first=Sumantra|last=Bose|year=2002|title=Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention|location=Oxford|publisher=Oxford University Press|page=216|isbn=1-85065-585-5}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|title=Consociational Settlements and Reconstruction: Bosnia in Comparative Perspective (1995βPresent)|journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|first=Sherrill|last=Stroschein|year=2014|volume=656|pages=97β115|doi=10.1177/0002716214544459|s2cid=8830183}}</ref> Scholars such as Canadian professor Charles-Philippe David calls Dayton "the most impressive example of conflict resolution".<ref>Charles-Philippe David, "Alice in Wonderland meets Frankenstein: Constructivism, Realism and Peacebuilding in Bosnia", ''Contemporary Security Policy'' 22, No.1, 2001</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=Raphael Israeli|author2=Albert Benabou|title=Savagery in the Heart of Europe: The Bosnian War (1992β1995) Context, Perspectives, Personal Experiences, and Memoirs|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eAV-AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA380|year=2013|page=380|publisher=Strategic Book |isbn=9781628570151}}</ref> American scholar Howard M. Hensel states that "Dayton represents an example of a conflict resolution negotiation that was successful.<ref>{{cite book|author=Howard M. Hensel|title=Sovereignty and the Global Community: The Quest for Order in the International System|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4pxADwAAQBAJ&pg=PT208|year=2017|publisher=Taylor & Francis|page=208|isbn=9781351148702}}</ref> However, Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western write that "As successful as Dayton was at ending the violence, it also sowed the seeds of instability by creating a decentralized political system that undermined the state's authority".<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bosnia-herzegovina/2009-08-17/death-dayton|title=The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia From Falling Apart|first1=Patrice C.|last1=McMahon|first2=Jon|last2=Western|journal=Foreign Affairs|issue=September/October|year=2009|volume=88 }}</ref> [[High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina|High Representative]] [[Wolfgang Petritsch]] argued in 2006 that the Dayton framework has allowed the [[international community]] to move "from statebuilding via institutions and capacity-building to identity building", putting Bosnia and Herzegovina "on the road to [[European Union|Brussels]]".<ref>[[Wolfgang Petritsch]], "My lessons learnt in Bosnia and Herzegovina", Sarajevo, 2006</ref> The Dayton Agreement has been the subject of criticism since its inception, including: * ''A complicated government system'' β As part of the Dayton agreement, Bosnia was divided regionally between two "Entities" within a consociational democracy, which was established to ensure the political representation and power of all sides. This can lead to an unproductive government in that every important issue is deadlocked within the central government as each party is championing opposing priorities that are based on ethnic policies and not shared ideals.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Yourdin|first1=C|title=Society Building in Bosnia: A Critique of Post-Dayton Peacebuilding Efforts'|journal=Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations|date=2003|volume=4|issue=2|pages=59β74}}</ref> * ''Dependency and control of international actors'' β Dayton was very much an international vision, led by the United States who supported an end to the war, but that did not allow Bosnian leaders to negotiate an ending to the war, therefore leaving no incentive in the afterward peacebuilding process and no area for leaders to discuss the underlying root causes of the conflict. International actors also played an extensive role in shaping the postwar agenda in Bosnia. The international community invests millions of dollars in BiH yearly through NGOs. However, this stifles the impact of local actors and the development of civil society. Instead, the international community should invest in local actors, youth activists, and democratization projects.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Chandler|first1=David|title=From Dayton to Europe|journal=International Peacekeeping|date=2005|volume=12|issue=3|pages=336β349|doi=10.1080/13533310500074077|s2cid=144226240}}</ref> The influx of NGOs and international actors to kick start investment in the country post war also failed to kick start the economy, with Bosnia suffering from poor economic growth (2% in 2015). The lack of economic development has been attributed to poor coordination between international actors and lack of consideration for local capacity.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Kell, Kudlenko|first1=S, A|title=Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after Dayton, complexity born of paradoxes|journal=International Peacekeeping|year=2015|volume=22|issue=5|pages=471β489|doi=10.1080/13533312.2015.1103651|s2cid=146390988|url=http://create.canterbury.ac.uk/13993/3/Keil_and_Kudlenko_2015_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_Twenty_Years_after_Dayton.pdf|access-date=19 April 2019|archive-date=29 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201029220017/http://create.canterbury.ac.uk/13993/3/Keil_and_Kudlenko_2015_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_Twenty_Years_after_Dayton.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> * ''Ending the war but not promoting peace'' β The primary aim of Dayton was to stop the war, but the agreement was only meant to be a temporary measure while a long-term plan was developed. The Dayton Agreement was the 35th attempt at a ceasefire following 34 other failed attempts. While Dayton has halted the conflict and there has not been a resurgence of violence, the stability in the conflict does not give an accurate assessment of peace. There is negative peace in BiH, meaning there is no open conflict or violence. However, there is no positive peace, as conditions that eliminate the causes of violence have not been reached. There is still currently an international military presence, [[Operation Althea|EUFOR Althea]], responsible for overseeing compliance with aspects of the Dayton Agreement. The Dayton Agreement provided peace by re-establishing and codifying division. Enforcing such peace can be seen as highlighting the still deep rooted tensions in the country, with Dayton covering the cracks of a fractured society that could be plunged back into conflict as soon as military forces left.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Berdal |first1=M| last2=Collantes-Celador|first2=G|title=Post-War Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina|journal=Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding|pages=75β94}}</ref> *''Consociational Democracy'' β The Dayton Agreement established a consociational democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This means that each group is ensured representation and power. This incentivized the end of the Bosnian War, but first requires collaboration or reconciliation for the government to function. Bosnia and Herzegovina operates with a three-member president role. There is a Croat, Bosniak, and Serb president. Similar quotas and rules apply for the two legislative bodies. *''Entrenching territorialized ethnicity'' - The Agreement was underpinned by a territorialized definition of ethnicity that divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into three constitutive nations and two distinct entities based on ethno-nationalist identities.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Rutar |first1=Sabine |editor1-last=Breuilly |editor1-first=John |title=The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism |date=2013 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford | isbn=978-0-19-876820-3 | page=528 | chapter=Nationalism in Southeastern Europe, 1970-2000}}</ref> According to survey results from a 2020 study, "in each of the three main ethnic groups of Bosnia, more people would have voted for Dayton than against it."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Morgan-Jones|first1=Edward|last2=Stefanovic|first2=Djordje|last3=Loizides|first3=Neophytos|date=2020-10-21|title=Citizen endorsement of contested peace settlements: public opinion in post-Dayton Bosnia|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1828356|journal=Democratization|volume=28|issue=2|pages=434β452|doi=10.1080/13510347.2020.1828356|s2cid=226332147|issn=1351-0347}}</ref>
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