Editing Counterterrorism (section)

==== Military ====
[[File:3RAR Afghanistan patrol Aug 08.jpg|thumb|[[Australian Army]] soldiers under the [[International Security Assistance Force]] interacting with a civilian in [[Tarinkot]], [[Afghanistan]] in 2008 during the [[War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)|War in Afghanistan]], part of the [[war on terror]]]]
Terrorism has often been used to justify [[military intervention]] in countries where terrorists are said to be based. Similar justifications were used for the [[War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)|U.S. invasion of Afghanistan]] and the [[Second Chechen War|second Russian invasion of Chechnya]].

Military intervention has not always been successful in stopping or preventing future terrorism, such as during the [[Malayan Emergency]], the [[Mau Mau uprising]], and most of the campaigns against the [[Irish Republican Army|IRA]] during the [[Irish Civil War]], the [[S-Plan]], the [[Border campaign (Irish Republican Army)|Border Campaign]], and [[the Troubles]] in Northern Ireland. Although military action can temporarily disrupt a terrorist group's operations temporarily, it sometimes does not end the threat completely.<ref>{{cite book
 | author = Pape, Robert A.
 | year = 2005
 | title = Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism
 | publisher = Random House
 | pages = 237–250
}}</ref>

Repression by the military in itself usually leads to short term victories, but tend to be unsuccessful in the long run (e.g., the French doctrine used in colonial [[Mainland Southeast Asia|Indochina]] and [[Algeria]]<ref name="Trinquier">{{cite web
 |url         = http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp
 |title       = Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency
 |first       = Roger
 |last        = Trinquier
 |year        = 1961
 |quote       = 1964 English translation by Daniel Lee with an Introduction by Bernard B. Fall
 |url-status     = dead
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20080112132017/http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp
 |archive-date = January 12, 2008
 |df          = mdy-all
}}</ref>), particularly if it is not accompanied by other measures. However, new methods such as those taken in [[Iraq]] have yet to be seen as beneficial or ineffectual.<ref name="FM3-24">{{cite journal | publisher = US Department of the Army | first1 = John A. | last1 = Nagl | first2 = David H.| last2 = Petraeus | first3 = James F. | last3 =Amos |first4 = Sarah | last4 = Sewall
  | title = Field Manual 3–24 Counterinsurgency
  | quote = While military manuals rarely show individual authors, [[David Petraeus]] is widely described as establishing many of this volume's concepts.
  | date = December 2006
  | url = https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf
  | access-date = February 3, 2008 }}</ref>