Editing Consciousness (section)

===Types===
[[Ned Block]] argues that discussions on consciousness have often failed properly to distinguish ''phenomenal consciousness'' from ''access consciousness''. The terms had been used before Block used them, but he adopted the short forms P-consciousness and A-consciousness.<ref name=block>{{cite book|title=The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates|editor=N. Block|editor2=O. Flanagan|editor3=G. Guzeldere|chapter=On a confusion about a function of consciousness|author=Ned Block|pages=375–415|year=1998|isbn=978-0-262-52210-6|publisher=MIT Press|chapter-url=http://cogprints.org/231/1/199712004.html|author-link=Ned Block|access-date=2011-09-10|archive-date=2011-11-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111103034117/http://cogprints.org/231/1/199712004.html|url-status=live}} Pages 230 and 231 in [https://www.nedblock.us/papers/1995_Function.pdf the version on the author's own website].</ref> According to Block:
* P-consciousness is raw experience: it is moving, colored forms, sounds, sensations, emotions and feelings with our bodies and responses at the center. These experiences, considered independently of any impact on behavior, are called [[qualia]].
* A-consciousness is the phenomenon whereby information in our minds is accessible for verbal report, reasoning, and the control of behavior. So, when we [[perception|perceive]], information about what we perceive is access conscious; when we [[introspection|introspect]], information about our thoughts is access conscious; when we [[memory|remember]], information about the past is access conscious, and so on.
Block adds that P-consciousness does not allow of easy definition: he admits that he "cannot define P-consciousness in any remotely [[circular definition|noncircular]] way.<ref name=block />

Although some philosophers, such as [[Daniel Dennett]], have disputed the validity of this distinction,<ref name="D375">{{cite book|author=Daniel Dennett|year=2004|title=Consciousness Explained|page=375|publisher=Penguin|isbn=978-0-7139-9037-9|title-link=Consciousness Explained|author-link=Daniel Dennett}}</ref> others have broadly accepted it. [[David Chalmers]] has argued that A-consciousness can in principle be understood in mechanistic terms, but that understanding P-consciousness is much more challenging: he calls this the [[hard problem of consciousness]].<ref name=ChalmersHardProblem>{{cite journal|url=http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html|title=Facing up to the problem of consciousness|author=David Chalmers|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|volume=2|year=1995|pages=200–219|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050308163649/http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html|archive-date=2005-03-08|author-link=David Chalmers}}</ref>

Some philosophers believe that Block's two types of consciousness are not the end of the story. [[William Lycan]], for example, argued in his book ''Consciousness and Experience'' that at least eight clearly distinct types of consciousness can be identified (organism consciousness; control consciousness; consciousness ''of''; state/event consciousness; reportability; introspective consciousness; subjective consciousness; self-consciousness)—and that even this list omits several more obscure forms.<ref>{{cite book|author=William Lycan|title=Consciousness and Experience|pages=1–4|year=1996|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0-262-12197-2|author-link=William Lycan}}</ref>

There is also debate over whether or not A-consciousness and P-consciousness always coexist or if they can exist separately. Although P-consciousness without A-consciousness is more widely accepted, there have been some hypothetical examples of A without P. Block, for instance, suggests the case of a "[[Philosophical zombie|zombie]]" that is computationally identical to a person but without any subjectivity. However, he remains somewhat skeptical concluding "I don't know whether there are any actual cases of A-consciousness without P-consciousness, but I hope I have illustrated their conceptual possibility".<ref>{{cite journal|last= Block|first=Ned|year = 1995|title = How many concepts of consciousness?|url = https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6174/aff557977a75c5d76463871180f8d1befbbc.pdf|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200210172202/https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6174/aff557977a75c5d76463871180f8d1befbbc.pdf|url-status = dead|archive-date = 2020-02-10|journal = Behavioral and Brain Sciences|volume = 18|issue = 2| pages = 272–284|doi=10.1017/s0140525x00038486| s2cid = 41023484}}</ref>