Editing Civil war (section)

=== Other causes ===

==== Bargaining problems ====
In a state torn by civil war, the contesting powers often do not have the ability to commit or the trust to believe in the other side's commitment to put an end to war.<ref>Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2005. "Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth". ''Handbook of Economic Growth'' 1: 385–472.</ref> When considering a peace agreement, the involved parties are aware of the high incentives to withdraw once one of them has taken an action that weakens their military, political or economical power. Commitment problems may deter a lasting peace agreement as the powers in question are aware that neither of them is able to commit to their end of the bargain in the future.<ref>Mattes, M., & Savun, B. (2009). "[https://www.jstor.org/stable/27735119 Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180908093107/https://www.jstor.org/stable/27735119 |date=2018-09-08 }}". ''International Studies Quarterly'' ''53''(3), 737–759.</ref> States are often unable to escape [[conflict trap]]s (recurring civil war conflicts) due to the lack of strong political and legal institutions that motivate bargaining, settle disputes, and enforce peace settlements.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Walter|first=Barbara F.|s2cid=154632359|date=2015-10-01|title=Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|language=en|volume=59|issue=7|pages=1242–1272|doi=10.1177/0022002714528006|issn=0022-0027}}</ref>

==== Governance ====
Political scientist [[Barbara F. Walter]] suggests that most contemporary civil wars are actually repeats of earlier civil wars that often arise when leaders are not accountable to the public, when there is poor public participation in politics, and when there is a lack of transparency of information between the executives and the public. Walter argues that when these issues are properly reversed, they act as political and legal restraints on executive power forcing the established government to better serve the people. Additionally, these political and legal restraints create a standardized avenue to influence government and increase the commitment credibility of established peace treaties. It is the strength of a nation's institutionalization and good governance—not the presence of democracy nor the poverty level—that is the number one indicator of the chance of a repeat civil war, according to Walter.<ref name=":1" />

==== Military advantage ====
[[File:Battle of Siping01.jpg|thumb|right|[[Chinese Communist Party|Communist]] soldiers during the [[Battle of Siping]], [[Chinese Civil War]], 1946]]
High levels of population dispersion and, to a lesser extent, the presence of mountainous terrain, increased the chance of conflict. Both of these factors favor rebels, as a population dispersed outward toward the borders is harder to control than one concentrated in a central region, while mountains offer terrain where rebels can seek sanctuary.<ref name=cs16/> Rough terrain was highlighted as one of the more important factors in a 2006 systematic review.<ref name="Hanania" />

==== Population size ====
The various factors contributing to the risk of civil war rise increase with population size. The risk of a civil war rises approximately proportionately with the size of a country's population.<ref name=cs17/>

====Poverty====
There is a correlation between [[poverty]] and civil war, but the causality (which causes the other) is unclear.<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-015628|doi-access=free|title=Complicit States and the Governing Strategy of Privilege Violence: When Weakness is Not the Problem|year=2018|last1=Kleinfeld|first1=Rachel|last2=Barham|first2=Elena|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=21|pages=215–238}}</ref> Some studies have found that in regions with lower income per capita, the likelihood of civil war is greater. Economists [[Simeon Djankov]] and Marta Reynal-Querol argue that the correlation is spurious, and that lower income and heightened conflict are instead products of other phenomena.<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1162/REST_a_00046|title=Poverty and Civil War: Revisiting the Evidence|year=2010|last1=Djankov|first1=Simeon|last2=Reynal-Querol|first2=Marta|s2cid=18168622|journal=Review of Economics and Statistics|volume=92|issue=4|pages=1035–1041}}</ref> In contrast, a study by Alex Braithwaite and colleagues showed systematic evidence of "a causal arrow running from poverty to conflict".<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1177/0738894214559673|title=Does poverty cause conflict? Isolating the causal origins of the conflict trap|year=2016|last1=Braithwaite|first1=Alex|last2=Dasandi|first2=Niheer|last3=Hudson|first3=David|s2cid=3460450|journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=33|pages=45–66|url=http://pure-oai.bham.ac.uk/ws/files/39344118/Poverty_Conflict_CMPS_Final.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200310153415/http://pure-oai.bham.ac.uk/ws/files/39344118/Poverty_Conflict_CMPS_Final.pdf |archive-date=2020-03-10 |url-status=live}}</ref>

==== Inequality ====
While there is a supposed negative correlation between absolute [[Welfare spending|welfare levels]] and the probability of civil war outbreak, relative deprivation may actually be a more pertinent possible cause. Historically, higher inequality levels led to higher civil war probability. Since [[Colonialism|colonial rule]] or population size are known to increase civil war risk, also, one may conclude that "the discontent of the colonized, caused by the creation of borders across tribal lines and bad treatment by the colonizers"<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last1=Baten|first1=Joerg|last2=Mumme|first2=Christina|date=2011|title=Does Inequality Lead to Civil Wars? A global long-term study using anthropometric indicators (1816-1999)|journal=European Review of Political Economy|volume=32|pages=56–79|doi=10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.06.007}}</ref> is one important cause of civil conflicts.<ref name=":4" />

==== Time ====
The more time that has elapsed since the last civil war, the less likely it is that a conflict will recur. The study had two possible explanations for this: one opportunity-based and the other grievance-based. The elapsed time may represent the [[depreciation]] of whatever [[Capital (economics)|capital]] the rebellion was fought over and thus increase the opportunity cost of restarting the conflict. Alternatively, elapsed time may represent the gradual process of healing of old hatreds. The study found that the presence of a diaspora substantially reduced the positive effect of time, as the funding from diasporas offsets the depreciation of rebellion-specific capital.<ref name=cs18/>

[[Evolutionary psychologist]] [[Satoshi Kanazawa]] has argued that an important cause of intergroup conflict may be the relative availability of women of reproductive age. He found that [[polygyny]] greatly increased the frequency of civil wars but not interstate wars.<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1017/S0022381608090026 |title=Evolutionary Psychological Foundations of Civil Wars |journal=The Journal of Politics |volume=71 |pages=25–34 |author=Satoshi Kanazawa |year=2009|s2cid=1492307 |author-link=Satoshi Kanazawa }}</ref> Gleditsch et al. did not find a relationship between ethnic groups with polygyny and increased frequency of civil wars but nations having legal [[polygamy]] may have more civil wars. They argued that [[misogyny]] is a better explanation than polygyny. They found that increased [[women's rights]] were associated with fewer civil wars and that legal polygamy had no effect after women's rights were controlled for.<ref>{{Cite journal | last1 = Gleditsch | first1 = K. S. | last2 = Wucherpfennig | first2 = J. | last3 = Hug | first3 = S. | last4 = Reigstad | first4 = K. G. | title = Polygyny or Misogyny? Reexamining the "First Law of Intergroup Conflict" | doi = 10.1017/S0022381610001003 | journal = The Journal of Politics | volume = 73 | pages = 265–270 | year = 2011 | url = http://www.unige.ch/ses/spo/static/simonhug/polygynyandmisogyny_v1.9.pdf | citeseerx = 10.1.1.518.5482 | access-date = 2017-10-24 | archive-date = 2017-09-21 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170921234547/http://www.unige.ch/ses/spo/static/simonhug/polygynyandmisogyny_v1.9.pdf | url-status = live }}</ref>

[[political science|Political scholar]] [[Elisabeth Jean Wood|Elisabeth Wood]] from [[Yale University]] offers yet another rationale for why civilians rebel and/or support civil war. Through her studies of the [[Salvadoran Civil War]], Wood finds that traditional explanations of [[greed and grievance]] are not sufficient to explain the emergence of that insurgent movement.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Wood|first1=Elisabeth Jean|title=Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador|date=2003|publisher=Cambridge Univ. Press|location=Cambridge [u.a.]|isbn=9780521010504|pages=1–16|edition=Reprint.|language=en|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QBAAN3ABKmIC}}</ref> Instead, she argues that "emotional engagements" and "moral commitments" are the main reasons why thousand of civilians, most of them from poor and rural backgrounds, joined or supported the [[Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front]], despite individually facing both high risks and virtually no foreseeable gains. Wood also attributes participation in the civil war to the value that insurgents assigned to changing social relations in [[El Salvador]], an experience she defines as the "pleasure of agency".<ref>{{cite book|last1=Wood|first1=Elisabeth Jean|title=Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador|date=2003|publisher=Cambridge Univ. Press|location=Cambridge [u.a.]|isbn=9780521010504|pages=17–20|edition=Reprint.|language=en|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QBAAN3ABKmIC}}</ref>