Editing Cartel (section)

=== Leniency programmes ===
Leniency programmes were first introduced in 1978 in the US, before being successfully reformed in 1993.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2015-06-25|title=Leniency Program|url=https://www.justice.gov/atr/leniency-program|access-date=2021-04-26|website=www.justice.gov|language=en}}</ref> The underlying principle of a leniency program is to offer discretionary penalty reductions for corporations or individuals who are affiliated with cartel operations, in exchange for their cooperation with enforcement authorities in helping to identify and penalise other participating members. According to the Australian Department of Justice, the following 6 conditions must be met for admission into a leniency program:

# The corporation is the first one to come forward and qualify for leniency with respect to the illegal activity being reported;
# The Division, at the time the corporation comes in, does not yet have evidence against the company that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction;
# The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported, took prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity;
# The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full, continuing and complete cooperation that advances the Division in its investigation;
# The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to isolated confessions of individual executives or officials;
# Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and
# The Division determines that granting leniency would not be unfair to others, considering the nature of the illegal activity, the confessing corporation's role in it, and when the corporation comes forward.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Martyniszyn|first=Marek|date=2017|title=Foreign State's Entanglement in Anticompetitive Conduct|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3116910|language=en|location=Rochester, NY|ssrn=3116910}}</ref>

The application of leniency programme penalties varies according to individual countries policies and are proportional to cartel profits and years of infringement. However, typically the first corporation or individual to cooperate will receive the most reduced penalty in comparison to those who come forward later.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Commission|first=Australian Competition and Consumer|date=2019-09-04|title=ACCC immunity & cooperation policy for cartel conduct - October 2019|url=https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/accc-immunity-cooperation-policy-for-cartel-conduct-october-2019|access-date=2021-04-26|website=Australian Competition and Consumer Commission|language=en}}</ref> The effectiveness of leniency programmes in destabilising and deterring cartels is evidenced by the decreased formation and discovery of cartels in the US since the introduction of the programmes in 1993.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Miller|first=Nathan H.|date=2009|title=Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25592481|journal=The American Economic Review|volume=99|issue=3|pages=750–768|doi=10.1257/aer.99.3.750|jstor=25592481|issn=0002-8282}}</ref> Some prosecuted examples include:

* [[File:The number of cartel discoveries per six-month period in the US.png|thumb|Graph showing the decline in formation and discoveries of cartels in the US following the introduction of leniency programmes in 1993.  Following the introduction, cartel formations and discoveries decreased to all time lows.]][[Lysine price-fixing conspiracy|Lysine]] Cartel: An employee of [[Archer Daniels Midland|Archer Daniels Midland (ADM)]] alerted authorities of the existence of the cartel within the Lysine industry.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Connor|first=John M.|date=1998|title=Lysine: A Case Study in International Price-Fixing|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43663287|journal=Choices|volume=13|issue=3|pages=13–19|jstor=43663287|issn=0886-5558}}</ref>
* Stainless steel: Buyers of the product complained to the [[European Commission|European Commission (EC)]] about price spikes.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Competition - Cartels - Cases - European Commission|url=https://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html|access-date=2021-04-26|website=ec.europa.eu}}</ref>
* Sodium gluconate: Defendants in the lysine case informed authorities of collusive behaviours between corporations in this industry.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Case search - Competition - European Commission|url=https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_36756|access-date=2021-04-26|website=ec.europa.eu}}</ref>