Editing Belief (section)

=== Occurrent and dispositional ===
Having an occurrent belief that the [[Grand Canyon]] is in Arizona involves entertaining the representation associated with this belief{{mdash}}for example, by actively thinking about it. But the great majority of our beliefs are not active most of the time: they are merely dispositional.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> They usually become activated or occurrent when needed or relevant in some way and then fall back into their dispositional state afterwards.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/> For example, the belief that 57 is greater than 14 was probably dispositional to the reader before reading this sentence, has become occurrent while reading it and may soon become dispositional again as the mind focuses elsewhere. The distinction between occurrent and dispositional beliefs is sometimes identified with the distinction between conscious and unconscious beliefs.<ref name="Bartlett">{{cite journal |last1=Bartlett |first1= Gary |title=Occurrent States |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |date=2018 |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=1–17 |doi=10.1080/00455091.2017.1323531 |s2cid=220316213 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BAROS-4 |access-date=3 April 2021 |archive-date=4 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210504181849/https://philpapers.org/rec/BAROS-4 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Frise">{{cite journal |last1=Frise |first1=Matthew |title=Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs |journal=American Philosophical Quarterly |date=2018 |volume=55 |issue=1 |pages=63–79 |doi=10.2307/45128599 |jstor=45128599 |s2cid=149057271 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FRIETP-3 |access-date=3 April 2021 |archive-date=1 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210601042950/https://philpapers.org/rec/FRIETP-3 |url-status=live |doi-access=free }}</ref> But it has been argued that, despite overlapping, the two distinctions do not match. The reason for this is that beliefs can shape one's behaviour and be involved in one's reasoning even if the subject is not conscious of them. Such beliefs are cases of unconscious occurrent mental states.<ref name="Bartlett"/> On this view, being occurrent corresponds to being active, either consciously or unconsciously.<ref name="Frise"/>

A dispositional belief is not the same as a disposition to believe.<ref name="Audi"/> We have various dispositions to believe given the right perceptions; for example, to believe that it is raining given a perception of rain. Without this perception, there is still a disposition to believe but no actual dispositional belief.<ref name="Audi"/> On a dispositionalist conception of belief, there are no occurrent beliefs, since all beliefs are defined in terms of dispositions.<ref name="Schwitzgebel"/>