Editing Battle of Tours (section)

===Preparations and manœuvre===
By all accounts, the invading forces were caught off guard to discover a large force sitting directly in their path to Tours. Charles achieved the total surprise he had hoped for. He then chose not to attack but rather set up a defensive, [[phalanx]]-like formation.<ref name="Hanson"/> According to Arab sources, the Franks drew up in a large square, with hills and trees in their front to impede or break up Muslim cavalry charges.

For one week, the two armies engaged in minor skirmishes while the Umayyads waited for their full strength to arrive. 'Abd-al-Raḥmân, despite being a proven commander, had been outmanœuvred by allowing Charles to concentrate his forces and pick the field of battle. Furthermore, the Umayyads could not judge the size of Charles' army since he had used the forest to conceal his true numbers.

Charles' infantry was his best hope for victory. Seasoned and battle-hardened, most of them had fought under him for years, some as far back as 717. In addition to his army, he also had levies of militia which had not seen significant military use except for gathering food and harassing the Muslim army.

While many historians through the centuries have believed that the Franks were outnumbered at the onset of battle by at least two to one, some sources, such as the Mozarabic Chronicle of 754, contradict that assertion.<ref>{{harvnb|Collins|1989|pages=81,&nbsp;90}}</ref>

Charles correctly assumed that 'Abd-al-Raḥmân would feel compelled to give battle, and move on and try to loot Tours. Neither side wanted to attack. Abd-al-Raḥmân felt he had to sack Tours, which meant he had to go through the Frankish army on the hill in front of him. Charles' decision to stay in the hills proved crucial, as it forced the Umayyad cavalry to charge uphill and through trees, diminishing their effectiveness.

Charles had been preparing for this confrontation since the Battle of Toulouse a decade earlier.<ref name="Hanson" /> Gibbon believes, as do most historians, that Charles had made the best of a bad situation. Though allegedly outnumbered and without any heavy cavalry, he had tough, battle-hardened infantrymen who believed in him implicitly. At a time in the [[Middle Ages]] when permanent armies had been non-existent in Europe, Charles even took out a large loan from the [[Saint Gregory III|Pope]] after convincing him of the impending emergency, to properly train and maintain a full-size army largely composed of professional infantry. Moreover, as Davis points out, these infantrymen were heavily armed.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Davis|first=Paul K.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nv73QlQs9ocC&pg=PA104|title=100 Decisive Battles From Ancient Times to the Present|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2001|isbn=9780195143669|pages=104}}</ref>

Formed into a phalanx formation, they were able to withstand a cavalry charge better than might be expected, especially as Charles had secured the high ground – with trees before him to further impede any cavalry charges. The failure of Arab enemy intelligence extended to the fact that they were unaware of the specific level of reliability that the combat forces that he commanded were in possession of; however he had trained them for a decade. And while he was well aware of the Caliphate's strengths and weaknesses, he was aware they knew nothing about the Franks.

Furthermore, the Franks were dressed for the cold, whereas the Arabs wore very light clothing more suitable for North African winters than European winters.{{Citation needed|date=June 2017}}

The battle eventually became a waiting game in which the Muslims did not want to attack an army that could be numerically superior and wanted the Franks to come out into the open. The Franks formed up in a thick defensive formation and waited for them to charge uphill. The battle finally began on the seventh day, as 'Abd-al-Raḥmân did not want to wait any longer, with winter approaching.