Editing Battle of Navarino (section)

===Strength of the two fleets===
====Allies====
The Allied navies at this time were still deploying essentially the same technology as during the Napoleonic Wars: sailing ships, unarmoured wooden hulls and [[muzzle-loading]] [[smoothbore]] [[cannon]]. The navies, especially the British one, had ignored the new technologies that were to transform them by the 1850s: [[steam propulsion]], [[ironclad|ironclad hulls]], [[rifling|rifled guns]] and [[shell (projectile)|explosive shells]]. All these had been invented by 1827, but their development for naval warfare, let alone introduction, met dogged resistance from senior naval echelons. In the words of one scholar: "The great admirals of the 18th century would have had no difficulty in taking over Codrington's command at short notice."<ref name="Woodhouse 1965 28">Woodhouse (1965) 28</ref>

However, the Royal Navy's warships had seen some improvements. Ships with triple gun-decks such as [[Horatio Nelson|Nelson]]'s famous {{HMS|Victory}} had been phased out. Triple-deckers had been found to be too unstable and difficult to manoeuvre. The standard {{sclass|Canopus|ship of the line|0}} was a double-deck 74–84 ship of the line, based on the successful "[[Seventy-four (ship)|74]]" French design. In addition, gun-calibres had been upgraded. The Napoleonic-era {{sclass|Fame|ship of the line|0}} had been equipped with 32-pounders on the main gun-deck, 18-pounders on the upper deck and 9- and 12-pounders on the super-structures (quarterdeck and forecastle). In contrast, the guns were now all 24- or 32-pounders (plus a couple of massive 68-pounder [[carronades]] on the super-structures). [[Frigates]] were either double-deckers of 50–60 guns (known as large frigates) or single-deckers with 24–44 guns.<ref name="Woodhouse 1965 28"/>

Most of the Allied ships, however, were still veteran Napoleonic-era warhorses (e.g. {{HMS|Albion|1802|6}}). Codrington's only ''Canopus''-class was his flagship, {{HMS|Asia|1824|6}} (launched 1824), although ''Genoa'' (an impounded French "74") was also post-Napoleonic (1816). In the French squadron, Rigny was so appalled by the state of the three ships of the line sent to him that he decided to keep his flag on the ''Sirène'', a modern frigate.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 70</ref>

====Ottomans====
[[File:IbrahimBaja.jpg|thumb|right|[[Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt|Ibrahim Pasha]], the commander of the Egyptian expedition to the Peloponnese. The atrocities committed by his forces against the Greek population made him one of the most reviled figures in Europe.]]Overall at Navarino, the Allies had 22 ships and 1,258 guns against the Ottomans' 78 ships with 2,180 guns (figures exclude smaller boats and fireships).<ref>James (1837) VI. 473–489</ref> But the numbers masked major Allied advantages in ship-types, gun-calibres and crew quality. As a result of these, Allied gun-crews could fire more powerful, more frequent and more accurate cannonades than their Ottoman counterparts.

The Allies had a substantial superiority in front-line combat vessels: 10 ships of the line to the Ottomans' three. This advantage was only partially offset by the Ottomans' seven double-deck frigates against one Allied vessel of this kind. The great majority of the Ottoman–Egyptian fleet were smaller vessels&nbsp;– 58 [[corvettes]] and [[brigs]]&nbsp;– which were of little use against the Allied heavyweights: they had much smaller firepower, and, their decks being lower, could easily be dismasted by raking fire. In addition, the Ottoman–Egyptians mainly deployed smaller-calibre guns than the Allies (often the guns discarded by the Allies when they upgraded their own calibres). Most of the Allied crews had gained extensive combat experience in the Napoleonic Wars, which had only ended 12 years previously, and were service professionals. In contrast, the Ottoman crews only had combat experience against the Greek revolutionary naval forces, which although gallant and effective, bore no resemblance to the navies of the Great Powers. In many cases, Ottoman crews practiced [[impressment]] to fill their ships' complements. Some Ottoman crew were even found, after the battle, to have been shackled at their posts (convicts, Greek prisoners or other involuntary recruits).<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 121</ref>

The Egyptian contingent, the largest and best-equipped of the Ottoman fleet at Navarino, had been trained by a team of French officers, under the overall direction of Capt J-M. Letellier. These officers acted as "shadow-captains" of the large Egyptian vessels, each advising the nominal Egyptian captain. The day before the battle, Rigny persuaded these officers to withdraw from the Egyptian fleet so as to avoid the possibility of fighting against their own navy (they moved to an Austrian brig that was in the bay, ostensibly neutral but in reality providing logistical support for Ottoman operations). Letellier himself was sick and also took no part.<ref name="Woodhouse 1965 108">Woodhouse (1965) 108</ref> This deprived the Egyptians of experienced command.

For the Allies, probably the Ottomans' most dangerous weapon were their [[fireships]]. These had long been deployed to devastating effect by the Greek revolutionaries against the Ottomans, who had learnt how to use them through hard experience.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 22, 117</ref> Fireships were posted on the wings of the Ottoman formation, and could, if effectively deployed, wreak mayhem on Allied boats concentrated in enclosed waters, especially as Allied sailors had no experience of this kind of warfare. The danger was graphically demonstrated in the early phase of the battle, when the French ship of the line ''Scipion'' narrowly escaped being destroyed by a fireship.<ref name="Woodhouse 1965 117-8">Woodhouse (1965) 117–118</ref>

The Ottomans possessed a [[shore battery]] on each side of the main entrance to the bay, in Navarino fort and on the southern tip of Sphacteria island. These could have seriously impeded Allied entry into the bay, but Codrington was clearly confident that the Ottomans would not start a shooting war. (Or, in an alternative interpretation, he hoped that they would, to give him an excuse to destroy the Ottoman fleet.)